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SITES OF ACTION.  
AN INVESTIGATION OF PERFORMATIVE PAINTING AND SPECTATORSHIP 
by Kate Hawkins 
This practice-based research sets out to explore modes of address and spectatorship in relation to 
contemporary  painting.  Taking  as  its  point  of  departure  Michael  Fried’s  Absorption  and 
Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980), I question whether painting can 
be performative without becoming theatrical and what this means for spectatorship specifically.  
Throughout, I aim to establish the contemporary conditions required for painting to firstly be 
sincere (non-theatrical) and secondly to ‘activate’ the spectator (as well as itself) and thus become 
‘performative’. In this way something gets done  (J.L.Austin) as opposed to just being described 
and  a  reality  is  changed.  I  have  undertaken  detailed  research  into  ‘theatricality’  and 
‘performativity’ as concepts, the latter possessing the potential to give power to the artwork and 
viewer simultaneously, thus enabling both the artwork and spectator to be at once ‘activated’. 
This sits in opposition to traditionally passive object/subject models of spectatorship. I utilise 
ideas of ‘action’ throughout the process of my research. The action-reflection spiral constitutes a 
large part of my method and I also intend for it to be transparent in the outcome of the research 
i.e the artworks and their consequent agency. 
Chapter one focuses on theatricality with particular emphasis on Michael Fried’s book Absorption 
and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980), which is used to scaffold the 
structure  of  my  argument.  I  break  down  his  argument  into  three  key  terms:  ‘absorption’, 
‘theatricality’ and ‘tableau’ and discuss them in relation to the paintings, collages and assemblages 
in my 2011 show titled My Brother is a Hairy Man. Chapter Two involves a discussion of my 
second 2012 exhibition titled, The King of Hearts Has No Moustache, in relation to performativity 
(Dorothea von Hantlemann) and networks (David Joselit) within gallery contexts. I unpack this 
discussion of performativity through the individual discussion of the two exhibition spaces (the 
front room and back room). In Chapter Three I focus predominantly on spectatorship’s potential 
for performativity with particular focus on Alfred Gell’s anthropological theory of art. I consider 
this  theory  of  social  agency  in  relation  to  my  2013  exhibition  Escape  The  Esplanade w h i c h  
addressed the dichotomy between the spectacle and the spectator, reversing the traditional roles 
in the process. 
Through a renegotiation and expansion of the term tableau I conclude a framework was put in 
place  from  which  the  spectator  could  be  ‘absorbed’  and  activated  in  larger  exhibition 
environments. In addition, networked displays of painting, engendered collective sociability and 
many-to-one (as opposed to one-to-one) performatives, as was demonstrated by the installation of 
the back room of the second exhibition. This more ‘plural’ performativity ultimately resulted in 
more ‘activated’ spectators. Finally through an inversion of traditional modes of address in Escape 
the Esplanade the spectator simultaneously became the spectacle and the artworks spectators. In 
this way painting, and spectatorship became performative whilst evading theatricality.  
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0. INTRODUCTION 
 
0.1 – Research Question 
 
Can painting be performative without becoming theatrical in Micheal Fried’s terms? What does 
this mean for spectatorship specifically? 
 
0.2  – H i s t o r y  a n d  c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  terminology  ‘Theatricality’  and 
‘Performativity’ 
 
The practice-based research presented here proposes new ways of conceptualising performativity 
in relation to theatricality, with specific focus on their relationship to spectatorship. My working 
hypothesis  centred  on  the  theory  that  theatrical  artworks  promote  shallow  reception  and/or 
shallow reception favours theatrical works of art. This is further expounded in the supposition 
that  painting  has  the  capacity  to  retain  the  spectator’s  attention  for  longer  durations  if  it  is 
‘performative’ rather than ‘theatrical’. Below I will outline a working definition of theatricality. 
Firstly I will define the term theatricality more broadly and then I will move on to a definition of 
theatricality in line with the writings of Michael Fried. A discussion of performativity’s origins 
and meanings will follow this. 
 
0.21.  Theatricality 
 
Michael Fried’s statements on theatricality come from a long discursive tradition in the visual arts 
that makes a distinction between those art works that are deemed to approach an idealised Real 
(non-theatrical) and those judged to be less real, inauthentic, and tending towards simulation 
(theatrical). The basis for this anti-theatrical bias, as Jonas Barish (1981) points out, stems from a 
much earlier Platonic hostility to mimesis, a prejudice that has been re-asserted at various points 
throughout its long history. Shannon Jackson also asks why theatricality is a perpetually avoided 
term while noting ‘the very long presence of prejudice in Western intellectual history – from 
Plato through Rousseau to its twentieth-century instantiations in J.L.Austin, Theodor Adorno, 
Michael Fried and now in critics of relational art ranging from Nicholas Bourriaud to Claire 
Bishop  – w h o  p l a c e  t h e  t h e a t r i c al  on  the  opposite  side  of  whatever  lines  they  are  drawing’ 
(Jackson, 2011: 20). 
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Indeed the seminal performance artist Marina Abramovic does just as Jackson describes in her 
wholehearted,  undiluted  alliance with the Platonic, idealised perspective.  On theatricality she 
says:  
 
To be a performance artist, you have to hate theatre. Theatre is fake: there is a black 
box,  you  pay  for  a  ticket,  and  you  sit  in  the  dark  and  see  somebody  playing 
somebody else's life. The knife is not real, the blood is not real, and the emotions are 
not real. Performance is just the opposite: the knife is real, the blood is real, and the 
emotions are real. It's a very different concept. It's about true reality. (Abromovic, 
2010) 
 
Michael  Fried  (who  I  will  discuss  in  greater  depth  later)  in  Art and  Objecthood al s o  u t i l i s e s 
metaphors  of  theatricality  to  reinforce  the  truth  claims  of  modernist  art.  Theatricality  as  a 
negative value actually helped Fried establish the terms of his argument: ‘theater and theatricality 
are at war today; not simply with modernist painting (or modernist painting and sculpture), but 
with art as such’ (Fried 1998: 163). In addition Glen McGillvray in his in-depth essay on the 
discursive  formation  of  theatricality p o i n t s o u t th a t Ro l a n d B a r th e s i n  h i s  essay  Baudelaire’s 
Theater, like Fried assigned a value to theatricality and theatre, ‘that allow[ed] him to produce a 
discourse founded on an asymmetrical logic based on the opposition of two ideas: an essential 
theatricality versus a “horrifying” theatre’ (McGillvray, 2009: 107). He goes on to unpack what is 
behind these binary oppositional concepts and concludes that for Fried and Barthes it is actually a 
struggle  for  interpretive  domination,  ‘the  logic  of  which  sets  the  terms  within  which  such 
arguments can occur’ (McGillvray, 2009: 107). The same could be said for Abromovic, as along 
with being overtly simplistic, her ‘dramatic’ statement smacks more of a desire to establish her 
own terms of engagement and a corresponding authority in that field.  
 
Post-Derridean, contemporary theoretical discourses on theatricality generally reject the search 
for an ultimate truth or origin and instead adopt a  more affirmative interpretational strategy 
which relies less on the binary oppositions employed by Fried. Josette Féral, for example, writes: 
 
Theatricality is made of this endless play and of these continuous displacements of 
the position of desire, in other words, of the position of the subject in process with 
an imaginary constructive space. (Féral, 1982: 177) 
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Richard Schechner and Victor Turner also perceived theatrical performance to locate itself loosely 
in this realm of ‘endless play’, ‘continuous displacements’ and ‘imaginary constructivist space’ 
signaling an affirmative interpretation. (McGillvray, 2009: 109)  
 
0.22.  Michael Fried’s Theatricality 
 
A  definition  of  theatricality,  for  Fried,  was  never  absolute.  At  no  point  in  Absorption  and 
Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980) or Art and Objecthood (1967) 
does he clearly define his terms. By ‘theatricality’ Fried was simply and broadly referring to the 
confusing of the space between a work of art and the spectator. For him theatricality resulted 
when there was a lack of differentiation between the work of art itself and the experience of 
viewing  it. I n  v i e w  o f  F r i e d  Stephen  Melville  states:  ‘what  theatricality  means  …  must  be 
something like what is left of theater once the drama “itself” has ceased to count or vanished 
altogether.’ (Melville, 2007: 9) i.e. the bare facts of stage, lighting and audience. But we must be 
very careful here not to presuppose that theatrical, as Fried sees it, means theatre-like. It does not.  
 
In his book: Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980), 
Fried analyses the writings of art historian and critic Denis Diderot who first introduced the 
relationship between painting and beholder as a topic for study. Fried argues throughout the 
book, that whenever a consciousness of viewing exists, absorption is sacrificed, and theatricality 
results. As I have mentioned, theatricality for Fried does not mean theatre-like. If a painting is 
theatrical it provokes a certain consciousness of viewing - meaning the spectator is disrupted from 
(optimal) self-transcendence in the act of spectatorship. Therefore Fried regards theatricality in 
negative terms as being disruptive and artificial. In Diderot’s writings on painting he insists that 
the slightest awareness of the beholder means that ‘action is replaced by posing, expression by 
grimace, grace and naivete by mannerism, and the entire painting is infected by falsity.’ (Fried, 
2011: 169) Fried, in support of Diderot, consequently situates ‘theatre’ as antithetical to the idea 
of truth throughout Absorption and Theatricality.  
 
Following on from ideas outlined in Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age 
of Diderot (1980), but written prior to it, Fried’s Art and Objecthood (1967) is probably his most 
notorious diatribe on theatricality in art to date. Here he anticipates his argument on theatricality 
in 18
th century French painting by first talking about theatricality in the context of 20
th century 
American minimalism. This was as much a response to his support of Modernist painting and the  
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critic  Clement  Greenberg  as  it  was  his  opposition  to  Minimalist  Sculpture.  For  Greenberg, 
painting’s spatiality was non-durational and highly circumscribed by the flatness of the canvas – 
that ‘ineluctable flatness of the support that remained most fundamental in the processes  by 
which  pictorial  art  criticized  and  defined  itself  under  Modernism’  (Greenberg,  1960:  756). 
Indeed,  according  to  Shannon  Jackson,  ‘it  was  this  critical  preoccupation  that  underpinned 
Michael Fried’s polemic against what he called “theatricality” in Minimalist art, a theatricality 
that  he associated with  medium impurity, cross-media  mixing,  literality,  and  a  scandalizingly 
explicit audience relationship … For Fried, “theatre” was the degraded term for an encroaching 
intermediality that needed to be avoided and evaded at all costs.’ (Jackson, 2011: 105) Thierry de 
Duve  also  in  reference  to  Fried’s  text  Art  and  Objecthood ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  e m p h a s i s e d  h o w ,  w i t h i n  
Minimalist sculpture the installation was the work thereby encouraging the viewer’s experience to 
stand in for/replace the work itself. By mounting an attack on Minimalist art Fried maintained 
that  it  became  emphatic  about  its  own  materiality  and  thus  stranded  the  viewer  in  his/her 
ordinary, non-transcendental world. Consequently, he argued, it brought about the wrong kind 
of relationship between the work and the beholder. Minimalist or Literalist art, according to 
Fried, was dishonest in the sense that it privileged ‘theatricality’ over ‘presentness’. He termed 
minimalist works ‘literalist’ as a consequence of their material processes and final forms which he 
found ‘too literal’. Fried used the term theatricality in relation to Literalist art to talk about artists 
such  as  Morris,  Judd  and  Smithson  whose  work  referenced  contextual  factors  of  the 
environments in which they were being shown ie. scale, light, the physical configuration of the 
gallery and surface appearance. ‘Minimalist or Literalist work deliberately minimized (no pun 
intended) such relationships in favour of placing as much emphasis as possible between the work 
and  the  viewer’  (Fried,  2011:  4).  The essay inadvertently opened the  door to establishing a 
theoretical basis for Minimalism as a movement based in phenomenological experience (as I will 
discuss in Chapter 2 in relation to Merleau-Ponty). It also provoked a lot of criticism. 
 
Fried brings his theories up-to-date in his recent 2011 book Four Honest Outlaws. In Chapter 
four he describes in detail the Douglas Gordon video Play Dead; Real Time where the Elephant 
Minnie is filmed repeatedly ‘playing dead’ on the Gagosian gallery floor. Fried claims that the 
video,  despite  material  and  contextual  instances  of  to-be-seen-ness  or  radical  facingness
1,  is 
antitheatrical in essence, which he views as positive. Fried makes a good case for Gordon’s Play 
                                                         
1 Fried uses this term in relation to Edouard Manet’s Bar aux Folies-Bergere and other works that acknowledge the eluctable presence 
of the beholder through this strategy.  
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Dead as an anti-theatrical artwork that succeeds in bypassing the minimalist/literalist trope of the 
‘experience’ of the work standing in for the work itself. He also, through this discussion, manages 
to bring the term ‘theatricality’ into  a  more  up-to-date contemporary arena which is helpful 
although in this 2011 selection of texts he discusses the work of four very diverse artists and at 
times his application of theory to the work of these four individual artists seems a little tenuous – 
as a group they have little or nothing in common: they are only linked by the fact that Fried has 
individually taken a liking to them. 
 
I  propose  that  theatricality  for  Fried  can  be  defined  through  an  art  object’s  failure  to 
communicate meaning devoid of the presence of a spectator. Empty of content, Fried explains 
how  the  Minimalists’  ‘installations  infallibly  offered  their  audience  a  kind  of  heightened 
perceptual experience’ (Fried, 1998: 40). Fried perceived this manner of viewing experience ‘too 
easy’-  in  the  next  sentence  he  even  uses  the  word  ‘surefire’.  My  reading  of  Fried  is  that  he 
considered Minimalist works to privilege external relationships, such as the relationship of the 
artwork to the viewer or gallery space, over relationships within the works themselves and as a 
result,  emphasis  tended  towards  their  own  surfaces,  thereby  bringing  about  a  certain 
consciousness and consequent inauthenticity.  
 
My  position  on  Fried’s  writings i s  s o m e w h a t  mixed.  In  clarification  I  am  in  over-arching 
agreement with him that works of art should always aim for authenticity by negating dishonesty.  
However I’m not convinced that the way in which to do this is through privileging relationships 
within the works themselves over and above those of the viewing environment as Fried describes, 
or by privileging medium-specificity over hybrid forms as Jackson outlines. My own practice is 
engaged with both viewing environments and hyb rid form s.  If I was to stringently adhere to 
Fried’s recommendation then strictly it should engage in neither. Personally I’m more interested 
in what painting can ‘do’ rather than ‘say’ or ‘mean’ as Fried prescribes in his accounts of the 
agency of works of art. I sense that the viewing environment might be as significant as the works 
themselves in achieving this. Fried on the other hand believes in a transcendental ‘presentness’. 
He describes how viewers are transported to this mystical plane of ‘presentness’ when the essence 
of a work of art ‘trumps’ the objecthood of its presence. ‘Presentness’ for Fried is a synonym for 
immediacy or ‘instantaneousness’ (Fried, 1967: 167). In order to establish this reading he created 
a dichotomy between the terms ‘presence and presentness’. ‘Presence’ – a term very much in 
vogue during the Sixties, was concrete in its relation to physical,  Minimalist objects whereas 
‘presentness’  represents  something  more  intangible,  other-worldly,  transcendental.  For  Fried  
 
 
 
 
6 
(1967) ‘Presentness’ is tautologically linked with ‘grace’. In the last line of Art and Objecthood he 
writes ‘Presentness is grace’.  I t  i s  a  m anifestation of  transcendence, and  must  be re-enacted 
perpetually: ‘It is this continuous presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of 
itself … a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience the 
work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it.’ (Fried, 1967: 167) Furthermore 
only ‘presentness’ is capable of separating modernist art from its theatrical potential. ‘I want to 
claim that it is by virtue of their presentness and instantaneousness that modernist painting and 
sculpture defeat theatre’. (Fried, 1967: 167) Thus we can see how Fried employs this intangible 
quality of ‘presentness’ that he invests with rescuing art from the ruins of theatricality. ‘For Fried, 
modern art constantly asks the viewer to recognise the sublime power of transcendence, whereas 
“literalist” art only asks for the recognition that it is there, a “presence” in one’s space, but no 
more than an obstacle, merely an object to be negotiated.’ (Winkenweder, 1967) 
 
I don’t agree. In fact I sense that in order for artwork to fully rid itself of theatricality it perhaps 
needs to first both rid itself of this idea of presentness (transcendentalism) as well as moving 
beyond mere presence (literalism) to an arena in which the artwork can ‘act’. Only in doing this 
can  it  begin  to  fulfill  its  potential  for  agency.  This  quest  for  agency  leads  us  directly  to 
performativity and a definition of ‘action’. 
 
Finally it is worth noting the fundamental difference between Fried’s two texts. Absorption and 
Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980) is an art historical text whereas 
Art and Objecthood (1967) is an art critical one. Fried himself explicitly distinguishes between his 
art history and art criticism and says that in the former the use of theatricality is less polemical 
and judgmental than the latter (Fried, 1998: 51) although he does acknowledge that they come 
from the same genealogy. Unsurprisingly it is the more condemnatory art criticism and Art and 
Objecthood (1967) in particular that I find most difficult to negotiate and find agreement with. 
Specifically I think this is related to Fried’s denunciation of Minimalism, which to this day I view 
as a groundbreaking movement in its ability to introduce context into the gallery space – to look 
beyond the work of Art. Indeed context as a concept seems ever more relevant to our present day 
society. I hope I have shown this with regard to my own practice, which I will discuss in Chapters 
1, 2 and 3. Many of Michael Fried’s theories stem from historical discourses such as Diderot’s 
which  in  turn  stem  from  social  circumstances.  For  example  in  18
th  Century  France  Diderot 
‘linked his distaste with “mannered” paintings with what he saw all around him as an ever more 
mannered life. He made clear that his art criticism was informed by the same distinction as that  
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between “a man presenting himself in company and a man acting from motivation, between a 
man who’s alone and a man being observed”’ (Pippin, 2005: 576) This demonstrates how his 
theories on art developed directly from his personal experience of corrupt court culture – his 
experience of society at that time i.e. in 18
th Century France. In this regard they perhaps need 
greater adjustment before being directly applied to contemporary artworks and contexts if indeed 
you  concur  with  them  in  their  original  formations.  As  Diderot’s  theories  sprung  from  and 
acknowledged the society that bred them so surely must Fried’s? However Fried seems stubbornly 
reluctant  to  recognise  the  society  from  within  which  he  writes.  Like  his  beloved  modernist 
paintings he lacks the capacity to look beyond his own borders.  I feel that this is ultimately his 
downfall.  
 
Despite  this  I  believe  Michael  Fried  is  a  hugely  important  art-historical  figure.  Fried’s  great 
achievement is to have shown us how significant the ontological dimensions of painting are to 
spectatorship of contemporary works of art. In this regard he is seminal. To clarify: I believe the 
term ‘theatricality’ introduced by Fried, despite its ambiguity and multitude of meanings is an 
overarchingly useful term (particularly as an antonym to performativity). When employed in this 
text it is employed within the framework of Fried’s original definition describing a consciousness 
of  viewing.  Similarly ‘absorption’, the other  titular term  of  Fried’s  1980 text Absorption and 
Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot, to use Robert Pippin’s words reveals, ‘a 
complete identification of a subject with the role or activity undertaken, so much so that the 
subject can seem completely absorbed in the activity, self-forgetful, lost in reverie, and so on’. 
(Pippin, 2004: 578) Within this thesis its original meaning will be retained although in Chapter 
1 I seek to expand the term and its application to use in conjunction with post-minimalist works 
in contemporary contexts.  
 
0.23.  Performativity 
 
To clarify my terms, the performative is not an adjective from performance, it does not mean 
performance-like; its meaning is not tied up with the content of a performance but the act of 
performing itself, where a transition of states occurs. Performance is a part of performativity but 
performativity should not be equated with performance; ‘it is neither free-play or theatrical self-
presentation’  (Salin,  2004:  344).  The  word  ‘performative’  was  coined  by  the  linguist  John 
Langshaw Austen who described the uttering of a performative as, or part of, the doing of a 
certain kind of action, the performance of which, again, would not normally be described as just  
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‘saying’ or ‘describing’ something (Austen, 1962: 6). An example of a performative utterance is as 
follows: ‘I do (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’: i.e something gets done. In this 
context it can be viewed as a linguistic contract. We are reminded here how action and change of 
states are intrinsic to the definition of the performative. For instance when I say, ‘I name this 
painting “Both Eyes”’, I am not just describing what it is called or stating that I am naming it – I 
am actually naming it i.e an action is taking place and something gets done through the act of 
speaking it, through a speech act, as Austen would term it: I am doing something with words. In 
any performative utterance (or speech act) the sentence ‘does’ something as opposed to describing 
something being done. Other examples include: ‘I bequeath this watch to my sister’, ‘I pronounce 
you  man  and  wife’.  In  this  way  it  is  possible  to  comprehend  how  under  certain  conditions 
language creates the reality it describes. Austen theorised that speech is itself a form of action. 
Consequently, his thesis stipulates that language is not just a passive practice of describing a given 
reality, but a particular practice that can be used to invent and effect realities. Austin also claimed 
that performative utterances have no truth-value. They are neither true nor false statements as 
sentences were traditionally assumed to be.  
 
Judith Butler builds on Austin’s definition, holding on to the reality-producing character of the 
performative while  giving greater focus  to the  conditions necessary for language to create the 
reality described by him. Butler essentially understands performativity as an agency that is both 
enabled and regulated by conventions. In this way it stands in opposition to performance art. For 
Butler  performance  art  is  an  autonomous  act  linked  to  an  individual  performer  whereas 
performativity is a non-autonomous and non-subjectivist idea of acting. According to Butler a 
performative act produces reality, not by will or intention, but precisely because it derives from 
the conventions that it repeats and actualises….. any form of acting (and thus social change) is 
only thinkable within the framework of conventions
2 (Hantlemann, 2010: 19). Butler originally 
discussed performativity in relation to gender. She views gender as an act that has been rehearsed, 
much  like  a  script,  and  we,  as  the  actors,  make  this  script  a  reality  over  and  over  again  by 
performing these actions: there is no preexisting identity by which an act or attribute might be 
measured.  Butler asserts that ‘gender reality’ is created through sustained social performances. 
Accordingly the claim by a doctor, ‘It’s a girl/boy’, is always to some degree performative: they are 
not simply reporting on what they see (this would be a constative utterance), they are actually 
assigning a sex and a gender to a body that can have no existence outside discourse. 
                                                         
2 She notes how performance art did the opposite: it endeavoured to break with the fundamental conventions of art.  
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Mieke  Bal  would  disagree  with  Butler’s  assessment  of  the  performative  and  performance  as 
distinct and separate concepts that should remain as such, but would agree with most of her other 
claims.  In  her  text  Travelling  Concepts,  Bal  quite  pointedly  argues  that  performance  and 
performativity should not be treated separately. Like Butler she equates performativity with the 
idea of cultural memory and states that ‘memory is itself, by definition, a re-enactment, and in 
that sense, a form of performative’ (Balkema, 2001, p.110) but goes on to argue that even if 
Austin meant the performative as a unique occurrence of an act in the here and now, such an 
utterance can only be effective if it is cushioned in a culture that ‘remembers what that act can 
do’ (Bronfen, 2011). She goes on to say: ‘Memory concerns the past and happens in the present’ 
(Bal, 2002: 183). In other words, as Elisabeth Bronfen explains in relation to Bal, ‘only social 
conventions guarantee the possibility of a felicitous speech act’ (Bronfen, 2011). The performative 
implies a process of repetition that underlines any individual speech utterance: each performative 
utterance is tacitly inscribed by a convention that can be re-iterated. I am inclined to agree with 
both Bal and Bronfen. ‘Perfomativity’ is used, and misused (if you adhere to Austin’s orginal 
meaning) so widely now it seems perverse to separate it so strictly from ‘performance’. Perhaps we 
should view performance and performativity more like siblings, with different characters yet from 
the same genetic pool? 
 
Indeed Richard Schechner in his 1994 text points out how the word `perform' (to make or do 
something) and the word `act' (to dissimulate, feign action) often double-up in performance 
theory. In order to begin to unpick them, I will utilise John-David Dewsbury’s distinction of the 
two. He says: 
 
Performativity is a slippery term indubitably linked to the idea of a performance, 
but, regardless of the multiple instances by which a performance might come to be 
such  actual  renditions.  In  this  sense,  whilst  constituting  a  discrete  act  - t h e  
performance – the performative is not itself a concept signifying such an act. The 
performative  is  the  gap,  the  rupture,  the  spacing  that  unfolds  the  next  moment 
allowing change to happen. (Dewsbury, 2000: 475) 
 
What this  quote seeks to demonstrate is that  performativity is an interdisciplinary term  and 
doesn’t just describe a performance but helps frame it. Its meaning is not tied up with the content 
of a performance but the act of performing itself, where a transition of states occurs. Indeed this is  
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not so far away from the definition of Derrida who employs the term in his work Signature, 
Event, Context. Derrida talks about the performative more in relation to his theory of difference 
and repetition which on the one hand enables meaning but on the other prevents any meaning 
from being able to exist in such a total sense because the context is never the same even if the act 
is repeatable. No act of repetition is therefore ever identical. Thus, the performative, (and its 
success) for Derrida is very much connected to context. Due to the possibility of repetition, the 
intentions  of  an  individual  actor  can  never  be  fully  present  in  a  speech  act.
  The  core  of  a 
performative utterance is therefore not constituted by animating intentions, as Austin would have 
it, but by the structure of language. Thus Derrida’s definition sits somewhat in opposition to 
Butler who does not agree with this Derridean analysis of context – she says in order for the 
performative to have any meaning it needs to occur with an acknowledged set of conventions. 
 
In relation to spectatorship of painting perhaps we need to achieve both a disruption (Derrida) 
and  connection  (Butler)  in  order  for  a  performative  to  occur  in  contemporary  frameworks. 
Perhaps it is something like this tension between the two that ultimately allows for artwork and 
spectatorship to function performatively, to achieve a transition of states or new production of 
reality. Indeed for Dorothea von  Hantlemann, (who argues that every  artwork  has a reality-
producing dimension, therefore every artwork is to an extent performative) the performative relies 
on both repetition (Butler) and variation (Derrida): ‘through repetition the artwork is identified 
as  such  and  through  variation  it  shows  its  originality’  (Hantlemann,  2010:  19).  Only 
Hantlemann discusses performativity exclusively in relation to the visual arts and in this sense I 
consider her accurate in her fusion of both Butler and Derrida. Moreover her conception of 
repetition through  variation  might  begin to pave the  way towards  a richer understanding of 
performativity in relation to spectatorship specifically. After all, spectatorship embodies just this: 
the repetition of an action with diminutive variations inherent in every glance.  
 
0.24. Contextualisation 
 
For the past three years I have been researching performativity’s potential from the position of the 
artwork alongside the spectator. As Hantlemann argues for an understanding of performativity 
founded on a fusion of Butler and Derrida, my work represents a synthesis of disciplines where I 
have built on old knowledge in order to gain new. Predominantly I have been concerned with 
combining painting and performance with a focus on a less temporal, but nevertheless transitive, 
outcome: a certain performativity. Jim Mooney’s dialogue seems appropriate here although it is  
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worth noting that he talks about the fusion of different mediums in somewhat disparaging terms. 
He  says:  ‘The  demand  is  that  painting  move  from  some  notional  and  moribund  purity  to  a 
condition of fashionable hybridity, where painting is dilated and brings other modes of practice 
under the purview of its discourse.’ He goes on: ‘I have considerable sympathy for this ambition 
to reshape the terrritory of painting and there is no doubt something to be said for its advocacy, 
but I do question the ease with which this proposition is advanced as a sort of cure all remedy.’ 
(Mooney, 2006: 134) I understand why he terms it ‘easy’. Painting should never be likened to a 
simple maths equation (medium a + medium b = a new and exciting medium c) however, as I 
was never strictly or purely ‘a painter’ in the beginning, neither is the reshaping of the territory of 
painting  my  intention.  However  I  could  more  feasibly  be  accused  of  trying  to  reshape  the 
territory of spectatorship, through a cross of painting and performance, a relatively new area of 
research and practice. For the past two years I have actively been encouraging a certain hybridity 
within my work in order that it might motivate a transition of states in its activation of both 
artwork and spectator. 
 
0.25. Contextualisation of Performance / Performativity in relation to Painting 
 
Briefly I would like to outline a few historical examples of circumstances in which painting and 
performance have conjoined. It would be amiss to not immediately mention Jackson Pollock who 
remains hugely significant in his treatment of the canvas as a ‘field of action, a real-time record of 
the  artist’s  movements  in  actual  space  and  time’  (Wood,  2012).  Pollock  has  always  been 
identified as a painter but his mythology is as equally tied up with the performance of his gestural 
and physical process as it is his outcome. I will discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 2.   
 
Yves  Klein’s  1960  Anthropometry  Performance  (in  conjunction  with  The  Monotone  Symphony, 
1949) maintains this physical approach to performative painting. Here  Klein fused paint  and 
performance while placing the body at the centre of the painting. During a monotone symphony 
consisting of one note composed by Klein himself, three models rolled themselves in his patented 
hue International Klein Blue and thereby created ‘living brushes’. His initial experiment into 
using the human figure as a medium dated back to June 1958 in a friend’s apartment. It was here 
that he first applied blue paint to a nude model and guided her in rolling across a sheet of paper 
that had been placed on the floor. Klein’s idea for the Anthropométries stemmed in part from his 
practice in judo, as he became fascinated by the markings left on the mat as a judo fighter fell. 
(Russell, 2011)  
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Yve-Alain  Bois  in  his  book  Painting  as  Model  points  out  that  Yves  Klein’s  concept  of  the 
Monochrome  was  based  on  the  same  antidialectic,  anti-dualistic,  antitheatrical  premise  of 
Strzemiński’s unism (as I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 1 in relation to collage): ‘Why 
not  two  colours  in  the  same  painting?  Well,  because  I  refuse  to  provide  a  spectacle  in  my 
painting. I refuse to compare and put into play, so that some stronger elements will emerge in 
contrast to other, weaker ones. Even the most civilized representation is based on an idea of 
‘struggle’ between different forces, and the reader [sic] is confronted by an execution [mise a mort] 
in a painting, by a morbid drama by definition, be it a drama of love or hate.’ (Rose, 2006: 189). 
 
One year on from Klein’s Anthropometry Performance Niki de Saint Phalle produced Shooting 
Picture (1961). She invited spectators to shoot at paint-filled polythene bags embedded within 
layers  of  plaster  on  a  black-board  backing.  As  the  bullets  pierced  the  bags  dollops  of  paint 
exploded forth from the painting and proceed to drip down its surface. In this way the process – 
the moment of action and emphasis on chance became as significant as the finished work itself.  
 
Ten years on from Niki de Saint Phalle a little-known Polish artist named Alina Szapocznikow 
(1926-1973)  produced  Photosculptures  (1971)  consisting  of  20  grainy  black-and-white 
photographs. Each photograph showed a wad of used chewing gum set on a tiny shelf after being 
stretched this way or that to form a little abstract sculpture. More directly a hybridisation of 
sculpture, photography and performance, Photosculptures nonetheless embodied something of the 
visceral and painterly. In a similar vein and in a similar time Bruce McLean’s 1970s works can 
likewise be viewed as a fusion of sculpture, performance and painting. Originally conceived as a 
performance at the Situation Gallery in 1971, McLean's Pose Work for Plinths is an ironic and 
humorous commentary on what he  considered to  be the pompous  monumentality of Henry 
Moore's large plinth-based sculptures. Most obviously a hybrid of performance and sculpture, 
here McLean undertakes a sequence of poses on top of a group of three plinths. Likewise High up 
on a Baroque Palazzo (1974) introduced ‘Nice Style’  - the world’s very first pose band. The ‘Nice 
Style’ enterprise dedicated to the ‘problems of performance and the quest for the perfect pose’ 
and described at the time as ‘a cross between the society slicker and the TV ad action man of the 
kind who delivers the chocolates against all the odds’, makes evident a dynamic interaction of all 
possible media put to work alongside an awareness of an ‘audience’. 
 
In the 1980s and 90s Martin Kippenberger perpetuated McLean’s awareness of audience and art  
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object’s  self-consciousness  as  something  to  be  ‘viewed’.  For  instance  Untitled  (Carousel  with 
ejection seat) (1991) consists of a colorful, circular train track hosting a motorized pilot seat that 
rotates around its own axis.  Originally exhibited at his San Francisco show, the work transported 
visitors  in  a  loop  allowing  them  to  view  the  exhibition  as  a  perfect  panorama.  In  this  way 
Kippenberger attempted a manifestation of the optimum viewing conditions for artwork where 
he also encouraged the beholder to synthesise the works into a panoramic whole. In this vein no 
matter  what their  make-up they were  all viewed  on one plane, one  level, devoid of internal 
hierarchies. In another work titled Lieber Maler, Male Mir or Dear Painter, Paint for Me (1981) 
Kippenberger hired a commercial painter named Werner to paint paintings on his behalf which 
he then signed Werner Kippenberger. This action in itself constitutes a performance. Dealing 
with what he perceived as the 'perceived death of painting' and his art reflected his struggle with 
the concept that, at the turn of the millennium, it was impossible to produce anything original or 
authentic. 
 
A more contemporary example of painting fused with performance can be found in the work of 
Jutta Koether. Koether was actually Kippenberger’s assistant for a time. In her painting Hot Rod 
(after Poussin) (2009) which I will discuss in much greater depth in Chapter 2, she places the 
painting at the centre of the body – in opposition to Klein’s placing of the body at the centre of 
the painting. The work consists of a large canvas on two stilts. The structure was positioned on a 
diagonal in order that it straddled two types of ground: the untreated concrete and the raised 
platform (delineating the gallery exhibition area). With one foot on and one foot off the raised 
platform  Koether’s  painting  appears  as  if  stepping  onstage.  ‘Three  lecture  performances 
accompanied the exhibition in which Koether moved around and even under the structure that 
supported her canvas—her body and the bright anger of her recitation of collaged text furnished 
a  frame  for  the  canvas.  The  painting’s  own  presence  as  a  personage—or  interlocutor-—was 
further enhanced by strobe lights flashing onto it in different configurations during these live 
events as if painting and painter had encountered one another in a club’ (Joselit, 2009: 127). 
 
The combination of painting and performance is thus not an entirely new area but neither is it 
oversaturated. I propose to continue research into painting and performance and the potential 
performativity that this alliance can produce. I also propose to take it one step further through 
incorporating  spectatorship  and  modes  of  address  in  the  debate.  I  will  explore  whether 
performative painting can in turn bring about performative spectatorship and consequent agency 
and how it might achieve this.    
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0.26 Performativity in relation to my Painting Processes 
 
This research began as an enquiry into how performance and painting might overlap.  My studio 
practices  have  always  been  very  ‘active’,  physical  and  quick  and  I  felt  like  this  sense  of 
provisionality might provide something of a key. My processes are also very concerned with a 
broad  understanding  of  ‘the  gesture’. O f  c o u r s e  p r o v i s i o n a l i t y  i s  c l o s e l y  a l l i e d  w i t h  g e s t u r e ,  
performativity  and  time.  If  a  gesture  is  an  action  performed,  a  gesture  is  also  intrinsically 
temporal – typically existing in an instant but with longer implications. This idea of time and 
duration is also present in Fried’s Art and Objectood. Fried characterises the theatrical in terms of 
a particular relation between the subject and the object that takes place in time and thus has a 
duration. He writes ‘The literalist preoccupation with time – more precisely, with the duration of 
the  experience  –  is,  I  suggest,  paradigmatically  theatrical:  as  though  theatre  confronts  the 
beholder, and thereby isolates him, with the endlessness not just of objecthood but of time; or as 
though the sense which, at  bottom, theatre addresses is a sense of temporality, of time  both 
passing and to come, simultaneously approaching and receding, as if apprehended in an infinite 
perspective.’ (Fried, 1967) However, within this thesis duration as a concept will not be directly 
addressed, as this would require a different and potentially confusing trajectory of enquiry. 
 
As outlined above, the manner in which I make the paintings is inherently gestural. Indeed I 
want my own works to invoke ‘action’ in its many guises and I feel from experience that one of 
the  best  ways  of  doing  this  is  to  remain  physically  active  throughout  the  making  process
3. 
Furthermore action is also a key component of performativity – it allows painting to ‘do’ things 
as  opposed  to  just  say  them.    As  a  consequence  the  facture  of  the  paintings  began  to  rely 
increasingly on the provisional and the gestural. I felt as if the seriousness and weight of the ‘oil 
paint’ needed to be balanced with something more temporary, incidental and light: something 
‘acting’ as opposed to ‘permanent’. By ‘weight’ of the oil paint I refer to the weight of association 
with the great painters of the past who traditionally chose oil as their medium. This has in the 
past proved paralysing for me. Pamela M Lee writes in Chronophobia ‘Medium is always already 
in between; becomes like a speech act, is performative in staging a dialogue between work of art 
and beholder. And in this sense medium always internalizes a singular engagement with time.’ 
(Lee,  2004:  52)  To  me  this  ‘in  between’  singular  exchange  is  specific  to  gesture  as  well  as 
                                                         
3 I have written more about my painting processes in the paper Looking Away From The Stage (2013)  
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medium.  Moreover  my  medium  (two-dimensional  paintings  with  three-dimensional 
supplements) as well as being theoretically provisional as Lee explains is also physically provisional 
i.e in between dimensions.  
 
Throughout  this  body  of  research  provisionality  was  achieved  in  a  number  of  ways.  Firstly, 
through the sketchiness of the paint application – to most of the works there is a thin or rubbed 
ground applied underneath the more gestural surface paint marks. This involved ‘articulating a 
space between the affirmative mark and the wipe or erasure’ (Ryan, 2012: 12) by either removing 
paint using kitchen roll saturated in turpentine or applying paint mixed with a large amount of 
turpentine  or  glaze  medium in  a slapdash  action. Provisionality  was  also  achieved through  a 
deliberate  engagement  with  precarity  and  suggestiveness  through  a  confusion  of  categories 
between sculpture and painting, painting and sculpture. This was done through utilising mass-
produced ‘supplements’ (often from IKEA) which evoked the legacy of the Duchampian ready-
made (further subverted by the self-assembly required for these IKEA items which rather undid 
the notion of the ‘ready-made’). This hybridisation further meant that the paintings plus their 
supplements  were  less  ‘serious’  and  more  akin  to  props  or  actors  than  ‘oil  paintings’.  Thus 
performance was manifest in both the process and execution – the gestural marks and assemblage 
of IKEA flat-packs – and the subject matter of the works. Also because the subject matters of the 
works were in essence acting out a provisionality through their hung and balanced supplements 
and exposed workings this prompted ‘analysis of [the spectator’s] own ability to be suckered in by 
a painting’s promises. After all it’s just greasepaint and lighting; it’s all a show’ (Street, 2014). 
 
0.3.  Methods and Methodologies  
 
The decision to base the output of my research around an action-reflection model was in part a 
corollary  of  my  earlier  performance  work,  which  mostly  demanded  a  direct  and  conscious 
interrelation with the audience.  As a performer you are almost always active, as well as being in 
some  sense  in  a  relationship  with  your  viewer.  Thus  it  was  important  that  the  working 
methodology could integrate both these functions, both action and interaction.   
 
0.31.  Action 
 
The primary reasoning for a methodology of action rests on the premise that ‘action’ is inherently 
linked to and provides the basis for my performative practice. The nexus of my research - that art  
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works  can  be  and  trigger  performatives  -  is  theoretically  bound  to  the  reasoning  that  social 
relations  can’t  exist  without  ‘action’.  Alfred  Gell  defines  art  objects  in  performative  terms  as 
systems of actions, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about 
it.  (I  am  similarly  interested  in  what  they  can  do  above  and  beyond  what  their  symbolic 
communications imply, their visual codes mean, or what they look like). My thinking also is 
governed by the understanding that action research could in theory bring about action – both 
from me the artist but also my spectator. In this manner form echoes content. The form that 
action  research  takes  neatly  allies  itself  with  performative  concepts  inherent  in  my  research 
question: ‘action’ as a term is deeply embedded within definitions of the performative i.e. How to 
Do Things with Words
4, the title of J.L.Austin’s seminal 1955 book. For Austin the concept of the 
performative  is  contingent  upon  the  agency  of  action.  In  the  instance  of  this  thesis  a  more 
suitable reading would be: ‘How to Do Things with Art’, which fortuitously is also the title of 
Dorothea von Hantlemann’s 2010 book on performativity in the visual arts. 
 
A discussion of binary oppositions Chapter 3 concludes that structuralism provides more fertile 
grounds for ‘active’ agency than many of the deconstructive agendas of post-structuralist thought, 
as discussed in relation to phenomenology and open-ended, process-based practices in Chapter 2. 
However Clive Cazeaux in his paper Interrupting the artist: Sartre and the topology of theory and 
practice published in K. Macleod and L. Holdridge (eds), Thinking Through Art, suggests that 
existentialism  might  in  due  course  prove  the  most  productive  when  viewing  practice-based 
research in relation to ‘action’. He maintains that present in Sartre’s existentialism is a topological 
theory of action, ‘that is to say, a theory which emphasizes the way actions, shape, sculpt and, 
generally,  give  form  to  experience.’  (Cazeaux,  2005:  41)  Cazeaux’s  theory  of  action  and 
consciousness proceeds through rethinking the nature of the subject in relation to the world. 
Existentialism  claims  that  an  individual  constructs  themselves  by  way  of  their  own  actions, 
thereby rejecting the thesis of any a priori essences or determinism: ‘the act is everything. Behind 
the act there is neither potency nor “hexis” nor virtue’ (Sartre, 1943: xxii). According to Sartre, 
freedom  is  the  central  and  unique  potentiality  that  makes  us  human.  In  a  rejection  of 
determinism, he claims it is our choice how we respond to determining tendencies. Freedom is 
existence, and in it ‘existence precedes essence’, (Sartre, 1946: 27) implying that what we do, how 
we act in our life,  determines our apparent ‘qualities’. It is not that someone tells the truth 
because she is honest, but rather she defines herself as honest by telling the truth again and again. 
                                                         
4 This performative title also suggests the inverse proposition i.e. How to ‘do’ things with words (as opposed to ‘say’ them).  
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Essentially our acts define us. In his essay L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme he claims that there 
is no reality except in action. It follows then, as Cazeaux so neatly puts it that ‘If all previous 
conceptions of truth [i.e those of metaphysical or rational orgin] are rejected, then one is left with 
the situation where truth has to be made. (Cazeaux, 2005: 41) In relation to an action-as-research 
model Cazeaux notes how in Sartre’s studies ‘action’ is the moment of distinction that makes a 
difference to a situation that would otherwise be an undifferentiated flow of experience. Thus 
action becomes the object of attention. Its topological definition also comes from its ability to rise 
above, or even drop below, the flat line of inactivity. In this way action is not a movement of 
physical bodies in space but something more akin to a rupture, a difference within an otherwise 
unexceptional field of experience. 
 
McNiff’s multiple spiralling model views action in more traditional terms but is helpful in its 
emphasis of  action  research as  a non-static form in  that it is always fluctuating:  a continual 
process and search. McNiff uses the example of a Yin Yang diagram and explains how if one 
portion moves it alters its own shape and that of its companion: 
 
There are no empty spaces. Each entity is in flux with the other accommodating the 
other  to  itself  without  losing  its  original  identity.  Consider  also  that  each  has 
something of the other inside itself (the dot of it’s partner’s colour) indicating that 
both are mutually dependent for their existence … So it is in dialectics. (McNiff, 
1988: 42) 
 
The Yin Yang diagram provides an important model in terms of marrying the practice and the 
theory elements of the research. Moreover this potential union plays a significant role in my 
reasoning for undertaking PhD research in the first instance. Neither should privilege the other – 
just as paint shouldn’t dominate over performance or vice versa.
5  
 
0.32.  Interaction 
 
This leads us to interaction. The reflexive and critical engagement with methodologies has proved 
an  inextricable  component  in  this  research.  Practice,  theory  and  methodology  have  come  to 
function  within,  through  and  alongside  each  other.  They  stand  together  as  distinct  but 
                                                         
5 However in equal measure I need to also avoid being prescriptive.  
 
 
 
 
18 
nevertheless interconnected ‘social’ practices, each with the capacity to reshape experience, each 
contributing to the action-focused process of making the work. By ‘social’ I am also referring to 
the concept behind the works. Within my work I explore and make visible ideas of curation and 
self-image, while bringing to attention the conceits of appearance. I’m interested in how people 
create and curate their own self-image. I work a lot with social codes and the presentation of 
gender. Much of what I do explores ideas of sincerity, particularly in relation to theatre and its 
inherent artifice (which I don’t always assume to be negative). I am interested in social rituals and 
facades and interrogate ideas intrinsic to the shallow and sometimes affected (social) surface and 
issues  concerning  ‘front  stage’  (being  visible  to  the  audience  and  therefore  complicit  in  the 
performance) and ‘back stage’ (where an audience is not present) as Erving Goffman explains. I 
look at how we commodify gender, identity and language and the way in which we use them for 
the purpose of power, with a view to understanding the various forces that shape and mould our 
society. In this way theory informs practice while practice shapes theory.   
 
Cazeaux’s writings once more provide support on this subject. Cazeaux holds artistic practice and 
theory as separate entities but maintains the importance of frequent interjections and relations 
between them. From a Sartrean perspective these interruptions can accordingly be understood 
‘(a) as contributions to the materiality of the artist’s practice and (b) as steps towards the location 
of  that  practice  as  a  form  of  knowledge’  (Cazeaux,  2005:  41).  Borgodoff  too  describes  how 
methodologies and practice should not be severed – they are contingent on one another, they are 
enfolded and integral components: ‘Artistic practice is not only the result of the research, but also 
its methodological vehicle, when the research unfolds in and through the act of creating and 
performing’
6 (Borgodoff, 2011: 46).  
 
In relation to the conjoining of theory and practice Cadeaux further instructs how this Sartrean 
topology of action brings a way of thinking to the theory-practice debate, allowing practice and 
theory to sit together as mutually supportive ‘interventions’ in the development of an artwork. 
He explains ‘What is unique to consciousness … is that it is the location of the perception of 
absence … the perception of absence or negation creates a gap in experience, and it is because of 
this rupture or interval that the subject is able to become aware of itself standing before a world’ 
(Cazeaux, 2005: 43). For Sartre this rupture in the causal order of the world is the structure of 
consciousness, thereby theorising the self as the gap in the world and defining subjectivity as 
                                                         
6 Again this quote guides us to an idea of a performative.  
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nothingness. In the process he implies that the self is constructed by thorough engagement with 
the world rather than any predetermined inclination. In these terms both theory and practice 
should be understood as performative gestures or ruptures that signify an engagement of the self, 
that make a difference.
7  
 
Next Cazeaux tackles Sartre’s theory of description wherein lies the relevance to my practice-
based  methodologies. His theory of language reveals how description (of art in my case) can 
expand the cognitive possibilities by which a work of art is seen. For Sartre, writing is also one of 
the main ways to rupture experience and also introduce a distinction between generality and 
specificity. According to Cazeaux this is significant for practice-based research because it alters the 
terms in which we think of (traditionally separate) studio practice and writing as types of activity. 
In  this  way  they  are  parallel,  non-hierarchical  but  related  processes  that  create  gaps  in  an 
otherwise uniform flow of experience.
8 (Cazeaux, 2005: 49)  
 
The object, for Sartre, is not something which opposes description or alienates the writer but 
something which establishes  a  moral contract  between itself  and consciousness. I say ‘moral’ 
because  the  metaphors  that  best  describe  the  relationship  come  from  the  sphere  of  social 
interaction:  objects  ‘invite’,  ‘motivate’,  ‘demand’,  or  ‘resist’  description.  Whether  one  is 
confronting a bottle of ink, a tree-root, or a painting, objects can only give themselves to the 
viewer incompletely and, therefore, in a way that requests or demands supplementation from her. 
(Cazeaux, 2005: 48) 
 
Within my methodology this idea of supplementation will evolve not only as part of my process 
(through the supplementary supports and structures used in my paintings) but also my outcome as 
Cazeaux reflects here in reference to the spectator. In this way the action reflection spiral with a 
Sartrean emphasis will constitute my primary method but it will also be reflected in the outcome 
of the research i.e the trigger of a performative (re)action by the spectator in conjunction with the 
artwork in order that something ‘gets done’ (Austin, 1955) and spectatorship is liberated from 
passivity through the generation of ‘a living theory of practice’ (McNiff & Whitehead, 2006: 50). 
 
                                                         
7 Remember ‘we  are  theorizing action  as an event,  a moment,  a rupture, something which makes a difference where  there was 
previously no difference at all. and which thereby allows the subject to orient itself in terms of the objects it encounters’. (Cazeaux, 
2005: 47) 
8 In Chapter 2 ‘gaps’ are discussed in greater detail in relation to attention and performativity.  
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1. MY BROTHER IS A HAIRY MAN: LOOKING TOWARDS 
 
In Chapter One I use Fried’s book Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age 
of Diderot (1980) to scaffold the structure of my argument. I will break down Fried’s argument 
according  to  three  key  terms:  ‘absorption’,  ‘theatricality’  and  ‘tableau’  and  discuss  them  in 
relation to the drawings, paintings and assemblages in the 2011 show of my work, My Brother is a 
Hairy Man. 
 
I would like to start at the beginning. ‘My Brother is a Hairy Man’ is a direct quote from the first 
book of the Bible, Genesis, and references the story of Jacob and Esau. With his mother's help, 
Jacob impersonates his hairy older twin by dressing in Esau's clothes and covering his own hands 
and the nape of his neck with the hairy hide of goats. Fooled by this ruse, their blind father, 
Isaac, is tricked into giving the younger son the blessing of the firstborn on his deathbed. This 
introduces  us  to  the  idea  of  deception  through  the  use  of  hair  – a n  i d e a  t h a t  i s  e x p l o r e d  
throughout the show, ‘My Brother is a Hairy Man’.  
 
In  utilising  the  chapter  heading  ‘Looking  Towards’  I  am  referring  to  Diderot  and  Fried’s 
conceptions  of  theatrical  painting  as  a  type  of  painting  that  consciously  ‘looked  towards’  or 
addressed  its  viewer  directly.  In  Diderot’s  time,  art  still  held  its  auratic,  transcendental  and 
political power and for Diderot this depended on its absorptive promise. For an artwork to be 
truly successful it was required to be casually indifferent to the spectator’s physical presence. Fried 
in his book Absorption and Theatricality: Painting And Beholder In The Age Of Diderot (1980), 
goes on to explain how Diderot was repelled by every form of exaggeration in drama and painting 
that indicated a desire to play to the crowd. Fried himself perceived any such consciousness to be 
the first marker of theatricality. He shows us how in paintings of the early and mid-1750s, the: 
 
automatic, involuntary, and unconscious actions [he means of the subjects of the 
paintings] were perceived by critics of the early and mid 1750s as signs of intense 
absorption and for that matter of rapt attention. More generally, we have inferred 
that for French painters of those years the persuasive representation of absorption 
characteristically entailed evoking the obliviousness or unconsciousness of the figure 
or figures in question to everything other than the specific objects of their absorption 
(Fried, 1988: 31).   
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According to Fried that was also the ultimate aim for spectatorship. He argues, with reference to 
the ‘critic’ Diderot, that whenever a consciousness of viewing exists, absorption is sacrificed, and 
‘theatricality’ results, which they both believed to be negative. 
 
1.1.  The Aesthetic Responsibility, Paintings: Absorption 
 
I would now like to take this idea of absorption and its relationship to consciousness and discuss 
it in connection with my series of paintings collectively titled The Aesthetic Responsibility. I will 
also describe how I was primarily aiming to achieve, through absorption (alongside a paradoxical 
embrace of theatrical forms and devices) a sincerity in this series of paintings. I will do this by 
using  a  direct  comparison  to  a  selection  of  more  minimalist  works  by  a  group  of  my 
contemporaries.  
 
The  Aesthetic  Responsibility  is  a  term  borrowed  from  Boris  Groys,  who  in  his  2009  lecture 
suggested  that  self-design  had  become  the  mass  project  of  our  age  as  a  result  of  overt 
aestheticisation of our political and social spheres:  
 
Today, everyone is subjected to an aesthetic evaluation—everyone is required to take 
aesthetic responsibility for his or her appearance in the world, for his or her self-
design. Where it was once a privilege and a burden for the chosen few, in our time 
self-design has come to be the mass cultural practice par excellence. The virtual space 
of  the  Internet  is  primarily  an  arena  in  which  my  website  on  Facebook  is 
permanently designed and redesigned to be presented on YouTube—and vice versa. 
But  likewise  in  the  real—or,  let’s  say,  analog—world,  one  is  expected  to  be 
responsible for the image that he or she presents to the gaze of others. It could even 
be said that self-design is a practice that unites artist and audience alike in the most 
radical way: though not everyone produces artworks, everyone is an artwork. At the 
same time, everyone is expected to be his or her own author. (Groys, 2009: 41)  
 
Groys’ remarks sit uncomfortably with artist and spectator alike. Groys suggests that the artist’s 
currency has been hijacked by spectators everywhere, the implication being an ultimate loss of 
power to the artwork i.e. if we are all ostensibly artists how do we discern a ‘real’ artwork? As 
John Miller explains: ‘The stage is already in the heads of the public’.  Ursula Frohne asserts how  
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this theatricality of the everyday  was instigated firstly  by the perforation of the dividing line 
between outside and inside, as Beatriz Colomina illustrates in her book Privacy and Publicity (in 
the sense that modern architecture is conceived like stage sets and their inhabitants perpetually 
have to play themselves). Secondly it came about through individual identities in the sense of 
Judith Butler’s concept of ‘gender as a corporeal style’, more an ‘act’, as it were, which is more 
intentional and performative than an a priori aspect of biology (Balkema & Slager, 2002: 47). 
 
Frohne is in agreement with Groys as she outlines in Concepts on the Move (Balkema & Slager, 
2002) how one of the most striking features of our everyday experience in contemporary culture 
is an increasing theatricality that seems to pervade all spheres of public and private life. She charts 
diverse  social  phenomena  such  as  the  advent  of  entertainment  culture,  fashion  hypes,  trend-
creations of lifestyles and gadget cults, celebrity culture in politics, the branding of bodies and 
products and the fantasies associated with themed entertainment destinations as displays which 
constantly produce new patterns of identification. Frohne claims that these phenomena blatantly 
toy with the aesthetic potential of prefabricated ‘mise-en-scenes’ and have elevated the ‘show-
effect’ to become one of the dominant paradigms of our social relations, and public and private 
rituals (Balkema & Slager, 2002: 46-47). 
 
In the same vein as Ursula Frohne’s remarks Shannon Jackson states: ‘This is the world that we 
live in at present and it suggests that, pace the Barthesian sense that we never go to the theatre 
anymore, we are in fact already there’ (Jackson, 2008). Accordingly, Jan Verwoert in his text 
Exhaustion & Exuberance, Ways to Defy the Pressure to Perform explains: ‘after the disappearance of 
manual labour from the lives of most people in the Western world, we have entered into a culture 
where we no longer just work, we perform. We need to perform because that is what’s asked of us 
… In a high performance culture, we are the avant-garde but we are also the job-slaves. We serve 
the customers who consume the communication and sociability that we produce.’ (Verwoert, 
2008: 90)  
 
On first glance this series of paintings appears to exhibit Frohne’s ‘show-effect’ and Verwoert’s 
‘high-performance’  qualities.  The  figures  are  smoking  (and  in  the  process ‘hyping’ smoking) 
while pouting more generally.  They also appear to exhibit many of the qualities that Diderot and 
the critics of the time privileged with regards to absorption. The figures in the paintings appear 
oblivious to everything other than the smoke plumes rising from their cigarettes and the activity 
of smoking. Yet the closer you look, the more rapt in themselves they seem (rather than the  
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action they are undertaking.) I’m sure this introverted focus could reasonably be argued to be 
absorptive in Fried and Diderot’s terms, however combined with a certain arrogance it manifests 
itself in something more akin to self-absorption or even perhaps self-design.  
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
Fig. 4. Kate Hawkins  
The Aesthetic Responsibility XV  (2011) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Kate Hawkins 
The Aesthetic Responsibility XVI  (2011)  
Fig. 3. Kate Hawkins 
The Aesthetic Responsibility XI  (2010)  
Fig. 1. Kate Hawkins 
The Aesthetic Responsibility XIV  (2011)   
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At this juncture I would like to offer a contemporary reading of ‘absorption’. I believe the term 
‘sincerity’ could feasibly be utilised as an apt contemporary synonym that in this current context 
parallels Fried’s idea of ‘absorption’ in 18
th century France. Today it is not so much that an 
artwork needs to exhibit absorptive qualities in order to be deigned authentic, rather an artwork 
needs to exhibit authentic qualities to be in any way absorptive to the spectator. Yet this is not as 
straightforward as it might seem. We find ourselves in a confusing moment beyond modernism 
and post-modernism which some have termed ‘post-postmodernism’ and others ‘altermodernism’ 
(Nicolas Bourriaud). For the sake of my argument ‘metamodernism’ is the term I wish to briefly 
unpack. This term was introduced by the cultural theorists Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van 
den Akker in 2010 and combined elements of the modern as well as postmodern. In their article 
'Notes on metamodernism'
 (Van den Akker & Vermeulen, 2010) they claim that the 2000s are 
characterised by the return of typically modern positions without fully forfeiting the postmodern 
mindsets of the 1990s and 1980s. Accordingly the 'meta' prefix refers to Plato’s metaxy, which 
intends a movement between opposite poles as well as beyond, rather than a self-reflexive or 
repeatedly  ruminative  stance.  Van  den  Akker  and  Vermeulen  define  metamodernism  as  a 
continuous, 
 
oscillation, a swinging or swaying with and between future, present and past, here 
and there and somewhere; with and between ideals, mindsets, and positions. It is 
influenced by estimations of the past, imbued by experiences of the present, yet also 
inspired by expectations of the future. It takes into account and affect the here, but 
also the there, and what might or might not happen elsewhere. It is convinced it 
believes in one system or structure or sensibility, but also cannot persuade itself not 
to  believe  in  its  opposite.  Indeed,  if  anything,  meta  intimates  a  constant 
repositioning. (Van den Akker and Vermeulen, 2010)   
 
Aptly Wikipedia (a tool celebrated for its facility to reposition content) tells us in relation to Van 
den  Akker  and  Vermeulen  that  this  constant  repositioning  suggests  ‘a  yearning  for  universal 
truths on the one hand and an (a)political relativism on the other’, a negotiation ‘between hope 
and  doubt,  sincerity  and  irony,  knowingness  and  naivety,  construction  and  deconstruction’ 
(Wikipedia, 2013). If then an artwork is to authentically exhibit sincerity an extremely subtle 
negiotiation  of  its  form,  content  and  context  will  be  required.  Only  in  this  manner  will  it  
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successfully shun inauthenticity or theatricality if we are to use Fried’s terms. Inherent in the 
word ‘sincerity’ is a purity that resists ideas of theatrical exaggeration. I want also to suggest that 
sincerity, like spectatorship, is a subjective phenomenon yet contingent on shared perceptions. As 
you can usually distinguish a good artwork from a bad one, you can generally sense whether 
something is sincere or not, although you  may not be able to access precisely the reasoning 
preceding  that  decision.  Sincerity  is  the  slippery,  elusive  quality  in  our  deeply  designed  and 
manipulative world that advertisers, artists, performers and their publics alike are all in search of. 
For the sake of this argument and subsequent discussion of theatricality I am going to argue that 
art should transcend fashion rather than unite with it as Ursula Frohne suggests is happening. 
Only in this way can it be sincere and consequently absorbing.  
Paradoxically the smoking men are not attempting sincerity. They are attempting calculation in 
their public display of their own personae. Through them I am aiming to encapsulate an idea of 
an empty and impermanent brand that is less than the sum of its parts: a space to be filled (and 
not by smoke). Through the employment of stereotyped motifs used in advertising alongside 
stylised and nostalgic cinematic imagery the series of smoking men occupy a largely aesthetic (and 
aspirational) realm. Marinetti in the Variety Theatre Manifesto talks about people smoking in the 
auditorium, creating a unifying ambience between the stage and the audience. I was focused on 
how the paintings might begin to mimic this ambience, in a gallery context, uniting viewer and 
artwork, painting and performance. 
In the same way that Groys writes about ‘design—including self-design—[being]  primarily  a 
mechanism for inducing suspicion,’ the smoking men also conceal their true essence by hiding 
behind their stylized pouts and plumes of hot air. Groys goes on:    
Every  act  of  aestheticisation  is  always  already  a  critique  of  the  object  of 
aestheticisation  simply  because  this  act  calls  attention  to  the  object’s  need  for  a 
supplement in order to look better than it actually is. Such a supplement always 
functions as a Derridean pharmakon: while design makes an object look better, it 
likewise raises the suspicion that this object would look especially ugly and repellent 
were its designed surface to be removed … Indeed … the contemporary world of 
total  design  is  often  described  as  a  world  of  total  seduction  from  which t h e  
unpleasantness of reality has disappeared. But I would argue, rather, that the world 
of total design is a world of total suspicion, a world of latent danger lurking behind  
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designed surfaces. The main goal of self-design then becomes one of neutralizing the 
suspicion of a possible spectator, of creating the sincerity effect that provokes trust in 
the spectator’s soul.’ (Groys, 2009: 41-42) 
 
Today the works of a handful of young London-based contemporary artists can be seen to be 
consciously employing this idea of (suspiciously) designed surfaces. In a sense they are revisting 
the same Minimalist oeuvre that Fried so energetically railed against in Art and Objecthood. Their 
works employ a somewhat revised form of Minimalism but nevertheless seem to privilege formal 
concerns. (See Fig 5 & 6.) For the purposes of this paper I am going to refer to them as the post-
minimalists after the group show titled ‘Glaze’, curated by George Henry Longly, which took up 
precisely those concerns related to surface formalism.  Plus the themes in ‘Glaze’ were all neatly 
anchored by a Carl Andre floor sculpture as you walked through the door.  
 
 
       
 
 
 
I want to suggest that, although similar in form, the works of these artists represent a departure 
from the work of the 60s minimalists and embody a different kind of theatricality. The post-
minimalist’s  works  are  focused  on  their  own  exterior  surface  but  not  far  beyond.  I  want  to 
propose that they are not quite so outward looking as their predecessors who, if anything, were 
concerned  with  a  total  exteriority  of  vision,  looking  only o u t w a r d s ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  i n  o n  
themselves.  As  a  consequence  the  60s  Minimalists  avoided  a  certain  navel-gazing  but  in  the 
process were labelled by Fried ‘theatrical’ as a result of their absolute awareness of the beholder 
before them. Despite also appearing theatrical (although not in the vein of the 60s minimalists – 
the post-minimalist’s theatricality resides in their use of theatre-like devices and technologies, for 
Fig.  5. N i c h o l a s  D e s h a y e s ,  Public  Work  1. ( 2 0 0 9 )  
courtesy of the artist and Jonathan Viner 
Fig. 6. George Henry Longly, Untitled (2010) courtesy 
of the artist and Chez Valentin  
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instance  stage  lighting  as  can  be  seen  in  Fig.  6.)  I  want  to  propose  that  although  on  first 
impression the works of these new Minimalists appear self-absorbed and consciously theatrical 
they ultimately achieve sincerity of sorts precisely because of their slippery surfaces. 
 
Indeed  on the surface  –  and surface is what these works are predominantly concerned with, 
absorption seems like an entirely appropriate term. The objects are absorbed in their own surfaces 
and their materials are likewise absorbing for the spectator. Many of the works are super sexy in 
form; as a spectator I find myself lusting after their slick, seductive surfaces and meticulously 
glazed veneers. They have the quality and finish of the most high-end kitchen showroom but are 
in essence even more aspirational precisely because they don’t belong to any kitchen or have any 
function:  they  are  pure  forms.  Their  forms,  like  those  of  their  predecessors,  reference  the 
industrial processes involved in their fabrication – Minimalist work had a technological feeling, 
with no perception of the artist’s hand, which is also  true of these contemporary works, the 
difference being that the post-minimalists seem less concerned with the context of their works’ 
reception. This is probably because their materials, to an even greater extent than the minimalists 
before, inspire aspiration and appear absorbing with every installation, in every context. Serra also 
said that Minimalist works were impersonal and Greenberg similarly claimed that they were the 
antithesis of the emotional abstract expressionists (Greenberg, 1960). Here then I think there is a 
difference.  The  works  of  George  Henry  Longly  et  al  may  not  be  warm  but  they  are  not 
impersonal.  There  is  very  much  a  human  element  in  play  that  is  often  unsavoury,  with 
underlying  erotic  references  never  being  made  absolutely  explicit.  For  instance  in  Nicholas 
Deshayes Public Work 1 & 2, (Fig. 5) a pair of stainless steel wall sculptures look like a men's 
urinal to the extent that they bear clear vinyl stickers in the shape of gushes of urine.  
 
There is emotion here but it’s the opposite of romantic: it is sexualised like its surfaces. This in 
turn means being a spectator is voyeuristic and one-way. You get nothing back from the work 
because you’re not meant to be looking at it in the first pace. You feel dirty. You steal glances. 
The works in this instant might not be aware that they are being watched but they are more than 
aware of their own power  – like the hot guy at school – everyone lusts to be in their presence in 
the hope that they too might become hot. All together they epitomize ‘cool’, like their exteriors. 
In their nonchalance and indifference they often seem too absorbed in themselves to register any 
beholder and in their own reflective surfaces they can always see themselves; they are their own 
mirrors like Morris’s mirror cube inside out. And just as they are absorbed in their surfaces, so are 
we,  the  beholder.  If  we  consider  Fried  again  for  a  moment,  I  wonder  if  a  ‘surface’  kind  of  
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absorption goes deep enough to allow for meaningful reception? Nicholas Carr in his book The 
Shallows would argue not. He introduces the term ‘power browse’ in relation to the internet and 
suggests that new forms of reading are emerging which focus less on assiduous processing of 
meanings, and more on honing the skill of skimming bodies of text at speed for relevant facts – 
proposing that shallowness of vision does indeed equate to a shallowness of thought. Perhaps the 
shallowness of vision embodied by these contemporary minimal works is the reason why I find it 
difficult to get much back from them other than the sense of a one-way relationship where you 
want them but they don’t want, or need, you – they can have whoever they like. As unrequited 
love (which usually turns out to be lust) can keep you occupied on and off for years, the sensible 
among us will in the end give up and give in to something more meaningful. A surface or shallow 
absorption  then, i t  w o u l d  s e e m ,  is  not  enough,  and  does  not  equate  to  the  unconscious 
‘absorption’ as outlined by Fried in Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age 
of Diderot (1980). In fact a surface absorption suggests that they are not really absorbed to begin 
with – they are just pretending to be. Thus the glazed works become at once, more insincere than 
sincere, and in addition theatrical (in Fried’s terms this time).  
 
This theatricality is further visible in their total control of their own spectacle and in this manner 
they sit much closer to advertising, subtly and brilliantly marketed. Like the Mad Men there is 
actually an astute consciousness of the game in play, which in turn suggests the works do care 
about us, the spectator and that they are not as casually indifferent as we might first assume. 
Indeed Mick Finch (1998) reminds us the relationship of Minimalism to consumerist forms of 
production and the commodity was always strangely positivist. I would argue that this is perhaps 
even more prevalent with the work of these post-Minimalists. In a related argument, Debord 
notes in The Society of the Spectacle, that quality of life is impoverished. He argues that there is no 
longer any separation between art and life and authentic social life has been replaced with its 
representation: ‘All that was once directly lived has become mere representation.’ (Debord, 2004: 
12) ‘The present stage, in which social life is completely taken over by the accumulated products 
of the economy, entails a generalized shift from having to appearing: all effective having must now 
derive both its immediate prestige and its ultimate raison d'être from appearances’. (Debord, 
2004: 16). Debord writes that ‘the spectacle is not a collection of images, rather, it is a social 
relationship between people that is mediated by images’ (Debord, 2004: 12). Images, he says, 
have supplanted genuine human interaction.
 With such lack of authenticity, human perceptions 
are affected, and there's also a degradation of knowledge, with the hindering of critical thought. 
Akin to advertising, the production processes of the contemporary Minimalists are never made  
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explicit and in this way they remain deceitful in their appearance. These glazed skins tell us what 
we want but won’t let us into it. They give next to nothing away and consequently leave us with 
little from which to move forward; they have been so expertly emptied of content so that they can 
be filled with surface. ‘Content is sort of emancipated with more emphasis being placed on an 
experimental approach.’ (Henry Longly, 2011) Longly doesn’t go on to define his terms but I 
suspect he has taken his lead from the old guard whose forms Fried also describes as ‘hollow’
9. As 
a result I would argue that the works of the post-minimalists end up being more (intentionally) 
empty and vacant than those of the 60s. Even their slippery and oily choice of materials mean 
that no precise meaning or definition can stay adhered for long. Indeed Nicolas Deshayes actually 
titled his recent show at S1 Artspace in Sheffield Crude Oil (August 2013).  
 
                                                         
9 Stephen Melville explains how ‘hollow’ is etymologically related to ‘hole’, and covers much of the same terrain as words like ‘empty’ 
or ‘vacant’, but is also strongly inflected by a distinct sense of ‘interiority’ (Melville, 2007: 12)   
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Fig. 7. George Henry Longly, Visions (2013) 
courtesy of the artist and Jonathan Viner 
 
 
Yet this is not quite the extent of it. They may be insincere and theatrical but then it is important 
to recognise that this was their ultimate intention in the beginning. Furthermore the glazed works 
negotiate this metamodern moment (Van den Akker and Vermeulen) defined by oscillations and 
constant repositioning, expertly. It is through this skilful negotiation as well as through their 
professed insincerity and total self-absorption that I believe they ultimately (and paradoxically) 
should be considered sincere. As a result they also manage to evade Fried’s vein of theatricality. 
This is exemplified by George Henry Longly’s new series of marble wall reliefs (see Fig. 7), where 
he artfully embeds several Yves Saint Laurent ‘Touché Éclat’ concealers into their machine-made 
grooves. Touché Éclat, 
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is an almost mythologised female beauty product, adored for its ability to conceal 
surface blemishes on the skin: a humorous take on the notion of artistic ‘lying’. Here 
we find Longly combining an intrinsically minimalist form (the marble slab) with 
the implied gloss of feminine beauty products and a campy temperament, in contrast 
to the butch machismo of Minimalism proper. (Little, 2013)  
 
If this isn’t honest (and sincere), with regards to the intentions of the work, then I’m not sure 
what is. He presents us simultaneously with the tool to finish the labour and the finished labour 
so  we  don’t  need  the  tool.  There  is  simultaneously  no  transparency,  yet  full  transparency: 
everything is concealed  (through the use of the touché éclat) but then revealed (through the 
insertion of the packaging of the touché éclat).  In this way, and in this metamodern day and age 
I believe it is the post-minimalist’s (self) ‘absorption’
10 that ultimately engenders their sincerity 
while simultaneously defeating their theatricality (in Fried’s terms). 
 
With  the A e s th e t i c  R e sp o n s i b i l i ty   series  I  similarly  set  out  to  play  with  ideas  of  sincerity  and 
transparency. Overall they achieved this although they do not operate at quite the same level of 
deception
11 as the works of Nicholas Deshayes and George Henry Longly. As a result of the 
repeated oscillations between sincerity and insincerity the glazed works in the end managed to 
deftly neutralize any ‘suspicion of a possible spectator [by] creating the sincerity effect [through 
full  transparency  merged  with  absolute  opacity]  that  provokes  trust  in  the  spectator’s  soul’ 
(Groys,  2009:  42).  Groys  points  out  how  today  ‘the  production  of  sincerity’  has  become 
everyone’s occupation having been the main occupation of art throughout the whole history of 
modernity. Ultimately the works of the post-minimalists effortlessly achieve this ‘production’
12 of 
sincerity due, in the most part, to their reflexive insincerity. The Aesthetic Responsibility paintings 
on the other hand are more insecure and despite setting out to operate on a similarly superficial 
level they (unintentionally) achieved a sort of humanity. Most likely this was a manifestation of 
their painterly, human gesture as opposed to slick, industrial surface.  
 
Nevertheless to play this precarious game you need to be absolutely sure of yourself, your power 
                                                         
10 The term absorption exploits two meanings here. First I am referring to  Fried’s understanding of absorption – the persuasive 
representation (in painting) of obliviousness or unconsciousness of the figure or figures in question to everything other than the 
specific objects of their absorption. Secondly I am referring to a more physical absorption illustrated by Longly’s ‘embedding’ of the 
touché éclat within the wall-relief itself. In this way the concealer is physically ‘absorbed’ within the artwork.  
11 I use deception here as a positivist term. 
12 By ‘production’ of sincerity I am referring to their ability to manipulate ideas of theatricality and sincerity in a contemporary 
context.   
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and  your  surfaces,  and  at  points  the  smoking  men  conceivably  weren’t  quite  arrogant  or 
manufactured  (in  both the industrial  and social sense) enough.  Fried explains how the  18
th 
Century critic Diderot noted that actors playing subordinate roles often did better in the sense of 
remaining within their roles than leading actors who, much to his disgust, consistently played to 
the audience. Diderot suggested that actors in subordinate roles were constrained by the presence 
of  someone  who  governed  them:  ‘they  address  themselves  to  this  other,  toward  him  they 
orientated all action’. (Fried, 1988: 95) Although the glazed facades of the New Minimalists at 
first appear like backdrops to the main action, as a spectator you very quickly realise they are the 
main action, basking in their own splendid surfaces, they monopolize the stage (in the form of 
the  gallery  space)  playing  subordinate  to n o  o n e .  C o n t r a s t i n g l y  The  Aesthetic  Responsibility 
paintings, although theatre-like in subject matter, don’t quite achieve this level of stage presence, 
this theatrical aura, thus remaining in subordinate roles. Diderot would of course deem this a 
positive although at this metamodern, overtly ‘theatrical’ (see Ursula Frohne above) moment in 
time, Diderot’s terms aren’t so readily applicable anymore. In contemporary terms, the subjects 
and  objecthood  of  the  smoking  men  were  perhaps  not  as  sufficiently  self-absorbed,  or  self-
designed (see Groys) as those of the post-minimalists. Despite a few supplementary (more man-
made) structures consisting of an off-cut of fake fur and a triangular stretcher covered in a fur-like 
fabric
13 (see Figs. 1-4) the paintings perhaps remained too human, too flawed and too painterly: 
conceivably not ‘manufactured’
14 enough. 
 
1.2.  The Barbs, Collages: Theatricality 
 
Next I would like to discuss my Barb (2010-11) collages. Although The Aesthetic Responsibility 
paintings  perhaps  didn’t,  on  quite  the  same  level  as  the  Glazed  works,  achieve  the  requisite 
sincerity (through their essential insincerity) I will argue that the Barbs, through their adoption of 
tableau, ultimately did combat theatricality. 
 
 
                                                         
13 These supplementary supports were altogether more human than industrial like those of the 60s and present-day Minimlists. 
14 Again I mean manufactured in terms of a machine-produced industrial context as well as a social one. In terms of a social context 
the ‘designed’ production of pop stars as well as online self-image (as Goffman terms ‘self-design’) springs to mind.  
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The series of collages Barbs (Figs. 8-9) from the latin barba meaning ‘beard’, again play on these 
ideas of sincerity and insincerity. They paradoxically conceal something while at the same time 
stylistically revealing something: a beard can perform both a cover-up and revelation of identity. 
Also it is revealing that language informally employs the term ‘beard’ to describe a person who 
stands in for another, therefore allowing the identity of the original persona to be concealed. For 
example a woman who accompanies a homosexual man as an escort to a social occasion, in order 
to help conceal his homosexuality can be described as a ‘beard’: the closeted male and his female 
‘beard’. In the case of the Barb works the collaged facial hair was meant to parallel this idea of 
covering-up a true essence. By physically pasting over areas of the face with glue and magazine 
cut-outs  the  production  process  of  the  drawings  neatly  echoes  the  concept  of  concealment. 
Furthermore it is worth mentioning that the origin of these hairy cut-outs were not images of 
hair but fake-fur torn from high-end glossy lifestyle magazines. So again an act of concealment 
occurred – that of the identity of the hair itself, revealing that the beard ‘hair’ was not facial hair 
after all but fake fur (aspirational in its ‘fake’ glamour).  
 
In contrast to ideas of concealment beards also provide us with strong images of identity. A beard 
– its shape, its texture, its colour, its ‘style’ tells us a lot about its owner. Its outward appearance 
conforms to a social code and consequently acts as a social signifier: the ‘barbs’ reveal an identity 
of sorts. Correspondingly the method used to construct the drawings themselves gently echoes 
their subject matter and in this ways ‘reveals’ an extra dimension. The drawings are composed 
using very fine black pen-strokes. These finely drawn lines echo the texture of the fake fur images 
Fig. 9. Installation View, Kate Hawkins & James Ferris  
My Brother is a Hairy Man (2011) George Polke, London 
Fig. 8. Kate Hawkins, Barb IV (2010)  
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from the magazine cut-outs adding to the overall ‘hairiness’. In summary, the ‘Barb’ drawings 
both conceal and simultaneously reveal identities. 
 
Theatre  also is considered  an  apparatus  for  both concealment and revelation.  However, it is 
theatre’s deceptive potential alone, Jonas Barish argues, that forms the basis for an age-old anti-
theatrical prejudice. He explains how, ‘Thespis, who gave his name to the art of acting, was called 
a liar by Solon because he was pretending to be someone else’ (Barish, 1981: 1) and adds how ‘it 
would not be overstating the case by very much to say that hostility to impersonation forms one 
of the cornerstones to Plato’s Republic.’ (Barish) According to Barish, Plato was first to articulate 
an antitheatrical prejudice. Furthermore in Plato’s view all forms of art equate to mimesis or 
imitation e.g. the making of a copy, a simulacrum rather than the making of something new and 
original. In relation to the arts Socrates was also in agreement claiming that ‘the painter, when he 
paints a bed, paints such a world, and it is a world of appearances, a debased version of what in 
nature is already only an appearance, since even the carpenter’s solid wooden object is no more 
than a particular instance of the Idea bed, which alone can be said to be real and true. The 
painter’s craft thus reduces itself to an effort of slavish mimicry … removed from truth’ (Barish, 
1985: 6). 
 
In Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980), and other 
writings, Fried also, with reference to Diderot, situates ‘theatricality’ as antithetical to the idea of 
truth. As discussed in the introduction, Fried argues that whenever a consciousness of viewing 
exists, absorption is sacrificed, and theatricality results. In these instances he describes theatricality 
in negative terms as being disruptive and artificial and more generally states that the mannerism 
and artifice inherent in theatrical artwork runs the risk of making patently insincere advances on 
the spectator,  ultimately discrediting it. In  Fried and D i d e r ot ’ s  t e rm s ,  th e  b a rb  d ra w i n g s  a r e 
hugely theatrical, both in their ability to promote a consciousness of viewing and their inherent 
artifice. Also, and this relates more to the definition of tableau which I will discuss in more detail 
later  in  this  chapter,  as  a  result  of  being  collages,  they  retain  the  potential  for  material 
disunification  – t h u s  l i k e l y  a d d i n g  t o  a n o t h e r  v i e w i n g  d i sruption  and  intensification  of 
theatricality. 
 
Sometimes  theatre  is  about  duration,  an  engagement  with  temporality  that  violates  the 
juxtapositive immediacy of visual art forms. Sometimes theatre is about referentiality – or worse, 
literality – a tendency that misunderstands the goals of modernist abstraction. Sometimes theatre  
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is about spectacle, a discourse that supports fragile delineations between a consumptive society of 
the  spectacle  and  presumably  anti-consumptive  forms  of  image-making.  Sometime  theatre  is 
about  situatedness  and  the  spectatorial  encounter,  an  extended  spatiality  that  unsettles  the 
circumscribed spatiality of the autonomous art form. Sometimes theatre is about mixture, an art 
of in-betweens that violates modernism’s “medium purity”. (Jackson, 2010)  
 
Despite  ‘reusing  [many  of]  the  fundamental  registers  of  theatre  …  embodiment,  spectacle, 
ensemble … gesture, situated space, reenactment of an elusive original’ (Jackson, 2010) the works 
comprising My Brother is a Hairy Man ultimately aimed at a truth rather than mimesis (Plato) or 
artifice  (Fried)  and  attempted  to  shine  a  light  on  our  increasingly  theatrical,  stage-managed 
world.  The  barb  drawings/collages  in  particular  were  an  attempt  to  make  visible  our 
interchangeable,  slippery  and  dressed-up  identities  –  particularly  in  this  internet  age  on  this 
digital stage. In a world where simulated identities, identity swaps or cover-ups are increasingly 
common and nothing is transparent, the collages profile every man yet no man simultaneously. 
Their ‘data’ is redundant because it is stolen from the pages of luxury fashion magazines, their 
beards are not real; they are fake. Yet in linguistic terms, they are stylistically flawless ‘beards’. 
They keep us off the scent. They are slippery sketches as opposed to precise profiles. David Joselit 
in his October text ‘What To Do with Pictures’ writes that: 
 
There are few things more ubiquitous in contemporary life than profiles: some are 
composed  voluntarily to  be posted on social-media  sites,  but  many,  and p e r ha p s 
most, are involuntary, like the data trails left by every purchase, cursor click, and 
mobile  phone  call  one  makes.  Silhouettes  have  existed  for  ages,  but  profiling  is 
modern—dating from the nineteenth century.
15 A silhouette is a bounded shape that 
sharply delineates an inside from an outside: the information it carries lies entirely in 
partitioning a field. The  verb ‘to profile’ denotes the imposition of such  a finite 
shape onto a set of perceived statistical regularities, as when scientists plot a straight 
line through an irregular array of data points, disciplining and abstracting inchoate 
(or sometimes merely imagined) patterns. The implicit violence of such projections 
is  conveyed  by  the  connotation  of  profiling  in  police  work,  where  persons  who 
belong to particular groups—be they organized by ethnicity, age, economic status, or 
                                                         
15 On nineteenth-century forms of aesthetic profiling, see Allan Sekula, The Body and the Archive, October 39 (Winter 1986), pp. 3–
64.  
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gender—are  believed to  be  more  likely to  commit a  crime  and consequently are 
more frequently treated as criminals. Profiling imposes a profile on populations of 
data (including visual data). (Joselit, 2011: 86) 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Seth Price, Talking/Writing/Lighting (2008-9) courtesy of the artist and Friedrich Petzel 
 
 
He goes on to describe Seth Price’s works and in particular two tactics related to profiling. I 
would like to quickly discuss the first, which can be understood through a series of works Price 
produced using rare wood veneers laminated behind clear plastic acrylic. His starting point for 
these  optical  puzzles,  mounted  on  blank  expanses  of  wall  were  small  icons  drawn  from  the 
internet ‘each picturing a gesture of touching, such as lighting a cigarette, kissing, or writing.’ 
(Joselit, 2011: 87) What the viewer is left with, once the appropriated ‘icons’ upon which they 
are based, the intimate moments of face-to-face contact, have been removed is a gap. Price, in a 
convincing but terrifying transition, transforms tactility into absence. ‘Needless to say, this is 
precisely an effect of digital communication’ (Joselit, 2011: 88).  
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Through an understanding of ‘absence’ Price’s anti-profiles relate closely to the Barb Series. In 
the final form of Price’s works the original ‘positive’ profiles or data become ‘negatives’ as can be 
seen in Fig 10. With the Barb series of collages the positives were never actually in place, or were 
certainly never true ‘stats’ in the first instance. Despite appearing as portraits or profiles of real 
people,  or  a  collection  of  collaged  ‘data’  they  were  only  ever  abstractions;  an  abstraction 
conceivably being described as a loss of information. There was no real data to begin with. The 
hair is not even real hair. It is fur, from an entirely different animal altogether. And on top of that 
it is fake, so not from an animal at all, but a machine.  
 
In their absence, deficiency or lack of transparency Price’s anti-profiles also become theatrical.  
On some level both sets of works are lying, with deliberate intent to mask or deceive which in 
turn cannot help but promote a consciousness of viewing, as Fried would have it. Because they 
are not being truthful up front, they make their viewers work to avoid being tricked or wrong-
footed. Indeed even David Joselit, a revered and experienced art critic and theorist, notes how he 
was tripped  up the first time he saw Price’s piece: ‘Because these giant puzzle pieces, which 
resemble landmasses in a wall map, are themselves free-form, it is not easy to recognize—let alone 
to remember—the motif they partially delineate (I admit that the first time I saw one, I failed to 
recognize the generating kernel at all)’ (Joselit, 2011: 87-88). 
 
The Barbs also are an art of in-betweens, an art of dressing-up and dressing-down. Once more, 
this time in the terms outlined by Fried in his 1967 diatribe Art and Objecthood, they are wholly  
‘theatrical’ in their violation of modernism’s ‘medium purity’. Just as minimalist or literalist art 
disrupted the frame of viewing and thus the pure forms of the modernist painting that preceded 
it, the Barb collages through their use of found magazine clippings also disrupt the tradition 
tableau form in their disunity. My basic understanding of collage stems from thinking of it in 
terms of an addition, an added extra, a supplement, (Derrida, 1967: 281) if you like. However if 
for one moment we return to its source, the derivation of the term comes from the French ‘coller’ 
meaning ‘glue’. In this context then, perhaps the glue is the key to conceiving of it in terms 
somewhat oppositional to my original. After all glue is a bond, a unifying agent with the potential 
to make a collection of disparate parts a unified whole (just as a tableau is understood to function 
because of its unity of composition). And just as Kaprow describes the form of ‘happenings’ as 
being subsumed into our definition of theatre, perhaps we can understand how collage could be 
viewed as an acceptable form of painting (and also tableau which I will discuss in more detail 
much later in this chapter):  
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[Happenings] are essentially theatre pieces, however unconventional. That they are 
still largely rejected by devotees of theatre may be due to their uncommon power 
and  primitive energy,  and to their derivation from the rites of American  Action 
Painting.  But widening the concept ‘theatre’ to include them (like widening the 
concept ‘painting’ to include collage), we can see them against this basic background 
and understand them better. (Allan Kaprow, 1993: 17) 
 
Let me just re-iterate though (as I also tried to outline in the introduction) that at no point in this 
thesis does theatrical (and particularly with reference to Fried) mean theatre-like. Jean-Francois 
Chevrier in his paper given at the ‘Tableau: Painting Photo Object’ conference at the Tate in 
October 2011 also discussed collage in relation to the idea of tableau and theatricality. Chevrier 
begun by outlining how, during the 1920s, post-suprematist Polish artist Władysław Strzemiński 
who was a pupil of Malevich formulated his theory of Unism.  Strzeminski’s ‘essentialism was 
never simply an aesthetic program (pursuit of degree zero, of the specificity of art); it was, rather, 
articulated onto a social program and found its ‘justification’ in the history of the social division 
of labour’. (Bois, 1990: 127) His theory of Unism stated that: ‘A picture that contained little 
contrasts, that was in agreement with its innate qualities and with itself – was a dull picture from 
the baroque point of view’. (Bois, 1990: 129) Unism was a de-dramatised space for the gaze that 
could suppress the conflict of forces. This fitted very neatly with the idea of tableau at the time.  
 
According  to  Strzemiński,  composition  rests  on  a  rhetorical  model  (more  recently,  Michael 
Baxandall has advanced a similar argument). Any composition stages a drama (thesis/antithesis) 
whose resolution (synthesis) must be convincing.
16 But this resolution, Strzemiński declared, is 
not ‘real’, because the plastic problem it resolves is based on metaphysical oppositions ‘artificially’ 
imposed on the pictorial and sculptural matter. (Bois, 1990: 137)  
 
However it transpired that Strzemiński’s unistic position on tableau was impossible to sustain 
during times of war – nothing worked together or was harmonious any more. Conflict of forces 
could not be expelled from this debate. Yve-Alan Bois explains how Strzemiński was forced to 
abandon Unism once he reached the point at which his system left him nothing to say in 1936. 
                                                         
16 Strzemiński notes that the basic assumption underlying the baroque is that a picture should be a sign of dramatic pathos. The 
pathos is that which finds its expression in the dynamism of directional tensions and in the drama of the blows inflicted by lines upon 
other lines (Bois, 1990: 137).   
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(Bois, 1990: 131). Unism was wrapped up with the utopian day-dream that could not easily be 
reconciled during or post war. Chevrier goes on to explain the convincing  manner in which 
Strzemiński then chose to include this binary opposition in his post-war work. The collage below 
(Fig. 11) from a series titled To My Friends The Jews (1945) is an example of his post-war (anti-
unistic) tableau. Here he combined drawing and collage and juxtaposed abstract structures with 
images of atrocities from concentration camps. 
 
 
      
  
 
 
As Chevrier points out, collage is a major invention in 20
th century art (Chevrier, 2011) and I 
posit  Strzemiński’s  series  To  My  Friends  The  Jews  bears  comparision  to  the  Barb s e r i e s .  Not 
dissimilar in terms of scale and figuration Strzemiński’s series To My Friends The Jews illustrates 
his latter, less than unistic approach. Here the picture plane is fully disrupted by contrasting, 
diverse elements  –  a  juxtaposition of  abstraction  and  document. It is a  cycle of ten collages 
constructed from drawings (exact copies of drawings from his earlier war series) and photographs 
 
Fig. 12. Kate Hawkins, Barb I (2010)  Fig. 11. Władysław Strzemiński, from the series 
To My Friends The Jews, (1945)  
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documenting the Holocaust.  These photographs were drawn over with, as Andrzej Turowski 
puts it, ‘empty contours of nonexistence’ (Bojarska, 2011) – meandering lines creating organic, 
amorphous shapes running nowhere and contouring nothing. There is a tension between the two 
separate entities, the photograph and the line, but it doesn’t give way to easy interpretation. It is 
of the time. Tentative as I am about drawing comparisons between these two drawings, bearing 
in mind Strzemiński’s subject matter, nevertheless I am interested in the similarities between the 
formal constructions of the works. But both show tensions in material. Both reconcile (or not) 
line with the photographic. And both are, if I may say it, honest representations of their own 
zeitgeist. 
 
In this way (although it might not be Fried’s reading but is probably Chevrier’s) I think both 
Strzemiński’s  series  To  My  Friends  The  Jews a n d  m y  Barbs,  in  their  own  manner  negate 
theatricality  and  embrace  tableau  and  sincerity.  Using  Unism’s  terms  they  are  both 
representations of a unified experience – To My Friends The Jews (1945) the experience of war, 
and  Barbs  (2010)  the  experience  of  peace  and  plenty.  And  although  the  Barb  series  can  be 
understood to be theatrical in Fried’s terms because they bring about a consciousness of viewing 
through their inauthentic surfaces, they also acknowledge their own dishonesty (like the glazed 
works) and in this way paradoxically their own sincerity. Ultimately they tell the truth through 
their (transparent) lies. 
 
1.3.  The Installation: Tableau 
 
So above I have shown how, through the adoption of tableau, the Barbs combated theatricality. 
Next I would like to discuss tableau in a little more depth and make a case for a reformulation of 
the term and its acknowledged contexts, to include not just a bounded frame but a bounded 
exhibition. In this vein the component works of the exhibition My Brother Is A Hairy Man might 
begin to be read by the spectator not as individual tableau but as a collective tableau.  
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Fig. 13. Installation View, Kate Hawkins & James Ferris, My Brother is a Hairy Man (2011) George Polke, London 
 
 
Up  to  this  point,  the  terms  in  which  Tableau h a s  b e e n  f o r m u l a t e d  a r e  w i t h  r e g a r d s  t o  a  
contained, bounded single, wall-based object. According to Chevrier, the key characteristics of 
contemporary photographic tableaux are that: ‘They are designed and produced for the wall, 
summoning a confrontational experience on the part of the spectator that sharply contrasts with 
the habitual processes of appropriation and projection whereby photographic images are normally 
received  and  "consumed”’  (Chevrier,  1989:  116).  Puttfarken a l s o  e x p l a i n s  i n  h i s  t e x t  The 
Discovery  of  Pictorial  Composition  how  ‘Poussin  accepts  the  bounded  nature  of  his  tableau, 
accommodates the frame as part of our visual experience of it, and thereby admits that its reality 
is different from that  of the surrounding world and that it demands to  be seen differently.’ 
(Puttfarken, 2000: 214). Alongside this he describes how in his Origine, Félibien (in discussion of 
Le Brun’s Tent of Darius had claimed: ‘… as a tableau is the image of a particular action, the 
painter must arrange his subject-matter and distribute his figures according to the nature of the 
action which he undertakes to represent’ (Puttfarken, 2000: 250). Following this Félibien enters 
into  detailed  descriptions  of  every  figure’s  expression,  character  and  temperament  although 
Puttfarken  explains  how  Félibien  is  alerted  to  the  risk  that  such  painstaking  attention  to 
individual  details  in  the  work  poses  as  a  constituting  threat  to  the  coherence  of  the  whole. 
According to Puttfarken, Félibien counters this ‘by invoking a neo-Aristotelian notion of l’unité  
 
 
 
 
42 
de  sujet or unity of action’.  (Puttfarken,  2000:  251).  Félibien  writes:  ‘However,  such  a  great 
variety  of  things  in  no  way  hinders the unity  of subject; on the contrary,  all these different 
expressions, and all these different movements contribute to the representation of a single action, 
as if there were so many lines joining each other at their centre’ (Puttfarken, 2000: 251). 
 
However  Fried  in  his  discussion  of  18
th  century  painting  views  tableaux v e r y  m u c h  a s  
autonomous scenes that kept the spectator apart from the ‘action’. He explains how: 
 
In  Diderot’s  writings  on  painting  and  drama  the  object-beholder  relationship  as 
such, the very condition of spectatordom, stands indicted as theatrical, a medium of 
dislocation  and  estrangement  rather  than  of  absorption,  sympathy,  self-
transcendence; and the success of both arts, in fact their continued functioning as 
major expressions of human spirit, are held to depend upon whether or not painter 
and dramatist are able to undo their state of affairs, to de-theatricalize beholding and 
so make it once again a mode of access to truth and conviction, albeit a truth and 
conviction that cannot be entirely equated with any known experience before. What 
is called for, in other words, is at one and the same time the creation of a new sort of 
object – the fully realized tableau – and the constitution of a new sort of beholder – a 
new ‘subject’ – whose innermost nature would consist precisely in the conviction of 
his absence from the scene of representation. (Fried, 1980: 104) 
 
The ‘scene of representation’ for the purposes of my argument is the exhibition My Brother is a 
Hairy Man, which comprised the installation of the whole gallery floor as opposed to separate and 
individual works - which historically constitute tableaux. It included works by myself and another 
artist,  James  Ferris.  Our  ‘scene  of  representation’  therefore  somewhat  conflicts  with  Fried’s 
descriptions of 18
th century tableau where the beholder’s absence from the scene was regarded as a 
defining factor. James and I, on the other hand, intended for our viewers to be wholly immersed 
in the ‘action’ of the installation. Historically then an installation such as My Brother is A Hairy 
Man would be closer in reading to the medieval tableaux vivants as a consequence of the ‘scene of 
representation’ representing the whole installation rather than individual ‘pictures’
17 including our 
                                                         
17 Both Tableau and Tableau Vivant are two terms still loosely connected through the understanding of the word ‘picture’. It is worth 
noting at this juncture that Fried, in all of his texts, conscientiously retains the French word ‘Tableau’ because, he argues (2008), there 
is  no  direct  translation  into  English  for  the  French  word  Tableau.  Picture  is  similar,  however  ‘it  lacks  the  connotations  of 
constructedness, of being the product of an intellectual act that the French word carries’. (Fried, 2008: 146)  
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introduction of supplemental forms and structures to individual works which also conflicted with 
the  perceived  definition  of  tableau a s  a  b o u n d e d  f o r m .  Tableau  vivant  can  be  very  crudely 
translated as ‘living picture’. These living pictures most often consisted of a group of static three-
dimensional figures depicting allegories staged for royal procession and their entry into medieval 
towns. ‘Royalty would move from tableau vivant to tableau vivant. Eventually, the tableau vivant 
included texts and a play was formed. Through this notion of theatre as a succession of individual 
scenes or pictorial moments, we gain an insight into the complex temporality that characterizes 
the history of tableau in its relation to the tableau vivant’ (Lisbon, 2013:  78). Jean-Francois 
Chevrier also points out this tableau vivant set-up allowed the viewer to enter the picture plane 
and become part of the image. He goes on to argue that this is why it is deemed theatrical, as 
theatre is connected with the possibility of entering into a composition.  
 
Despite this historical reading Chevrier in his Tate lecture (2011) speculates about how the term 
tableau might be extended and re-thought in the current internet age although acknowledged that 
the reformulation hadn’t as yet been done. At this juncture I would (somewhat cautiously) like to 
suggest an alternative formulation of the term, which will require me to digress briefly. Recently I 
attended the opening of Hauser and Wirth’s new Onnasch collection exhibition titled Re-view. It 
was housed in two venues – their Saville Row and Piccadilly spaces. An impressive installation by 
Edward Kienholz could be found in the Piccadilly space. The accompanying gallery text read as 
follows: 
 
EDWARD KIENHOLZ (1927 – 1994)  
The Big Eye (Homage to H.S.) 1961 
Painted TV console, newspaper article, figurine and plastic 
 
In  the  early  1950s,  Kienholz  was  a  conduit  to  Los  Angeles  for  the  energy  and 
muscularity of the New York School. But by 1957 he was working almost exclusively 
with found objects to create dramatic assemblage sculptures that often contained 
scathing social commentary. In the same year he opened the famed Ferus Gallery 
with Walter Hopps. The gallery was dedicated to promoting avant-garde art and 
culture  in  Los  Angeles  –  and  Kienholz  became  the  de  facto  leader  of  the  city’s 
burgeoning art scene. Wanting to spend more time on his own practice, Kienholz 
sold his share of the gallery in 1958,  but he remained a presence  at the  gallery, 
mounting  the  first  exhibition  of  assemblage  sculptures  in  1959.  Thoughout  the  
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1960s, Kienholz increased the scale of his works to build what he called ‘tableaux’ – 
large installations that allowed the viewer to enter the space. The tableaux would 
become Kienholz’s signature style, with striking juxtapositions and startling imagery 
that often referenced earlier historical periods while drawing on current social issues. 
Many of the subjects he dealt with were controversial and he enhanced the spectacle 
by tapping into a dramatic theatricality that was distinctly ‘Hollywood’. In the early 
1970s  Kienholz  began  spending  extended  periods  of  time  in  Berlin  where  he 
developed  a  strong  relationship  with  Reinhard  Onnasch,  resulting  in  this 
unparalleled collection of Kienholz’s assemblage sculptures. 
 
What I find interesting about this gallery text (other than Kienholz’s work) is his description of 
his installations as ‘tableaux’. Historically, as I touched on before, tableau, in spite of its slippery 
translation, denotes a single ‘picture form’ or ‘picture object’. Here however, Kienholz is naming 
his  whole  installations  ‘tableaux’.  Not  only  does  this  not  fit  within  the  perceived  definition, 
neither is there any historical precedent for it. Typically such a scene of physical objects would be 
referred to as tableau vivant or ‘living sculpture’ as opposed to the tableau associated with the 
autonomous picture plane, but nowhere in this text is there any suggestion from Kienholz of this 
understanding and no suggestion that tableau is limited or linked only to a picture.  
 
Tableau vivant contrary to the translation ‘living picture’ I always feel suggests something dead. 
Laura Lisbon reminds us how, ‘it is in this context that we recall the explicit stillness of the 
related concept of the tableau vivant.’ (Lisbon, 2013: 78). This stillness troubles me further when 
I consider it in terms related to the performative - whose definition is contingent to the idea of 
action (not stillness). I will get to performativity more fully in Chapter 2 but at this stage it is 
important to acknowledge perfomativity’s significance in the construction of my argument as a 
whole. At this stage then, stillness cannot be viewed constructively. I have pursued a reframing of 
the term tableau so as to avoid tableau vivant and the stillness intrinsic to it. Although tableaux 
vivants provide context through their immediate environments I have always felt they slightly 
lacked in content. For instance, they and their constituting elements do not move or speak. They 
are passive and in their unnatural muteness they consequently appear dead or in the very least 
impotent.   
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Fig. 14. Installation View, Kate Hawkins & James Ferris, My Brother is a Hairy Man (2011) George Polke, London  
 
Fig. 15. Kate Hawkins, Sam Sausage (2010) & James Ferris, Sam Sausage (2011) 
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Fig. 16. Installation View, Kate Hawkins & James Ferris, My Brother is a Hairy Man (2011) George Polke, London  
 
 
 
 
47 
On the other hand, the concept tableau, despite the crude translation ‘picture’ or ‘picture form’, 
perhaps possesses something intrinsically more powerful in terms of content and context. Lisbon 
remarks in her Notes on the Tableau how the concept incorporates ideas of ‘coming into form … 
stilling, distancing, or cutting’ (Lisbon, 2013: 78). Again all of these are verbs and point to a 
more dynamic state, an action. In this way I think Kienholz is right to term his installations 
tableaux. Formally they are closer to the historical tableaux vivants but in concept they possess 
much more of the indeterminate tableau in their complex, dynamic compositions. Like Kienholz 
I would like to make a case for the sum of the exhibition My Brother is a Hairy Man to be 
understood  as  a  tableau  with  varying  compositional  elements:  an  expanded  painting,  or 
installation that enabled the viewer to enter the picture plane. Like this, the whole ‘composition is 
also  the  name  of  the  operation  that  denies  the  fetishization  process  of  the  cut-out,  critically 
displacing  the  spectator  in  the  operation,  and  opening  the  relation  of  placement  and  refusal 
(distanciation) that both criticism and painting share. As Barthes notes, referring to Diderot, “the 
creation of the painter or dramatist lies not in the choice of a subject but in the choice of a 
pregnant moment, in the choice of the tableau” (Barthes, 1977:76)’ (Lisbon, 2013: 80). I see this 
to be true for the show as a whole alongside the individual paintings, the context and the content. 
This way the context, intrinsic to understanding the tableau vivant, can at one and the same time 
be incorporated into the richer content of tableau form. For instance the individual elements 
within the installation My Brother is a Hairy Man in my mind are very much animated in the 
larger conversation of the gallery space which positions itself as the frame or bounded plane – 
symptomatic therefore of a tableau rather than tableau vivant. Both paintings and sculptures were 
in active in their dialogue with one another throughout. For instance Fig. 15 depicts one of my 
collages hung close to one of James’ oil paintings. Their conversation speaks of their mimicking 
each other in their sausage-shaped forms and even their muted tones. To emphasise this imitation 
even further we titled them identically. And this way the context intrinsic to understanding the 
tableau vivant can at one and the same time be incorporated into the richer content of tableau 
form. Thus the individual works become ‘absorbed’ in the larger exhibition context as a whole. 
This absorption of the works into the exhibition ‘tableau’ in turn leads to an absorption of the 
spectator  in  viewing  terms,  which  accordingly  (if  we  concur  with  Fried’s  argument  that 
absorption negates theatricality) overcomes any potential theatricality. 
 
Furthermore, although Fried, as outlined before, stressed the importance of the absence of the 
spectator from the scene of representation, at the same time, he does acknowledge, that ‘tableau’ 
in itself embodies something of a paradox: the viewer is still required to participate in the tableau  
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while simultaneously being excluded from it. 
 
Once again we have arrived at a paradox … As we have seen, the recognition that 
paintings are made to be beheld and therefore presuppose the existence of a beholder 
led to the demand for the actualization of his presence: a painting it was insisted had 
to attract the beholder, to stop him in front of itself, and to hold him there in a 
perfect trance of involvement. At the same time, taking Diderot’s writings as the 
definitive formulation of a conception of painting that up to a point was widely 
shared, it was only by negating the beholder’s presence that this could be achieved: 
only  by  establishing  the  fiction  of  his  absence  or  nonexistence  could  his  actual 
placement before and enthrallment by the painting be secured. This paradox directs 
attention to the problematic character not only of the painting-beholder relationship 
but of something still more fundamental – the object-beholder (one is tempted to 
say  object-‘subject’)  relationship  which  the  painting-beholder  relationship 
epitomizes. (Fried, 1980: 103-104)  
 
This illusory paradox once again supports my argument for the consideration of the exhibition as 
a whole to be tableau. Fried explains how Diderot’s conception of painting and tableau rested on 
the supreme fiction that the beholder was not really there standing in front of the canvas. And 
that in itself is a lie, an untruth, an insincerity. At the very least My Brother is a Hairy Man as 
exhibition tableau sincerely acknowledges the existence of its spectator through, for example, the 
repeated use of the ‘conceal’ in tandem with the simultaneous ‘reveal’, present in all the hairy 
works for instance. Perhaps in widening the reach of the term tableau we can simultaneously help 
resolve its internal paradoxes.  
 
Foucault also talks of tableau but his is a much more empirical, structural reading of the term – 
he talks about tableau (not in relation to pictures but) in relation to tables, structures, supports 
and bodies of knowledge. I don’t wish to go into much more detail as I don’t wish to confuse my 
argument but what is briefly worth mentioning is that ‘what [Foucault’s tableau] shares  with 
other tableaux of the eighteenth century is the function of graphing the systems of relations’. Julie 
Candler Hayes (Feilla, 2013) has also argued that Diderot’s poetics of drama can similarly be seen 
as an extension of his theory of rapports that informs all areas of his thought. ‘Diderot borrows 
the eighteenth-century interest in natural and aesthetic relationships to posit a reality that is 
comprehensible only insofar as it is perceived in terms of relational systems.’ (Feilla, 2013)  I  
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believe it is this idea of a system of relations within tableau outlined independently by Foucault 
and Diderot that is key to addressing both the individual works within My Brother Is A Hairy 
Man as well as the show as a whole. For Foucault these relational systems were conceived of as 
scientific, political and economic; for Diderot they were more in line with the aesthetic, moral 
and social. Furthermore, as Cecilia Feilla explains, Barthes propaedeutic
18 understanding of the 
tableau was also anchored around relational systems. For Barthes tableau enabled ‘the viewer in 
the theater, the reader of a novel, or spectator before a painting to grasp the otherwise invisible 
order of things – the larger social system – within which individuals figure in relation to others’ 
(Feilla, 2013). 
 
Through  Kienholz’s  constituting  claim  for  tableau a l o n g s i d e  F o u c a u l t ,  D i d e r o t  a n d  B a r t h e s ’  
understanding of tableau as a system of relations I would like to make the case for not only My 
Brother is A Hairy Man but also my successive exhibitions to be considered tableaux (as opposed 
to tableaux vivants) in their exhibition forms. The intention for all my paintings, installations and 
assemblages discussed within this thesis is the same. When viewed as an installation, the works 
should  yield  a  single,  balanced  visual  tableau  alongside  their  simultaneous  functioning  as 
individual and autonomous tableaux. It is key that they have a conversation or at least have the 
means by which to have a conversation by way of their relational systems. 
 
I consider this systemic approach a productive way of conceiving of exhibition layouts in general 
but as I said before I think it is particularly appropriate in the context of my exhibition  My 
Brother Is A Hairy Man, which overarchingly dealt with social concerns and relationships and 
even more so because of its collaborative nature. When making work for the show, James and I 
had  many conversations  about contemporary theatricality and  how this  might  manifest itself 
socially. We were keen for the show to set up a potential social but also theatre-like space within 
which the works and spectators could congregate and relate. 
Richard Sennett in his book The Fall of Public Man published in 1977 mourns the erosion of the 
public domain – the replacement of city streets and squares as social centres with suburban living 
rooms – and calls for a re-evaluation in our thinking towards public and social behaviours. He 
urges us to consider which social conditions specifically encourage people to display their feelings 
to others in a way that rouses sympathetic response. In other words: under what conditions do 
                                                         
18 ‘propaedeutic’ in this context implies providing the preliminary framework and rules for understanding a larger body of knowledge.  
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human  beings  tap  their  creative  powers  to  make  an  ordinary  experience  expressive?  Sennett 
maintains that these questions are ways of asking when, if ever, does the human being naturally 
and without fuss call on the energies which today seem isolated in the very preserves of art? He is 
talking in this instance about social playacting. 
The artfulness that is squandered in self-absorption is that of play-acting; playacting 
requires an audience of strangers to succeed, but is meaningless or even destructive 
among intimates. Playacting in the form of manners, conventions and ritual gestures 
is the very stuff out of which public relations are formed, and from which public 
relations  derive  their  emotional  meaning.  The  more  social  conditions  erode  the 
public forum the more people are routinely inhibited from exercising the capacity to 
playact … These modes of playacting are ‘roles’. Thus, one method of making sense 
of the shift between public and private in modern culture would be to investigate the 
historical changes in these public ‘roles’ (Sennett, 2002: 28-29). 
 
 
Fig. 17. Installation View, Kate Hawkins & James Ferris, My Brother is a Hairy Man (2011) George Polke, London 
 
Similarly to Sennett, we were also keen, within the show, to explore the shift between public and 
private spheres. To an extent this was achieved through the inclusion and juxtaposition of  a 
handful of domestic and personal objects with those that were not. The personal objects included  
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a bottle of perfume (see Fig. 17), a pack of kitchen sponges, a shirt belonging to James (see Fig. 
17), a drawing of my boyfriend, a doorstop to stabilize one of the wobbly sculptures (see Fig. 17), 
and Ben’s table (although I am still confused as to who Ben actually is). These public/private roles 
were also loosely echoed by the dual use of the George Polke gallery space itself, which at times 
functioned as a public gallery and at others a private studio. Furthermore, the door at the back of 
the space led you through into the owner’s permanently private living area. In terms of our 
audience we hoped, in the vein of Sennett, that their experience was shaped by the works social 
potential  for  play-acting,  in  that  through  play-acting  the  works  engendered  a  public  arena, 
tableau or stage which endorsed the formation of the public’s relations with the works in the 
space and potentially each other. 
 
Erving Goffman’s ideas also relate back to Sennett’s thoughts on ‘playacting’ or ‘role-playing’, 
although Goffman sees playacting as less of an ‘Art’ than a science. Goffman and his text The 
Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, provides a potentially useful framework for public versus 
private identities in his discussions of front stage and back stage. Goffman believes that as an 
actor plays his established role each night, an individual will repeatedly play his own particular 
role in a particular situation. Goffman calls this a ‘front’. He goes on to point out the importance 
of a separation between spheres of action i.e. the divide between ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ in 
most institutions, underlining how, when these two separate spheres are amalgamated, workers’ 
performances  are  degraded. It  is  unhealthy  and  unsustainable  to  be  in  ‘front  stage’  or 
‘performance’ mode all of the time. His basic premise is that life is theatre and the world is a stage 
and we are all, more or less consciously, always playing a role. This, it can be argued, relates not 
only to our online behaviours and our urge to perform online, but very closely to the concept of 
tableau  and  its  carefully  considered  composition,  our  carefully  curated  ‘self-design’ a s  e a r l i e r 
established by Groys. 
 
These curated compositions (tableaux) are now more than ever made for their audience. I would 
argue that a contemporary definition of tableau should acknowledge the presence of the spectator, 
be received on the level of the exhibition as a whole, alongside that of individual ‘pictures’ and no 
longer be viewed in such binary terms i.e an absent interlocuter or beholder set against a painting 
but more as a network of relations. In my mind both beholder and artwork are participants, both 
part of a ‘rapport’, or set of relations, both part of the overall composition or contemporary 
drama. A transcendental experience before an artwork seems a somewhat outdated and passive 
perspective. I might even go so far as to suggest that we should predominantly be thinking about  
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reception on the level of the exhibition as a whole rather than as an individual responses to 
individual works as this aligns much more closely with our current socially ‘networked’ mode of 
operations. 
 
This reformulation and expansion of the term tableau consequently allowed for a rethinking of 
the  terms  ‘display’  and  ‘installation’  within  the  exhibition  My  Brother  is  A  Hairy  Man.  The 
exhibition represented a crossroads in relation to the means and methods of display of artwork 
and painting specifically. It was the first time I had considered painting as an expanded field in 
terms of object and subject. This resulted in the use of external structures and supports beyond 
that of the canvas stretcher to hang/display my paintings. For example I put triangle shaped ‘hat’ 
on  top  of  one  of  the  paintings  in  the  show  and  draped  some  fake  fur  from  another.  This 
represented a departure from the traditional hang and in a sense marked the beginning of my 
exploration into the paintings as structures or objects ‘performing’ or ‘acting’. Also, at points, the 
external structures acted like props. Spotlights were incorporated in the hang alongside a painting 
titled  Backdrop,  thereby  playing  on  ideas  of  theatrical,  scenic  backdrops.  Alongside  the 
exploitation of theatrical structures
19 this disregard for the historical definition of tableau, with 
regards to the unity of a single, bounded plane, was emphasised further by the fact that My 
Brother is a Hairy Man was a collaboration. In this manner the boundaries of tableau were once 
again pushed by the inclusion in the exhibition of works by two different artists that were asking 
to be  viewed  as one by the spectator. Together with the show  as a whole functioning  as an 
expanded tableau the intention was for each individual work to function as autonomous tableau 
alongside it with the ultimate aim of the individual works
20 equating to a sum of their parts. This 
wasn’t  always  the  case  but  despite  these  instances  the  exhibition  as  a  whole  did  well  as a  
renegotiated and expanded tableau. The spectator was absorbed into the entirety of installation 
akin to how they would be in a theatre or sports stadium. Also this more absorptive environment 
encouraged me to consider the potential for more emotional and affective spectatorship.
21 
                                                         
19 When making the work for My Brother is a Hairy Man I spent time researching theatrical forms. I wanted to ascertain to what 
extent the forms of the artworks could ‘act out’ their own theatrical performance – using external structures or otherwise. Also I was 
directly trying to address notions of theatricality within the content of the paintings themselves through my use of smoking and 
bearded men imagery. It was a challenge not to make this too literal yet still palpable enough. There is a very fine line between self-
conscious and sincere especially when employing theatrical imagery. Ultimately I think the juxtaposition of James’ works alongside 
helped pull mine back from the brink of total affectation. 
20 The individual works didn’t always function convincingly as individual tableau (as alluded to earlier with reference to The Aesthetic 
Responsibility series) as a result of them not being manufactured or theatrical enough in this metamodern moment. In these instances 
the works became less than the sum of their parts; useful still to the overall curation and reception of the exhibition but less so to 
themselves. 
21 Jean McNiff on page 9 of her book You and Your Action Research describes how a number of recent publications on Action Research 
have celebrated the importance of feelings (Dadds, 1995; Whitehead, 1995:630-632), or shown the need for an awareness of affective 
aspects that inform practice (Laidlaw, 1994; Collins and McNiff, 1996). Action researchers tend to be working intentionally towards 
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Fig. 18. Installation View, Kate Hawkins & James Ferris, My Brother is a Hairy Man (2011)  
George Polke, London 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the implementation of ideas that come from deep-seated values.  
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The fact that My Brother is a Hairy Man was a collaboration also helped facilitate the direction I 
wanted  to  take  the  work  in  –  towards  a  more  social,  dialogical  and  performative  mode  of 
painting.  James  Ferris’  abstract  works  situated  themselves  very  convincingly  as  strange  props 
alongside my more figurative paintings while also having a conversation. However, with regards 
to my own interests I felt as if I was still dealing with two separate entities: performance and 
painting.  Despite  this  the  exhibition  represented  a  defining  moment:  the  beginning  of  a 
conversation and investigation into the middle ground and areas of overlap between the two. 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, I was not aiming for the work in My Brother is A Hairy Man to be theatrical in 
Fried’s terms, i.e. to be inauthentic and promote a consciousness of viewing, however I did intend 
to reference theatre and illusory practices. As a consequence of our ‘metamodern’ (Van den Akker 
& Vermeulen,  2011),  ‘self-designing’ (Groys,  2009)  moment I deemed this the most sincere 
approach.  Paradoxically,  however,  imbued  in  these  references  to  illusionism  and  theatre  also 
rested the capacity to bring about a consciousness of viewing. In this manner a renegotiation of 
the term tableau seemed necessary.  Through an expansion of the term to incorporate the larger 
gallery  space,  a  framework  was  put  in  place  whereby  the  spectator  could  feasibly  become 
‘absorbed’ (Fried,  1980) into the exhibition environment and installation as a whole. In this 
physical  ‘absorption’  theatricality’s  inauthenticity,  was  thus  negated  and  overall  sincerity 
prevailed.   
 
The final challenge was for the work to deal not only with performance in terms of its content 
but also its reception. As Chevrier says: ‘Tableau not a way of seeing but a way of being in the 
world.’ (Chevrier, 2010) and this is conceivably key: to address performativity in conjunction 
with theatricality. As discussed before, theatricality is a complicated and widely debated term in 
relation to the visual arts (Shannon Jackson, 2010). Contrastingly, the performative as a concept 
is still slippery, but in relation to the visual arts is more simply defined through its inherent 
ability  to  ‘act’.  As  a  result  more  power  can  be  disseminated  to  the  artwork  and v i e w e r  
simultaneously, enabling them both to be at once ‘activated’ in their responsibility. I think this is 
likely to prove more valuable in time with regards to exhibition contexts. The paintings shouldn’t 
just  see th em s e lv e s  a s  p a i n t i n g s ,  ( a s  The  Aesthetic  Responsibility  paintings  at  times  did  in  the 
context of My Brother is A Hairy Man) they should have the ability to do something more, to  
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activate both themselves and the spectator. Artwork shouldn’t just show things – it should have 
the  capacity  to  do  things.  As  Dorothea  von  Hantelmann  says,  ‘what  the  notion  of  the 
performative brings into perspective is the contingent and difficult to grasp realm of impact and 
effects that art brings forth both situationally, i.e. in a given spatial and discursive context, and 
relationally, e.g. in relation to a viewer or a public… Art’s performative dimension signifies art’s 
possibilities  and  limits  in  generating  and  changing  reality’.  (Von  Hantlemann:  18)  Thus,  in 
Chapter 2 I will ‘look towards’
22, a more performative painting. I also propose to ‘look at’
23 the 
agency of the spectator. In generating new realities, through a more performative practice, I hope 
to ultimately summon action from the viewer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
22 This is a reference to the Chapter 1’s title. 
23 This is a reference to Chapter 2’s title.  
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2. THE KING OF HEARTS HAS NO MOUSTACHE: LOOKING AT 
 
For  this  show  I  aimed  to  explore  painting  as  performative  ‘process’  alongside  painting  as 
performative ‘object’. Throughout I was conscious not to be overly focused on the output or 
object itself however I did aim to communicate the ‘actions’ involved in the production process 
by way of the exhibited object. Both performance and process were made transparent alongside 
the painting’s ability to function individually as well a part of a ‘network’ (Joselit, 2009: 125). 
Yve-Alain Bois contends, in an October text of 2004 in discussion of two of Barnett Newman’s 
works, that his oeuvre should be considered akin to a deck of playing cards: ‘In such a deck each 
card has a distinct role to play while forming specific links with various other cards – the King of 
Hearts is directly connected to all the cards of the same colour though perhaps more closely to 
the figures [Jack, Queen], as well as to the three other kings: such is my working model’ (Bois, 
2004: 4). He follows this claiming that Newman might not be the only artist for whom this 
model prevails but thanks to his limited corpus he might be the only one for whom it can be 
tested.  Bois'  heuristic  insight  – t h a t  B a r n e t t  N e w m a n ' s  w o r k s  m a k e  u p  a  f o r m a l  t o t a l i t y ,  
‘something like a deck of cards’ (Bois, 2004: 4) is relevant conceptually and structurally to my 
own practice and this exhibition specifically. 
 
Though the title I chose for this show was deliberately clunky and slightly childlike it essentially 
conveyed a factual statement. In a pack of playing cards the king of hearts has no moustache, in 
contrast to all the other kings who do. I did not attempt to unpack this fact much further for my 
audience but was keen for its revelation, and the transparency inherent in its revelation, to act as a 
subtle introduction to my thinking. Furthermore, as I outlined above in relation to Yve-Alain 
Bois, Barnett Newman and the deck of cards, I wanted the title to hint at the idea of links and 
networks within a specific (exhibition) structure. Finally, while whispering other connections, the 
title-statement of course neatly touched on the recurring theme within the show: moustaches. 
 
Moustaches are performative. As well as being plays on sincerity they are just plays. A moustache, 
unlike a beard, performs its presence – it can only come into being by consciously cutting away 
everything  around  it.  And  through  acting  itself  out,  it  tends  to  reveal  more  than  it h i d e s .  
Sometimes a moustache is so parodic and consciously curated, a spectator can forget he or she is 
witnessing a staged fiction at all. In the moment of disorientation between fake and sincere, this is  
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where the parody becomes the reality. And the ridiculed, the strong. The moustache becomes 
honest
24,  not  a  cover-up:  it  becomes  accountable  for  itself.  Accountability,  like  moustache 
maintenance,  is  a  fragile  thing.  There  is  a  fine  balance  between  too  much  and  too  little  – 
physically a moustache needs distinctive parameters to be a moustache at all. It is a balance of 
nerve and skill. Like painting. (Hawkins, 2012)  
 
2.1.  Performativity, Action, Transparency 
 
 
Fig. 19. Kate Hawkins, The King of Hearts Has No Moustache (2012) Installation View,  
Gallery Vela, London 
                                                         
24 ‘A thought or a work of art that exhausts itself in the confirmation of something that has already been carried out, or in its ratifying 
continuation, is dishonest and superfluous.’ (Duttman, 2007: 113)   
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Firstly in this chapter I want to discuss the works in the front gallery space (Fig. 19) in relation to 
performativity and transparency (the gallery space was composed of two separate rooms – a long 
and narrow front room which opened out into a more generous back room). I will then move 
onto a discussion of performativity in relation to the networks that Joselit references together 
with the works in the back room.  
In terms of the works in the front room performativity and the ability for a painting to entice 
action from the beholder was at the forefront of my thinking when installing this exhibition. As 
noted in the introduction, the ability to ‘act’, the capacity to produce a new reality, is at the core 
of performativity’s definition. Performativity is an interdisciplinary term and doesn’t just describe 
a performance but helps frame it. Performativity is the ability to ‘act’ upon something in order 
that a reality is changed
25. Its meaning is not tied up with the content of a performance but the 
act of performing itself, where a transition of states occurs. Just as Jacques Rancière in his book 
The Emancipated Spectator, talks of abolishing the indeterminate gap or chasm between active and 
passive in order that the inertia of the spectator may  be overcome,  I would similarly like to 
provide a gallery context where this is possible in order that a performative can be initiated. For 
me  Rancière’s  handling  of  the  term  ‘emancipation’  comes  very  close  to  the  idea  of 
‘performativity’ as outlined above, as I view  both as positive outcomes initiating (degrees of) 
independent  action  and  consequent  freedom
26.  Inherent  in  Rancière’s  ‘emancipation’  is  the 
liberation  of  the  spectator  –  feasibly  through  performative  ‘action’.  Accordingly,  it  could  be 
argued that the traditional passivity inherent in the terms ‘spectacle’ and ‘spectatorship’ sit as far 
away from performative action as is possible. Rancière also tells us there is a historical dimension 
to this view of spectacle going as far back as Plato who found theatre abject insofar as it promoted 
illusion and passivity by stifling the action of knowing and the action led by knowledge. However 
Rancière ends by concluding that it is wrong to create distance between spectator and dramaturgy 
in  the  first  place  and  emancipation  only  ‘begins  when  we  challenge  the  opposition  between 
viewing and acting’. (Rancière, 2009: 13) In the same vein you could argue that we shouldn’t 
position the spectator and artwork as binary entities. They are perhaps not so far away from each 
other  to  begin  with.  And  just  as  Hantelmann  believes  in  visual  art’s  performative  potential, 
Rancière’s  view  encourages  us  to  reduce  the  separation  between  artist  and  spectator  thereby 
                                                         
25 It’s meaning, although distinct, should not be severed from performance entirely. 
26 It should be noted that Rancière never directly mentions performativity in The Emancipated Spectator yet he talks frequently about 
activating and emancipating the spectator, which he uses as his axiom for the book.  
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closing the gap between art and spectacle, active and passive. This in turn brings spectatorship 
much closer to performativity and allows us to begin to imagine their coexistence: an arena where 
‘spectacle’ could (and should) ‘act’.  
Throughout The King of Hearts Has No Moustache, I attempted this removal of passivity (and 
consequently promoted activity) through an exploration of ideas of transparency both in terms of 
the work’s realisation and display strategies. By making the spectator aware of the mechanics of 
producing  and  hanging  a  painting  I  examined  modes  of  active  and  passive  spectatorship  in 
relation to performance and theatre. My interest in social rituals as cultural stereotypes and ways 
in  which  society  increasingly  performs  its  own  display  was  revealed  throughout  by  the 
simultaneous exposure (the making visible of installation techniques) and disguise (the drawing of 
moustaches) of the paintings on show. However I was cautious not to give all the information 
with regards to making transparent my various decisions throughout the making and installation 
process as this has implications for attention which I discuss presently.  
 
Transparency has been one of the most hotly debated political and financial topics of the last five 
years.  The term broadly implies openness, communication and accountability.  Following the 
2008 crash of the financial markets the British public started asking uncomfortable questions and 
braying for answers. In 2009 Lord Myners proposed that the pay and identity of up to 20 of the 
highest-paid employees at British companies should be disclosed (Treanor, 2009). This coincided 
with the  2009 expenses scandal in Westminster where records of MPs unscrupulous expense 
claims  were  leaked  to  the  press  with  damaging  political  consequences.  Concurrently  the 
international website WikiLeaks was catapulted into public consciousness through its publication 
of secret information and classified media from anonymous sources. According to the WikiLeaks 
website, its goal is ‘to bring important news and information to the public... One of our most 
important activities is to publish original source material alongside our news stories so readers and 
historians alike can see evidence of the truth.’ (WikiLeaks, 2013) And ‘truth’ is the significant 
term here. It is after all so heavily imbued with moral symbolism it becomes difficult to argue 
with a call for transparency which recruits the notion of truth.  
 
However in Jodi Dean’s discourse on communicative capitalism she explains how, as a result of 
information overload and the decline of symbolic efficiency (the failure of symbols and messages 
to produce expected meanings – Slavoj Zizek) we, as a society, have less and less capacity to ‘act’ 
(which relates directly to performativity if we understand action as the nexus of performativity).  
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Dean is an American political theorist and terms a networked society a communicative capitalist 
society. ‘Because communicative capitalism’s media setting is open, distributive, recombinant and 
chaotic, revelation is much less effective than repetition.’ (Dean, 2011: 54) Dean is suggesting, in 
specific relation to WikiLeaks, that these networked communications and information overload 
are actually inhibiting action as opposed to inciting it. And action, of course, forms the nexus of 
performativity. ‘The lack of capacity to know, is the other side of the abundance of knowledge … 
because  we  can  never  be  certain  we  always  need  more  information’,  (Dean,  2011:  49)  the 
implication being that at no point will we have enough information to act: our internet-based 
lives mean information is infinite. Dean is suggesting, in specific relation to WikiLeaks, that these 
networked  communications  and  information  overload  (i.e  full  transparency)  are  actually 
inhibiting action as opposed to inciting it. Seemingly she suggests that transparency rather than 
encouraging performativity through information flow, actually prohibits it, and instead promotes 
impotence.  In  summary  Dean  claims  that  we,  as  a  communicative  capitalist  society,  are  less 
performative and more passive than ever. And this has serious repercussions for attention. 
 
As Dan and Chip Heath outline in their book Made To Stick, in order to retain attention it is 
advisable to employ processes of mystery where not all gaps are filled in at once.  The best way to 
gain attention is to break a pattern (surprise) but the best way to keep attention (interest) is to 
generate a mystery. ‘Mysteries are powerful … because they create a need for closure’ (Heath & 
Heath, 2007: 81), and in the case of spectatorship this equates to a filling in of the gaps. Robert 
McKee, the screenwriting guru says, ‘Curiosity is the intellectual need to answer questions and 
close open patterns’ (Heath & Heath, 2007: 83). Additionally ‘In 1994, George Loewenstein, a 
behavioural economist at Carnegie Mellon University, provided the most comprehensive account 
of situational interest …  Curiosity,  he says, happens  when we  feel  a gap in our knowledge.’ 
(Heath & Heath, 2007: 84) Loewenstein argues that gaps cause pain – it’s like having an itch 
that we need to scratch. Dan and Chip Heath remind us that one important implication of the 
gap theory is that we need to open gaps before we close them rather than disclose all facts all at 
once. Indeed a prescriptive artwork dictating to the spectator what they should think is in my 
mind not an artwork at all. The most successful work poses a puzzle or question that confronts 
people with a specific gap in their knowledge. Indeed some might go as far as pronouncing that 
this knowledge gap is art’s specific currency. ‘To make our communications more effective we 
need to shift our thinking from “What information do I need to convey” to “What questions do I 
want my audience to ask”’. (Heath & Heath, 2007: 88)  
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If Dean argues that full transparency does not lead to a more ‘active’ or ‘engaged’ society then 
Dan  and  Chip  Heath  argue  that  as  a  consequence  of  full  transparency  we  don’t  have  any 
knowledge  gaps  to  fill  in  the  first  instance:  we  are  therefore  disincentivised  from  attending. 
However with the works in The King of Hearts Has No Moustache I was never trying to achieve 
full transparency. In many ways this would only seek to reduce the work of art to an impotent 
object and as Sven Lütticken points out in his Open 22 text ‘Secrets of the See-Through Factory’, 
‘the very fabric of the modern work of art is an object lesson in the dialectic of opacity and 
transparency. For much of modernity, visual art has perfected techniques for mystifying through 
openness, laying bare its procedures with obscure results. The work of art … can be seen as a 
form  of  political  economy  that  intervenes  in  as  much  as  it  reflects  on  Art  today’s  opaquely 
transparent and transparently opaque spectacle.’ (Lütticken, 2011: 102) Here Lütticken claims 
that art’s economy and agency is centred on the oppositional terms transparency and opacity.  
Later in the text he quotes Theodor W. Adorno (1970: 90-91) who analysed the development of 
modern art in terms of an ever more rational construction. Lütticken claims: 
 
However, this constructive rationality did not result in works that were transparent 
and devoid of mystery. On the contrary, it is the apparent rationality of ever more 
carefully planned construction that cements their status as riddles (Adorno, 1970: 
182). In a  disenchanted  world dominated  by technocratic ‘purposive rationality’, 
Adorno averred that art constitutes a scandal because it cannot rid itself of magic, of 
primeval  enchantment.  Even  the  most  constructive  modern  art  remains 
fundamentally mimetic. In its mimicking of rational construction methods it is a 
kind of ‘secularized magic’ that reveals itself as make-believe, as Schein, as illusive 
appearance. (Lütticken, 2011: 102) 
 
It  is  the  ‘reveal’  that  is  key  here.  Indeed,  just  as  a  ventriloquistic  device  is  dependent  on 
experiencing the illusion while knowing, on an intellectual level, that it isn’t real, to an extent the 
same is true for art – in order for it to function at all, transparency and opacity need to exist side 
by side.  
 
According to Philosopher Stefan Nowotny in his text Publicity and Secrecy, the same is also true 
for politics. He contends that publicity and secrecy are more intertwined with one another than 
ever before. Moreover a certain narrative or ‘representation of publicity, which asserts publicity as 
the crucial principle of political and social representation and allows no more room within the  
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organization of the modern world for the “secret”’ – has never actually left the secret behind’ 
(Nowotny, 2011: 28). He cites Colin Powell’s speech before the United Nations in 2003 as an 
example  of  a  (re)performance  of  the  modern  ritual  of  publicity.  Powell  achieved  this  by 
simultaneously shifting the aspects of this ritual concerned with legitimation disputes from the 
maxim for action itself into a ‘secret’ area that remains elusive, i.e the speech was never intended 
to convince the ‘international public’ of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and 
make the case for action. He maintains that the use value of publicity – or rather the speciﬁc 
intertwining  of  the  use  of  publicity  and  secrecy  –  shows  itself  here  closely  linked  with  the 
production of affect-political effects, which result from techniques of valorising or devaluing signs 
as he explains here:  
 
And  perhaps  it  is  exactly  in  this  that  we  ﬁnd  a  crucial  indication  of  how  the 
question of the relation of publicity and secret should be posed today: as a question 
about  the  production  of  affects  (certainties,  anxieties,  insecurities,  feelings  of 
solidarity, resentments, etcetera) through signs that are established on the unstable 
boundary between publicity and secret. For what the modern myth of publicity 
covers  up  is,  among  others,  the  circumstance  that  power  (whether  securing 
domination or even emancipatory) is developed by whoever controls the boundary 
between  publicity  and  secret,  indeed  by  whoever  continually  reinvents  it.   
(Nowotny, 2011: 34)     
 
In summary, power, for Nowotny, is contingent on who controls levels of transparency. I am 
reminded once again of Boris Groys’ maxim (as outlined in Chapter 1) that now every kind of 
design—including  self-design—is  primarily  regarded  by  the  spectator  not  as  a  way  to  reveal 
things, but as a way to hide them. Moreover he explains how ‘the aestheticisation of politics is 
similarly  considered  to  be  a  way  of  substituting  substance  with  appearance,  real  issues  with 
superficial  image-making’  (Groys,  2009:  41-42).  So  we  see  how  levels  of  transparency 
(particularly in political arenas) are interconnected with levels of performativity and performative 
spectatorship. 
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In the first room of The King of Hearts Has No Moustache three works played on these ideas of 
simultaneous  revelation  and  concealment,  publicity  and  secrecy.  The  first  work  encountered 
when entering the gallery space was, Be Yourself Or Something Else (Fig. 20). This consisted of an 
unframed mirror hung at head height with a moustache painted onto its surface. The moustache 
sat roughly in line with where a moustache would be on a human face i.e. two thirds of the way 
down the mirror. A second mirrored moustache was also in the gallery toilet. The intention was 
that the mirrors should promote something like a spectator sport where viewers would attempt to 
line the top of their lips up with the bottom of the moustache on the mirror. Thus through the 
act of spectatorship something was revealed (the image of their face sporting a moustache) and in 
the same moment concealed (their face by the moustache). Through the act of looking at an 
artwork they would be changed; they would ostensibly gain facial hair:  a transition of states 
would occur: a ‘performative’
27 (J.L.Austin, 1962) could take place. Be Yourself Or Something Else 
took its cue from Michelangelo Pistoletto’s series of mirror paintings from 1962. Pistoletto also 
adhered images to reflective surfaces (in his case they were images of a life-sized human figures). 
                                                         
27 Although I intended the works within The King of Hearts Has No Moustache to reference theatrical themes (as I did also for My 
Brother is a Hairy Man) I was wary of the artworks actually becoming theatrical, as opposed to performative. In this vein I aimed to 
encourage the spectator to be as active as possible. During the initial planning of the exhibition I considered including a large plan 
chest where viewers, in order to view the artwork, would need to open mirror-lined drawers with moustaches painted onto them i.e. 
they would have to actively perform an action (the opening of drawers) in order to view the artwork. The act of viewing the work 
would mean they could no longer remain passive: it would physically activate them as spectators. In the end however I chose not to do 
this. Although the concept seemed neat, all in all it felt a little too prescriptive. I resorted to hanging one single mirror defaced by a 
black moustache on the wall near the entrance of the gallery. Overall I felt this more subtle intervention communicated my intentions 
more succinctly and poetically. It still allowed for interaction with the spectator (as they viewed themselves in the mirror with a 
moustache) but was less of a box-ticking exercise in the manner in which it went about it. Moreover I designed the works in this show 
to  play  on  the  traditions  of  painting  and  their  display.  The  single  moustached  mirror  on  the  wall  conceptually  played  off  the 
traditional ‘hang’ more cleanly than multiple drawer-lined plan chest mirrors would have done.  
Fig. 20. Kate Hawkins, 
Be Yourself Or Something Else (2012)  
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By doing this he allowed for a dynamic interaction between the art object and the viewer. The 
movement of the spectator not only animated each painting but ensured the viewer became an 
integral part of the piece. While the subject of the work (the viewer) is drawn into the activity of 
the gallery space, he/she is prompted to contemplate questions of self, representation and reality. 
 
At this juncture it would be prudent to remember that performativity is a term derived from 
linguistics  and  the  speech  act  specifically.  If  we  are  to  consider  performativity  in  relation  to 
spectatorship and the viewing of artwork perhaps now would be a good point to briefly outline its 
previous employment in visual contexts. Dorothea  von Hantelmann in her  book  How  to  Do 
Things  with  Art:  The  Meaning  of  Art’s  Performativity  (2010)  argues  that  we  should  be  more 
concerned with what art does and less with what it says. She goes onto maintain that all visual art 
has a performative dimension, in that all artwork has the potential to produce a (new) reality. 
This is even more arguable, since the advent of conceptualism and the inherent proximity of 
concepts and language. Henry Flynt, the philosopher and artist, claimed that ‘since “concepts” 
are closely bound up with language, concept art is a kind of art of which the material is language’ 
(Wood, 2002: 8). So conceptualism might be briefly described as an art of the mind instead of 
the senses and in this way more easily allies itself with the ‘performative’. The same cannot so 
simply be argued for spectatorship, which as a rule privileges vision over language and speech. 
However I believe Be Yourself Or Something Else (2012) goes some way to closing this theoretical 
gap, making spectatorship performative in the same way that Hantelmann argues artwork is. As a 
spectator viewing Be Yourself Or Something Else you can ostensibly become something or someone 
else and in that moment a reality is changed. 
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Fig. 21. Kate Hawkins, Two Screws on Studio Wall (2012) 
 
 
Two Screws on Studio Wall (Fig. 21) serves to extend this discourse. This digital print, stemming 
from pareidolia (a type of illusion or misperception involving a vague or obscure stimulus being 
perceived as something clear and distinct) was another attempt to make transparent my artistic 
process. Here again we are reminded of Sven Lütticken’s remarks relating to visual art’s capacity 
for mystification through openness. Two Screws on Studio Wall depicts two of the screws on my 
studio wall that I use to hang my canvases from while I paint them. In the process of viewing, the 
two screws come to resemble eyes when the beholder acknowledges the surrounding marks on the 
wall, in particular two  black brush strokes directly  below the screws that  could  convincingly 
represent a moustache. Similarly to Be Yourself Or Something Else the spectator is incited into 
action by a disruption of a viewing pattern. Two Screws on Studio Wall is not a straightforward 
face  or  documentation  of  my  studio  wall.  On  one  hand  it  is  neither  a  convincing  face  nor  
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document of my studio wall, yet on the other it is both. It is both fully transparent while being 
simultaneously not clear in the way Sven Lütticken alludes to above. 
 
 
 
Fig. 22. Kate Hawkins, Backdrop (2011) 
 
 
The last work in the first room of The King of Hearts Has No Moustache was titled Backdrop (Fig. 
22). The painting Backdrop was made using 2m of faux fur material that I stretched tightly over 
some wooden stretcher-bars. The title backdrop directly references the theatrical scenery used as 
settings for theatrical productions. This was further emphasised by its display in a receding alcove 
painted matt black, thus echoing the colours used in theatrical masking techniques of backstage 
areas. I intended backdrop to perform a similar role to the backdrops found in theatres: that of 
scene-setter for the ensuing ‘performance’ of the main protagonists (in the case of The King of 
Hearts  Has  No  Moustache, this meant the other paintings and sculptures in the show). I put 
‘performance’ in inverted commas here because it is a commonly assumed that artworks do not 
perform.  If  anything they do the antithesis and  actively reject performance.  However in our 
increasingly showy and performance-driven society (even as far back as the 60s the sociologist  
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Erving  Goffman,  whom  I  referred  to  in  Chapter  1,  described  how  we  are  all,  more or less 
consciously, always playing a role28) I wanted to investigate to what extent artworks can remain 
apart from the idea of performing one’s identity.29  
 
Backdrop was also an attempt to engage in this idea of ‘performance’ identity. Through the use of 
a large expanse of abstract ground, with its invitation to the passer-by to stroke grand, sweeping 
gestures into the fur, I was making reference to the male expressionistic gesture in painting and 
the mythology of the (male) artistic genius specifically – which could feasibly, in the case of 
Jackson Pollock, to name just one, be viewed as a life-long performance of machismo. Pollock has 
always been identified as a painter but his mythology is as equally tied up with the performance 
of his gestural and physical process as it is his outcome. Hans Namuth’s 1950 photographs of 
Pollock working in his studio and his later film ‘helped transform Pollock from a talented, cranky 
loner into the first media-driven superstar of American contemporary art, the jeans-clad, chain-
smoking poster boy of abstract expressionism,’ according to acclaimed culture critic Ferdinand 
Protzman (Protzman, 1999: G06). As a result Pollock quickly became as much identified by his 
‘active’ working processes as he did his paintings. The term that is now most associated with these 
works, and others made in similar gestural fashion, was Action Painting. It is also a term that is 
particularly  pertinent  to  my  discussion  of  performativity  (in  that  action  forms  the  nexus  of 
performativity according to John Langshaw Austin). It was proposed by critic Harold Rosenberg 
in his 1952 article The American Action Painters: ‘At a certain moment the canvas began to appear 
to one American painter after another as an arena in which to act. … What was to go on canvas 
was not a picture but an event’(Rosenberg, 1952: 57). Though Rosenberg was not the first to 
suggest this idea of the painting as a site of spontaneous direct action (nor was it universally 
accepted as what these painters were primarily concerned with), Action Painting was the term 
that caught the wider imagination, in the same way that the Namuth’s images had, tapping into 
wider cultural ideas of macho, manly pursuit. 
 
The  ‘fake’  fur  surface  of  this  ground  however  simultaneously  undermined  the  idea  of  the 
authenticity of the male artistic genius through the use of fake, as opposed to real animal fur. 
Destabilisation of ‘the artwork’ was further achieved by the use of fur itself as opposed to canvas 
                                                         
28 In his 1959 book The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life he discusses this in much more detail. 
29 It seems that the terms in which we understand identity are increasingly terms of performance/display/appearance. i.e What does he 
look like? What is his profile picture on facebook? Who is he seen to be ‘friends’ with on facebook? As a result of the internet much of 
this information is on show for us to see. Visual art and visual artist’s, although separate, to a degree, would be short-sighted to 
completely ignore contemporary terms of engagement – for artists communication is still their main currency.  
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or linen (the proper substrates for expressionist painting). As a material, fur also has numerous 
connotations, many of which hint at aspiration and social performance. In this way the Backdrop 
painting hopefully acted as something akin to a theatrical backdrop, suggesting other works in the 
show might explore notions of performance in relation to artwork and society while at the same 
time becoming something of an abstract expressionist ‘performance’ in its own right. 
 
The title Backdrop also speaks of a certain physicality in relation to the forms of architectural and 
geographical vistas. In this way it hints at more sculptural and environmental concerns and to an 
extent the Minimalist or Literalist trope as outlined by Michael Fried in Art and Objecthood 
which he understood as bringing about the wrong kind of relationship between the artwork and 
the  beholder,  privileging  the  experience  of  viewing  over  the  artwork  itself.  Backdrop w a s  
absolutely about the viewing experience and I did not at any point discourage spectators from 
touching the work in order to make their own performative mark. I was at ease with the viewing 
(or touching) experience superseding the actual object. The object, after all, was an empty object 
termed simultaneously a painting and non-painting, luxuriating in its own fake (in)authenticity: 
its Friedian theatricality. In fact Robert Morris’ riposte to Fried’s criticism of Minimalist work 
seems particularly apt in relation to the absurd comedy of Backdrop: the object had not become 
less important, it had merely become less self-important (Fried, 1998: 154). At no point does 
Backdrop take itself seriously, and even less so at the point where the viewer is invited to touch 
and interact with its furry surface in order to create his or her own ‘work of art’. In this way it 
became more of a performative tool than artwork. If ‘action’ forms the nexus of performativity 
then the actions of the spectators running their hands through the fake fur in varying directions 
to paint a picture can only be viewed as a performative engagement. 
To  summarise  the  works  in  the  front  room  of  the  Gallery  Vela  exhibition  exhibited  an 
appropriate balance of transparency and opaqueness, which in turn gave them power and ability 
to independently inspire ‘action’ from the spectator. In terms of their individual agency they all 
achieved performativity in that they activated the spectator on their autonomous terms. In this 
way they were all individually successful. However these examples of individual agency didn’t 
necessarily equate to a cohesive show. It is possible that in the front room there were still too 
many (physical and conceptual) gaps that remained as a result of the room being hung sparsely. 
As Dan and Chip Heath point out, in relation to Loewenstein’s theory, in order to get people 
interested  you  have  to  point  out  gaps  in  their  knowledge.  ‘But  what  if  they  lack  so  much 
knowledge about, say, the Georgia Bulldogs, that they’ve got more of an abyss than a gap?’ (Dan  
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and Chip Heath, 2007: 91) In this instance, you have to fill in enough knowledge to make the 
abyss into a gap. In the case of Roone Arledge, twenty-nine year-old upstart television network 
employee in the 1960s, he attracted viewers to otherwise niche audience college football games by 
setting the scene, showing the local fans, panning across campus, talking up the emotions, the 
rivalries, the histories. ‘By the time the game started some viewers had begun to care who won. 
Others were riveted’. (Dan and Chip Heath, 2007: 91-92) In other words he filled in the gaps by 
providing context. He connected individual pieces of information and created a network.  This 
introduces us to an idea of networked spectatorship. This contextualisation is what the works in 
the front room didn’t on every level achieve but what the works in the more networked back 
room of the gallery space attempted to.  
2.2. Performativity, Agency, Networks 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 23. Installation View, Kate Hawkins, The King of Hearts Has No Moustache (2012) Gallery Vela, London 
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I  would  now  like  to  discuss  the  works  in  the  back  space  of  Gallery  Vela  in  relation  to 
performativity  and  networks.  Because  networks  inherently  deny  more  binary  artist/spectator 
positions  (the  traditional  Platonic  positions  from  which  theories  about  theatricality  and 
spectatorship have originated) they feasibly might begin to show us a way forward with regards to 
performativity and spectatorship.  
 
To begin with I will briefly describe the paintings in the back room of Gallery Vela. The works 
consisted  of  a  series  of  semi-abstract  oil  paintings  displayed  on  or  from  external  structures 
conceived and presented as a series of bristly protagonists painted in pastel-infused hues. The 
manner in which the paintings were displayed – i.e in partnership with independent structures – 
was as important as the works themselves. Hans Heights (Fig. 23) included a ladder propped 
below  the  painting  as  if  the  hanging  process  was  still  underway,  while  Triffid ( F i g . 2 6 )  w as 
suspended from a tripod-like device, standing next to a (now redundant) wall. As representations 
of moustaches throughout history and the history of visual art, the paintings’ references ranged 
from the eminent: Errol (Flynn) and Duchamp’s LHOOQ (Fig. 23) – to more general abstracted 
forms.  The  paintings/sculptures/assemblages  made  up  a  visual  network  of  moustaches.  The 
intention was for the works to sport with their ambiguous forms and behave like ‘players’, in the 
theatrical sense. Also I wanted the works to ‘play’ with presentations of male identity, ‘play’ off 
the spectator and their own display mechanisms as well as ‘playing’ off every other work within 
the exhibition thereby creating a network. In a sense each work embodied the bounds of the 
canvas and the exhibition space all at once – an interrelation between physical human painterly 
gesture and the gallery composition, both of which held direct traces of my actions: the former in 
its construction and the latter in its display. To an extent the spectator could follow the process of 
the exhibition’s making through the content and display of each work in the room. In relation to 
display, the process of installation was largely instinctive and heavily dependent on the formal 
and  conceptual  composition  of  the  network  of  neighbouring  works.  In  these  terms  the 
neighbouring works  more  often than not dictated the hang and  position of the paintings in 
question. The process of making was also essentially intuitive to the extent that my thought at 
particular  moments  can  be  traced  through  the  subject  matter  and  surfaces  of  the  paintings 
themselves.  
 
So how can painting belong to a network? David Joselit in his text Painting beside Itself (2009) 
cites Martin Kippenberger’s characteristic flourish of perversity linking painting to pasta in his 
discussion  of  networks  and  spectatorship  in  relation  to  mixed-media  artist’s  Jutta  Koether’s 
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Fig. 24. Installation View, Kate Hawkins, The King of Hearts Has No Moustache (2012) Gallery Vela, London 
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Fig. 26. Kate Hawkins, Triffid (2012) 
 
 
 
       Fig. 25. Kate Hawkins, Garcon (2012) 
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work30. He explains how Kippenberger identified networks as the most important problem to be 
addressed on (and around) canvas since Warhol in an interview of 1990-91: ‘Simply to hang a 
painting  on  a  wall  and  say  that  it’s  art  is  dreadful.  The  whole  network  is  important!  Even 
spaghettini … When you say art, then everything belongs to it. In a gallery that is also the floor, 
the architecture, the colour of the walls”. (Joselit, 2009: 125) Kippenberger claims something 
more: an individual painting should explicitly visualize such networks. This idea of networked 
painting was the focus of the exhibition The King of Hearts has no Moustache with regards to 
reconciling  painting  and  performance  in  the  same  architectural  contexts  (Fig.  24).  I  am  in 
fundamental agreement with Kippenberger and Joselit that the whole network is important. It 
shouldn’t be a case of either/or – painting or performance. Indeed ‘performativity’, in relation to 
both the making and viewing of art, in theory allows both painting and performance to actively 
function as part of the same network.  
 
 
 
Fig. 27. Jutta Koether, Lux Interior (2009) Reena Spaulings, New York, courtesy of the artist and Reena Spaulings 
 
 
                                                         
30 Jutta Koether was Kippenberger’s assistant for many years. I think it is worth pointing out that her practice primarily consists of 
painting and performance.  
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Joselit goes on to describe the work of Jutta Koether who responded to the question of how 
painting can belong to a network through producing work for her show Lux Interior at Reena 
Spaulings, 2009 (Fig.27) that comprises many different networks. These include historical and 
conceptual networks (Lux Interior was inspired by T. J. Clark’s extended reading of Poussin in 
The Sight of Death (2006)), architectural and theatrical networks (the on/off stage devices plus the 
use  of  spotlights)  and  physical  and  performance  networks  (Three  lecture  performances 
accompanied  the  exhibition  in  which  Koether  moved  around  and  even  under  the  wall  that 
supported her canvas) to name but a few. Joselit describes how instead of attempting to visualize 
the overall contours of a network, Koether approached the problem of how a painting could 
belong to a network through actualizing the ‘behavior of objects within networks’ (2009: 128) by 
demonstrating  what  he  calls  their  transitivity.  The  Oxford  English  Dictionary  gives  one 
definition of ‘transitive’ as ‘expressing an action which passes over to an object.’ Joselit says ‘I can 
think of no better term to capture the status of objects within networks –which are defined by 
their circulation from place to place and their subsequent translation into new contexts – than 
this notion of passage’ (Joselit, 2009: 128). 
 
In  Lux  Interior,  Koether  established  such  transitivity  along  two  axes.  First,  each 
brushstroke  of  her  reenactment  of  Poussin’s  Landscape  with  Pyramus  and  Thisbe 
embodies the passage of time. This diachronic axis of painting-as-medium is joined 
to a second synchronic kind of passage which moves out from painting-as cultural 
artifact  to  the  social  networks  surrounding  it,  as  indicated  both  by  Hot  Rod’s 
behavior as a personage (it ‘steps’ on stage, is lighted by disco lamps, etc.) as well as 
the artist’s performance as the painting’s discursive and bodily interlocutor in her 
three lecture events. (Joselit, 2009: 128) 
 
Here ‘Hot Rod’ is an abbreviation of Koether’s painting in the show titled Hot Rod After Poussin. 
Joselit  neatly  outlines  how,  through  its  transitivity,  it  belongs  to  both  historical  and  social 
networks. The painting functioned as a fusion of performance, installation, and painted canvas.  
 
This discussion of Jutta Koether’s work parallels concerns in the exhibition The King of Hearts has 
No Moustache, which could also be understood to be bridging a gap between performance and 
painting,  the  historical  and  the  social.  In  the  latter  context  the  works  were  an  attempt  to 
investigate varying conditions of display and the space in-between painting and performance in 
relation to the fluxus artist Dick Higgins’ rather apt term ‘intermedia’. Higgins in his 1965 text  
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described the tendency for the most interesting new art to cross the boundaries of recognized 
media or even to fuse the boundaries of art with media that had not previously been considered 
for art forms, including computers: ‘Part of the reason that Duchamp’s objects are fascinating 
while Picasso’s voice is fading is that the Duchamp pieces are truly between media, between 
sculpture  and  something  else,  while  a  Picasso  is  readily  classifiable  as  a  painted  ornament’. 
(Higgins, 2001: 49) Through fusing the boundaries between painting and performance the works 
in The King of Hearts Has No Moustache aimed for a certain performativity both in terms of 
process  and  outcome.  As  a  spectator  it  wasn’t  always  clear  what  you  were  looking  at  i.e.  a 
painting, a sculpture or a performing prop or assemblage, which consequently encouraged the 
beholder to work harder. Similarly to how Koether’s ‘painting’s own presence as a personage—or 
interlocutor—was further enhanced by strobe lights flashing onto it in different configurations 
during these live events as if painting and painter had encountered one another in a club’, (Joselit, 
2009:  127)  the  external  structures  I  used  to  house/hang  the  paintings  acted  as  both 
anthropomorphic  tools  as  well  as  (conceptual  and  physical)  frameworks.  Marrying  two  very 
different mediums such as powder-coated steel and oil-paint (even with the justification of Dick 
Higgins’ term ‘intermedia’) without one privileging the other proved complex but ultimately 
rewarding. I  was keen to see how far  I could expand the  field  of painting  before it  became 
something else. The structures enabled the paintings to grow apart from and beside themselves31 
and in this way they became performative devices.  
 
Interestingly the transitivity that Joselit describes is also closely linked to performativity if we 
consider a transition of states to cause a new reality in that one thing is acting on another in some 
way. Thus, if, as Joselit maintains, Koether’s is a transitive art then it is surely a performative one 
as well in that bringing about a new reality is intrinsic to the definition of performativity. In this 
way it is possible to understand how networked painting can also be performative painting. 
 
Dorothea von Hantlemann in How to do Things with Art would go so far as to argue that indeed 
every painting is a performative one in that every artwork has a reality-producing dimension. i.e. 
artworks cannot be non-performative. (Hantlemann, 2010: 18) I believe she is fundamentally 
right  although  there  are  of  course  varying  degrees  of  performative  success  and  consequently 
varying degrees of artwork success.  This state of variance could feasibly be clarified further by 
                                                         
31 David Joselit in his text Painting Beside Itself uses similar terminology. Within the text as a whole he discusses how a painting can 
belong to a network, a question first identified by Martin Kippenberger in 1990.  
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once  again  bringing  in  Judith  Butler’s  definition  of  the  performative.  It  is  worth  reminding 
ourselves  how  for  Butler  performativity  is  an  agency  that  is  both  enabled  and  regulated  by 
conventions. In this way Butler focuses more on the conditions necessary for language to create 
the reality described by J.L.Austin. This is especially relevant to the discussion of networks as she 
is  implying  that  a  linguistic  performative  can  only  occur  within  pre-established  network o r  
context. If we apply the same thinking to painting we can see how networks and performativity are 
symbiotic to painting’s production and display.  
 
 
Fig. 28. Kate Hawkins, Installation View, The King of Hearts Has No Moustache (2012) Gallery Vela, London 
 
Butler originally talked about performativity in relation to gender. She sees gender as an act that 
has been rehearsed, much like a script, and we, as the actors, make this script a reality over and 
over again by performing these actions. She says there is no preexisting identity by which an act or 
attribute  might  be  measured.  She  says  ‘gender  reality’  is  created  through  sustained  social 
performances.  Butler  asserts  that  the  constative  claim  “It’s  a  girl”  is  always  to  some  degree 
performative. When the doctor or nurse declares “It’s a girl/boy!”, they are not simply reporting 
on what they see (this would be a constative utterance), they are actually assigning a sex and a 
gender to a body that can have no existence outside discourse. I am interested in Butler less in 
terms of gender politics but in terms of what she says about the performative in relation to the 
reiterative act within conventional structures and how gender identity (and in my case painting’s 
identity) is culturally constructed by the repetition of stylised acts in time. As Simone de Beaviour 
says  one  is  not  born  a  woman,  one  becomes  one  i.e  through,  in  Butlers  case,  repeatedly  
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performing your gender. Hantlemann might dispute this more environmental and contextual 
turn in favour of a more predetermined one, but I believe this emphasis on context is just as 
significant  as  content  and  might  well  provide  a  key  to  creating  believable  identities  within 
artworks also.  In the  most successful works content and context sit comfortably among each 
other. 
 
So  we  have  seen  how  art  (and  specifically  painting)  can  belong  to  a  network  and  achieve 
performativity  but  can  spectatorship?  It  can  according  to  Irit  Roggoff.  Indeed  the  slightly 
fragmented  exhibition  layout  of  The  King  of  Hearts  Has no  Moustache,  representing  a  visual 
network of sorts, stemmed from ideas in Roggoff’s text Looking Away. Roggoff points out, that in 
a gallery context, breaks in attention do not automatically mean shallower thought. She explains 
how through the process of ‘looking away’ we ‘produce for ourselves an alternative  mode of 
taking  part  in  culture  in  which  we  affect  a  creative  bricolage  of  artworks  and  spaces,  and 
modalities of attention and subjectivities, that break down the dichotomies of objects and viewers 
and allow for a more dynamic manifestation of the lived cultural moment’ (Roggoff, 2004: 133). 
This diverting of attention can also, ‘free up a recognition that other manifestations are taking 
place that are often difficult to read, and which may be as significant as the designated objects on 
display’ (Roggoff, 2004: 119). 
 
In the same vein Nicholas Carr in The Shallows also acknowledges that not all distractions are 
always negative. It is entirely plausible that attention structures of online users of hyperlinked 
articles actually echo those of gallery visitors and that the increasingly performative way in which 
we  navigate  and  dissect  exhibition  spaces  is  much  more  akin  to  the  reading  behaviours  of 
hyperlinked text users than those reading traditionally linear books. In both cases, the attention 
of gallery visitors and hypertext readers becomes fragmented and the viewer or reader is left open 
to being led off in another direction (as Roggoff describes) by a further series of visual clues. 
Conceivably,  and  Carr  would  most  likely  agree,  hypertext  is  creating  viewers a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
readers. Correspondingly there is no linear narrative within the exhibition The King of Hearts has 
no Moustache. The intention is not for it to be ‘read’ from beginning to end as you would a novel 
or fiction. Here the narrative is constructed by the spectator and they are free to navigate the 
space  and  create  connections  as  they  choose.    In  this  way,  as  a  result  of  these  dynamic 
distractions, they are given agency and performatives occur. Furthermore these spectator-driven 
connections could also be read as part of another network – a distracted one. 
  
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
Fig. 29. Kate Hawkins, Two Moustache (2012)   
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Fig. 30. Kate Hawkins, Errol, (2012)  
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Fig. 31. Kate Hawkins, Augustus Again (2012)  
 
On the surface it might appear as if Roggoff and Carr’s positive propositions on distraction sit in 
opposition to Loewenstein’s theory of attention. But actually they are all concerned with gaps and 
breaks. And all three view gaps positively (as long as they don’t become gulfs – gulfs, chasms, 
voids,  deep  holes  are  all  indicators  of  a  lack  of  signposting  that  can’t  so  easily  bring  about 
performativity and ultimately lead to impotence).   
Rancière,  like  Roggoff,  agrees  that  in  relation  to  spectatorship  binary  distinctions  should  be 
broken down. Although he is not talking directly about spectatorship of the visual arts his views 
are nevertheless useful, particularly in relation to ideas surrounding theatre and performance. He 
says that we should not allow a gap between spectator and dramaturge (or actor) to remain. He 
doesn’t go so far as to endorse a networked approach but suggests that in order for the spectator to 
be emancipated the gap or separation between art and life needs to be abolished. Rancière in his 
text The Emancipated Spectator cites Debord. He explains how Debord’s idea of spectacle comes 
from an idea of externality and that in essence vision means externality. Rancière insists that ‘now 
externality means the dispossession of one’s own being’ and goes on to quote Debord: ‘The more  
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man contemplates, the less he is … separation is the alpha and the omega of spectacle’. (Debord, 
2004: 23) He shows us here how in order to emancipate ourselves from spectacle and overturn 
the separation inherent in it we need to do away with these separations or oppositions. In this 
manner Rancière is distancing himself from Plato and the theatrical associations inherent in his 
writings by  taking  a  more of  a post-structuralist interpretational  approach in  his approval  of 
something closer to a networked outcome. 
Rancière asks ‘if it is not precisely the desire to abolish the distance that creates it’32 (Rancière 
2009: 12). In essence he is suggesting that there need be no gap or separation between art and life 
arguing  against  Guy  Debord’s  1967  theatrical  account  of  the  spectacle,  The  Society  of  the 
Spectacle, as a realm of appearances that separates passive subjects from themselves. Indeed he 
claims that the position of the spectator in contemporary cultural theory is wholly reliant on the 
theatrical idea of ‘the spectacle’, a concept he employs to describe any performance that puts 
‘bodies in action before an assembled audience’ (Rancière, 2009: 2) and in order for the spectator 
to be emancipated this gulf between active and passive requires removal33.  
 
      
Fig. 32. Kate Hawkins, Mustache I (2012)                                   Fig. 33. Kate Hawkins, Mustache II (2012)  
 
                                                         
32 ‘It’ in this context refers to the distance, the gulf separating activity from passivity. 
33  Its  also  worth  noting  that  Rancière’s  desire  for  no  separation  between  art  and  life  sits  somewhat  uncomfortably  next  to  the 
sociologist Erving Goffman’s ideas of ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ and his conviction that at the point  at which the separation 
between spheres of action i.e. the divide between ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ is abolished (and the two spheres are amalgamated) is 
the point at which the workers performances are degraded.   
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I  think  this  interrogation  of  the  perceived  inertia  of  the  spectator  is  broadly  positive  in 
relation to contemporary  culture and  might  help us begin  to overturn  what Fried  terms 
‘theatricality’  in  relation  to  spectatorship  through  outright  abolition  of  the  two  binary 
positions required for it to exist in the first instance – those of spectator versus art object. 
Indeed throughout the fabrication and installation of The King of Hearts Has No Moustache I 
repeatedly aimed to consider the space in between: ‘the gap’ of which Rancière speaks or 
‘zone  of  indeterminacy’  (Rancière,  2009:  107)  between  painting  and  performance  in  the 
context of exhibitions. This gap encourages agency within spectatorship and also relates back 
to Loewenstein’s knowledge gap (referred to above) with regards to retaining attention. In 
Roggoff’s,  Carr’s  and  Rancière’s  terms  it  seems  plausible  then  that  spectatorship  can  be 
activated by the provision of ‘gaps’ and encouragement to create its own networks which 
bring about performativity in the process. 
However, I think it is important to be extremely wary at this juncture about the limitations of 
this networked approach. I worry that excessive open-endedness including a complete dissolution 
of binary positions in both production and reception of painting can too easily lead not to a 
performative beholder but an impotent one as Jodi Dean in her text Know it All (2011) attempts 
to flesh out. Dean in addition to suggesting that transparency plausibly promotes impotence as 
discussed earlier also acknowledges that networks have a large part to play in this. In summary 
we, as a society, as a result of our networks that take the form of open-ended production and 
reception, are consequently becoming passive spectators as opposed to active agents. 
Much art produced in the 1990s and early 2000s subscribed to what Nicholas Bourriaud terms a 
‘network mode’, outlined in his book Postproduction, Culture as Screenplay: How Art reprograms 
the World. 
 
In this new form of culture … artwork functions as the temporary terminal of a 
network of interconnected elements, like a narrative that extends and reinterprets 
preceding narratives. Each exhibition encloses within it the script of another; each 
work may be inserted into different programs and used for multiple scenarios. The 
artwork is no longer  an end point  but  a simple  moment in an infinite chain of 
contributions. (Bourriaud & Schneider, 2005: 19)  
 
Bourriaud’s  account  very  closely  echoes  Dean’s  descriptions  of  twenty-first  century  cultural  
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production as a ‘networked infrastructure, with … abundant and dispersed information streams’. 
In terms of production artwork this of course can very well be a positive position of which as 
Bourriaud gives many examples in his book. However, as David Ryan (Ryan, 2013) and others 
point out, the danger here is that collective sociability and ‘transactive’ approaches tend to be 
fetishised to such an extent that often it is not detected that nothing is actually transformed or 
changed  i.e.  no  performative  occurs.  So  long  as  some  collective  activity  is  figured  and 
contextualized within the remit of ‘participatory networks’ then many artists perceive that to be 
the limit of their responsibility. 
 
This open-ended, anti-hierachical homage to subjectivity charted by the commentators above, 
originates,  to  a  degree,  from  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty’s  influential  text  The  Phenomenology  of 
Perception (1949) and his investigations of the body/subject. I have noticed over recent years a 
trend whereby this text is regularly employed to scaffold the discipline of Art and especially those 
performative  practices  concerning  the  materiality  of  the  body,  within  a  neat  theoretical 
framework. In summary The Phenomenology of Perception undertakes a non-dualistic investigation 
of embodied experience and seeks to re-define it through studies of perception: Merleau-Ponty 
views both empiricism and intellectualism as inherently flawed phenomenological positions. In 
his criticism of these dichotomous positions he refutes the possibility that one can exist as  a 
constituting thing (subject) or as a thing (object). For Merleau-Ponty the body and mind are 
symbiotic.  Neither  one  can  be  philosophically  severed  from  the  other.  He  explores  how 
perception is explained through a reciprocal openness, rather than being grounded in either a 
subjective or objective component.  
 
In  Merleau  Ponty’s  terms,  perception  involves  positioning  the  perceiving  subject  within  a 
situation,  as  opposed  to  casting  him/her  as  a  spectator  who  has  somehow  abstracted 
himself/herself from that situation. Hence action and perception are directly interrelated ensuring 
that  there  is  little  distinction  between  the  act  of  perceiving  and  the  thing  perceived:  ‘every 
perceptual  habituality  is  still  a  motor  habit’  (Merleau-Ponty,  2002:  153).  Correspondingly 
Merleau-Ponty’s dissolution of boundaries often leave us somewhere in the middle of a no-man’s-
land between object and subject. His descriptions however, of the involvement or participation of 
the spectator within the process of perception go a long way to underwriting the phenomenology 
behind this recent interest in networks and participatory practices. 
Other adherents to Dean and Ryan’s caution include the architect Markus Miessen whose book  
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The  Nightmare  of  Participation:  Crossbench  Praxis  as  a  Mode  of  Criticality e n c a p sulates  his 
uneasiness with the term ‘participation’ and its seepage and consequent lazy over-use in various 
politicised  arenas  today.  He  outlines  how  participatory  practices  can  engender  impotence  as 
opposed to action though an over-prescribed focus on process rather than outcome and argues for 
an urgent revision of the ‘harmonious’ model of participation favouring consensus. He suggests 
that conflict might be an enabling rather than immobilising force and terms this ‘conflictual 
participation’.  
Correspondingly Federica Bueti also explains how:  
 
Rather  than  discover  a  new  space  of  experience,  these  [loosely  participatory, 
rhizomatic] practices have perpetuated the sense of free floating like a hot air balloon 
with a direction, yet no definitive landing ground and a necessary postponement of 
expanding horizons. (Bueti, 2011) 
 
She describes how it is this lack of signposting that allows the spectator to become easily lost in a 
landscape deficient in public rights-of-way even to begin with. I agree with Bueti’s analysis of the 
situation that contemporary spectatorship finds itself in. Without any structure whatsoever it is 
unsurprising  that,  in  many  situations,  the  spectator  and  consequently  the  artwork  become 
impotent.  
 
So if largely open-ended, participatory, ‘floaty’ practices produce passive rather than active or 
performative spectators where does this leave us with regards to spectatorship? David Ryan in his 
text Transitions/Abstractions, describes the work of contemporary artist Sam Porritt, whose use of 
theatrical devices has also piqued my own interest. Porritt’s sculptures could feasibly be read as 
both  props  and  players:  they  allude  to  both  the  figure  and  its  more  abstract  environments. 
Moreover as Ryan (2013) points out ‘theatricality’ for Porritt, is exemplified by the address of the 
components of the piece to one another (as Joselit talked of in Painting Beside Itself)– and on a 
literal level by the presence of theatrical masks that catch the viewer in a kind of cross–fire of 
glances. Even more interestingly Ryan notes in relation to spectatorship that ‘this kind of address 
… locates the  viewer within the work itself, either  via the work of imagining, perceiving or 
literally being in it. What differentiates this work from other installational approaches is the way 
it figures a viewer singularly rather like the medium of painting does.’ (Ryan, 2013) In other 
words the work directs agency towards a single spectator rather than anonymous audience unlike  
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those more open-ended practices as described by Bourriaud, Miessen and Bueti above. 
 
 
Fig. 34. Sam Porritt, Looking for Trouble (2009) courtesy of the artist and PEER 
 
 
And perhaps this singular rather than collective address is the key to performative spectatorship? 
Ryan’s assertion that ‘the singular perceiver rather than the socially positioned event can also have 
access to radicality, one which doesn’t partake solely in either idea or narrative as pre-givens, and 
without flagging up the mechanisms of everyday interchange’, (Ryan, 2013) is the significant one 
here. Indeed many of Porritt’s works I would argue achieve just this. Looking for Trouble (Fig. 34) 
emphasises, even in its title, the precariousness of interpretation yet at no point does the work 
entirely reduce itself to a site of open interpretation. For the spectator it provides anchor points, 
as a gesture does, and in its gestural make-up – its economy of line delineating facial expression it 
reminds us that facial expressions not only convey emotion but more generally act as a site of very 
sophisticated interaction, one that can figure the singular spectator as such. To summarise, Ryan 
suggests works addressing the spectator on the level of individual, perhaps, ultimately give more  
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agency and power to the beholder. In this way they can’t hide intentions so easily amongst ‘the 
collective’ and are required to be more direct with regards to outcome (and not just process).  
 
Indeed within the King of Hearts Has No Moustache I was concerned that the works should openly 
address the individual spectator as opposed to anonymous audience. In this way the beholder is 
directly  entrusted  with  a  responsibility.  In  social  psychology  this  is  a  phenomenon  widely 
recognised as the bystander effect. First discovered by John Darley and Bibb Latané in 1968, after 
they became interested in the topic following the murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964. it refers to 
cases  in  which  individuals  offer  less  help  to  a  victim  when  other  people  are  present.  The 
probability of help is inversely related to the number of bystanders. In other words, the greater 
the number of bystanders, the less likely it is that any one of them will help. Variables that help 
to  explain  why  the  bystander  effect  occurs  include  ambiguity,  cohesiveness  and  diffusion  of 
responsibility. In this way and in the case of the Gallery Vela exhibition I perceived the most 
likely conditions for the occurrence of performative spectatorship would be when agency was 
given to one rather than many.  
 
Grant Kester in his book Conversation Pieces takes a different view and argues (in oppposition to 
Ryan  and  myself)  precisely  for  these  networked,  open-ended,  dialogical,  visual  art  practices. 
Kester asserts that these practices help cross the boundaries of race, religion, and culture and 
bring together diverse audiences and promote change (mostly political) for the greater good. I 
could be persuaded to agree with the first half of that sentence but not with the second. In the 
Chapter Dialogical Aesthetics Kester advises that a traditional orthopedic aesthetic (i.e aesthetic of 
correction  – m o r e  a k i n  t o  w h a t  M i c h a e l  F r i e d  w a s  a r g u i n g  f o r  w i t h  M o d e r n i s t  A r t ) ,  t h a t  
originates  from  the  belief  that  the  viewer  suffers  from  an  epistemological  lack  that  can  be 
corrected by the artist through the encounter with his/her artwork, either leaves the artist with 
contempt for the viewer or with an evangelical superiority that sees the viewer as subject-to-be-
transformed. Instead Kester favours a more dialogical exchange based on reciprocal openness or 
dialogical aesthetic (as suggested by the chapter heading). The dialogic is posited as a means of 
enlightenment, through a process as opposed to product. In the same way that contemporary 
‘theatricality’  resists  definition  so  does  Kester’s  ‘dialogic  aesthetic’  through  his  focus  on 
collaborative, process-driven practices. The corollary of object as a work of art is of course process 
but in his privileging of process over object (antithetical to Fried) he overlooks that process itself 
is fascinating for those directly involved in it but perhaps less so for those on the periphery i.e. the 
spectator. And in instances where the spectator becomes the process I often find myself walking  
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Fig. 35. Installation View, Kate Hawkins, The King of Hearts Has No Moustache (2012)  
Gallery Vela, London 
 
 
 
Fig. 36. Installation View, Kate Hawkins,  
The King of Hearts Has No Moustache (2012)  
Gallery Vela, London 
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Fig. 38. Kate Hawkins, Untitled (2012)  
 
Fig. 37. Kate Hawkins, 4 Marks (2012)  
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away  feeling a little  cheated
34.  Kester claims the  artists  who  utilise these  methods  are ‘context 
providers’ rather than ‘content providers’ in the words of the British artist Peter Dunn. (Kester, 
2004: 1). Yet I strongly contend that it shouldn’t be a case of either/or but more a case of both. 
Certainly in the gallery Vela exhibition I was aiming to convincingly exhibit ‘content’ alongside 
‘context’. In this manner the work became richer and more robust in that the paintings had the 
capacity to hold in suspension actions internal to a canvas, as well as those external to it.  
 
In order to achieve this I was required to utilise the idea of a network within the construction and 
display of the work (as Joselit describes in relation to Jutta Koether’s Lux Interior exhibition) 
while simultaneously trying to sidestep it with regards to the reception of the work (as Ryan 
explains in relation to Sam Porritt’s practice) in order to avoid the spectator experiencing any 
diffusion of responsibility or paralyzing ambiguity of agency. Just as Joselit outlines I was keen to 
introduce the idea of networks with regards to the display and installation of the works – with the 
intention that their relationships to the other works in the show were made overt. 
 
All the above Figures show works in direct dialogue with one another. In Fig. 35 it is their forms 
and black structures that most readily inspire conversation whereas in Fig. 36 it is perhaps their 
installation – they are conscious in their outright disregard for one another. Figs. 37 and 38 
illustrate the clean right-angled lines of two floor pieces. These two forms closely  mimic the 
other, which in addition their positioning on the gallery floor further contributes to the wider 
conversation. Yet because they are both essentially paintings (paintings within structures) they 
persuade a more singular access with respect to the spectator. Painting as an art form is most 
often  representative  of  a  flat  plain.  Consequently  in  the  majority  of  circumstances  optimal 
viewing manifests in direct confrontation and reception of that plain. For anyone that has, in 
recent years, visited a blockbuster museum show like the Velázquez at the National Gallery in 
2006 you will likely acknowledge  how difficult it often is to ‘see’ the work face on and the 
frustration that that provokes. 
 
                                                         
34 In 2005 I spent an afternoon milling around Rirkrit Tiravanija's installation at the Serpentine Gallery in London which composed 
ply-wood mock-ups of two identical New York apartments (his own). I took the open-house, free-for-all of Tiravanija's apartments as 
an invitation to participate, to behave in the gallery as I would at home. Yet I didn’t want to and it only served to increase my own 
self-consciousness. Plus I wasn’t sure what I was meant to ultimately gain from this overly-public participation. I assume it was some 
understanding of the maxim that perception requires involvement. But, ‘conversely, some kinds of involvement require little in the 
way of perception, and don't invite much in the way of reflection, let alone responsibility’ (Searle, 2005). I personally felt this to be 
the case here.  
 
 
 
 
90 
By embracing networks in the vein of the above Figures the paintings
35 were given a context i.e 
that of painting exhibition. Furthermore in terms of conceptual nascence networked forms neatly 
reflected the current zeitgeist: social and cyber patterns through their ‘difference and repetition’ 
(Deleuze, 1968). The paintings in the back room referenced the figure of the individual and 
autonomous performer yet they never fully embodied him/her: at all times they were flanked by a 
troupe of fellow players. There existed no hierarchy among the works; there was no lead role; no 
painting or structure was subordinate to any other. In other words they all belonged to one 
egalitarian network. I mentioned briefly, in chapter one’s discussion of theatricality, Diderot, and 
his  comments  on  leading  actors  who  consistently  played  to  the  audience  vis-à-vis  those  in 
subordinate roles who were constrained by the presence of someone who governed them i.e. ‘they 
address[ed] themselves to this other, toward him they orient[ed] all action’ (Fried, 1988: 95) and 
how  Diderot  suggests  that  those  in  subordinate  roles  gave  much  more  convincing  all  round 
performances. This relates very closely to the works in the back room of The King of Hearts has no 
Moustache. As a result of there being no hierarchy whatsoever the works were forced to play to 
each other and the spectator in equal measure. Perhaps this lack of hierarchy is also why, while 
hinting at a theatrical playfulness and alluding to the theatre of self-curation and self-image, they 
managed  to  avoid  becoming  theatrical  in  Fried’s  terms  i.e.  being  wholly  conscious  of  the 
spectator  before  them.  On  some  levels  it  could  be  argued  they  played  to  the  spectator  – i n 
bringing to the spectators’ attention the conceits of appearance, but fundamentally, I believe, they 
managed to teasingly navigate a path between process and object, form and content, performance 
and theatre.  
 
Corresponding to this delicately balanced navigation, I found the process to be as significant as 
the  output  during  the  fabrication  of  the  works  for  The  King  of  Hearts  Has  No  Moustache. 
Alongside attempting to demonstrate the performativity inherent in the production process of the 
paintings, the final paintings also became performative objects in their own right. i.e a transition 
of states occurred and a new reality was produced. The paintings in the exhibition continually 
acted out their ambiguous status – somewhere between painting and sculpture, prop and player – 
and through this ‘act’ they began to inhabit and embody that status. They became ‘paintings’ as 
well as ‘sculptures’, ‘props’ as well as ‘players’. It could be argued that they were playing on 
degrees  of  theatricality  (in  all  senses  of  the  word)  whilst  remaining  essentially  performative. 
Throughout  the  show  the  artworks  repeatedly  declared  ‘I  am  a  painting’  or  ‘I  am  neither  a 
                                                         
35 I use the terms ‘paintings’ here in the broadest sense. I also intend it to mean paintings on structures, assemblages and the like.  
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painting or a sculpture’ or even ‘I am  a sculpture’. They could look forward and in a sense 
reconfigure  the  conventions  of  performativity w h i l e  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  p l a y i n g  o f f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
conventions  of  painting  as  a  medium.  They  became  performative,  in  the  way  Judith  Butler 
outlines, through their non-autonomous and non-subjectivist idea of acting (Hantlemann, 2010: 
19). The ‘social’ works relied on the power of social conventions for the activation of meaning. As 
I  explained  before,  a  performative  act  for  Butler,  produces  reality,  not  by  virtue  of  will  or 
intention, but precisely because it derives from conventions that it repeats and actualizes and in 
this instance those conventions are the conventions of painting and spectatorship. 
 
Furthermore (I hope) that at no point the spectator’s ‘experience’ of the work fully stood in for or 
replaced the work itself: the content and context remained delicately balanced (unlike in Kester’s 
world where he greatly privileges context) in order that the work could still exist regardless of the 
presence of a spectator (another way in which Fried defines the Minimalist/Literalist trope and 
consequently a theatrical artwork). I would however argue, in the context of the works in The 
King  of  Hearts  Has  No  Moustache t h a t   the  spectator’s  presence  was  intrinsic  to  their  deeper 
meaning. After all why make the effort to grow a moustache if not to show it off? 
 
In summary I am attempting to straddle a fine line here between explicit prescription and open-
ended (networked) subjectivity within the work. Thus I deem it positive when artwork ‘belongs’ 
to a network, in Joselit’s terms, but not when it ‘becomes’ a network, as in Kester’s. Ultimately I 
find  painting  has  more  potential  to  promote  performativity  when  it  is  acknowledges  its 
conceptual  and  contextual  networks  but  spectatorship  has  more  potential  to  promote 
performative agency when it is not so concerned with a network but rather a singular address. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The works within the exhibition The King of Hearts Has No Moustache all achieved performativity 
on some level – they all incited a transition of states and production of reality. In the front room 
performativity most often occurred on the level of the individual pieces, whereas in the back 
room performativity occurred more on the level of the exhibition as a whole. This was played out 
by the paintings in the front room engaging the spectator on more of a one-to-one basis while 
those in the back space functioned plurally, through generating a many-to-one experience with 
the intention that the spectator became fully immersed in the installation. In this way Rancière’s 
(2009) chasm between active and passive was reduced and the demise of the difference between  
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reality and its simulation, that gives rise to the inactivity, aesthetic unresponsiveness and political 
impotence of the  masses (Dean,  2011) was also  addressed. Furthermore the  making and the 
hanging of this exhibition gave me the opportunity to reflect on exhibition practice as a nexus for 
how art is received. Overall The King of Hearts Has No Moustache achieved what I had set out to 
do. I felt it brought together, more comprehensively and performatively than the previous show 
My Brother is a Hairy Man, ideas of painting and performance. In part it achieved this through a 
sensitive negotiation between context and content but also through the works’ address to the 
spectator on the level of individual rather than social collective. Thus the beholder was invested 
with greater agency and power that ultimately promoted greater performativity.  
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3. ESCAPE THE ESPLANADE: LOOKING BACK 
 
The exhibition Escape the Esplanade took place in July 2013 at LIMBO, an artist-run space in 
Margate.  The  space  itself  is  an  old  electricity  substation  and  is  unusually  long  and  narrow. 
Accordingly I decided to treat it like a promenade: the length and shape of the space lends itself 
to a practical act of ‘walking through’, an act that is similarly directed by the structure of a street 
or pier. It also physically paralleled the composition of the nearby high street, forming a central 
‘path’ through which the viewer navigated, ‘overlooked’ by ‘bystanding’ paintings and structures. 
‘[My] loose and airy canvases upend[ed] their status as images for gazing at by channelling the 
traditional high street pursuit of people-watching. Depicting eyes of all kinds – from the cool 
gaze of sunglasses to the beady eyes of an owl – these are paintings that look back.’ (Sherwin, 
2013) 
 
In utilising the  Chapter heading ‘Looking  Back’  I  am referring to how  Escape  the  Esplanade 
addressed the dichotomy between the spectacle and the spectator. The paintings ‘looked back’ at 
the viewer thereby de-activating the artwork/viewer paradigm, instead making the spectator the 
spectacle. Like an English passegiata the works themselves performed while eliciting a parallel 
performance  of  sorts  from  the  beholder  whose  enforced  promenade  meant  that t h e y  w e r e  
similarly ‘on display’ which resulted in the traditional and binary object/viewer separation being 
overturned. The viewer was persuaded to partake in ‘active’ engagement with the work, and, in 
doing so, enact a parallel performance of sorts. 
 
I am going to argue within this Chapter that the exhibition  Escape  the  Esplanade achieved  a 
greater degree of performativity and consequent agency than both the previous shows. I will do 
this through first discussing the ability of the works to engender eye-contact and the subsequent 
social, psychological and historical implications of this. Next I will discuss how through a non-
binary hanging style the works negated theatricality while stimulating performativity. Following 
this I will explain how in making visible performative transitions through a combination of see-
through  structures  and  hinges  Escape  the  Esplanade  achieved  performativity  and  consequent 
agency. Then I will talk about how the context of the exhibition simultaneously helped suggest 
meaning,  hold  attention  and  promote  agency.  And  finally  I  will  discuss  Alfred  Gell’s  
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Anthropological Theory of Art in relation to the indexes
36 of the exhibition (the paintings) and 
their role as social agents. 
 
3.1.  Eye-Contact 
 
 
    
Fig. 39. Kate Hawkins, Owl (2013)  
 
                                                         
36 Alfred Gell in his book Art and Agency, An Anthropological Theory (1998) which I refer to frequently in this Chapter explains how 
he will use ‘index’ as a technical term for an ‘art object’, ‘work of art’ or ‘artwork’. He denotes how ‘an ‘index’ in Piercean semiotics is 
a ‘natural sign’, that is,  an entity from which  the observer can  make  a causal inference of some kind, or an inference about the 
intentions or capabilities of another person’ (Gell, 1998: 13). He gives the example of smoke as an index of fire.  
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Escape the Esplanade brought about performativity as a result of the show’s repeated depiction of 
eyes and the action of ‘looking’ innate in those representations – through their eyes the paintings 
became  instruments  of  social  exchange.  The  ocular  imagery o f  t h e  p a i n t i n g s  i n  Escape  the 
Esplanade  manifested  itself  through  the  employment  of  forms  relating  to  the  eye  such  as 
sunglasses,  lenses  and  lengthy  eyelashes.  Every  painting  in  some  sense  referenced  the  act  of 
‘looking’. Throughout the show this took many forms, one example being Owl (Fig. 39) who 
peered down from his lofty and tilted vantage point at the viewers below. Hung approximately 
three meters high Owl took its point of departure from Picasso’s collage The Great Snow Owl, 
1957.  In  this  self-portrait  as  an  owl  Picasso  collaged  photographs  of  his  own  eyes  onto  the 
drawing in place of the owl’s eyes.  In this way the  act of looking (at an artwork) is further 
emphasized through the insertion of Picasso’s own somewhat beady eyes. In Escape the Esplanade, 
Owl (2013) was hung so that the bottom of the canvas touched the wall while the top of the 
canvas  came  away  from  the  wall  at  a  roughly  30  degree  angle.  This  created  a  somewhat 
intimidating effect for the spectator of being observed from height similar to that of a surveillance 
device  with  its  constantly  shifting  eye.  He/she  was  ‘looked  back’  at.  Alfred  Gell  in  his 
Anthropology of Art would term this ‘animism’. 
 
Gell uses Hindu beliefs to ground his discussions on seeing. According to Diana Eck (1985) 
worshipping images in Hinduism is realised by  means of obtaining darshan f r om  th e  g o d,  a 
particular type of blessing conveyed through the eyes. According to Eck the conceptualisation of 
darshan is closely allied to the role allotted in the Hindu tradition to the eye as an organ for 
interpersonal  transactions.  Correspondingly  Gell  describes  how  Eck  cites  Stella  Kramrisch’s 
account of ‘seeing’ (informed by Sanskrit philosophical writings) as a transitive form of agency: 
 
Seeing  … is  a  going forth  of the sight  towards the  object. Sight  touches it and 
acquires its form. Touch is the ultimate connection by which the visible yields to 
being grasped. While the eye touches the object the vitality that pulsates in it is 
communicated … (Kramrisch 1976:136) 
 
Here it is possible to ‘see’ how seeing is, like touching, understood as a form of contact. Also 
through  this  materialist  conception  of  seeing  Alfred  Gell  contends  that  seeing  can  create  a 
physical bridge between one being and another. (Gell, 1998: 117) Akin to the reception of ‘Owl’ 
and all the works in Escape the Esplanade, Darshan is thus a two-way affair. ‘The gaze directed by  
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the god towards the worshipper confers his blessing; conversely, the worshipper reaches out and 
touches the god. The result is union with the god, a merging of consciousness according to the 
devotionalist interpretation’. (Gell, 1998: 117) In addition Gell notes how this in turn brings 
into the frame issues of reciprocity and intersubjectivity in the relationship between the image 
and the recipient. In Hindu material he remarks that the key to the process of animation appears 
to depend on the logic of looking and being seen. And imagist devotion specifically comes from 
the act of looking into the eyes of the god – only eye contact (not the study of other image 
details) can bring about union. From this viewpoint it is not unreasonable to assume that every 
work within the Margate show, (as every work contains, in some form, a depiction of the eyes) 
could command a similarly reciprocal act of union. Gell notes that sometimes, in Jain temples, 
the eyes of images are inset with mirrors, in order that the devotee can see him or herself reflected 
back at themselves in the ‘act’ of looking. 
 
Animacy takes its origin from this ocular exchange, because, even if one does not 
take a mystical attitude towards images, one is none the less entitled to apply action 
verbs like ‘look’ (or ‘smile’, ‘gesticulate’, etc.) to them. (Gell, 1998: 118) 
 
In this way then it can only be argued that the images are engaging in an action: a performative. 
Gell points out that even a sceptic would be obliged to acknowledge that an idol ‘looks’ in a 
particular direction. And according to Gell it is not mysticism on the devotee’s part which results 
in the practical inference that the image ‘sees’ him or her, because in essence we only ever know 
what other persons are seeing by knowing what they are looking at. (Gell, 1998: 118) He goes 
on: ‘The sceptic would say ‘the idol is blind – it cannot see anything’, but even so, to be blind is 
to be unable to see what one looks at, which hardly banishes the residual animacy of images, since 
a disability implies a potential ability.’ (Gell, 1998: 118)  Yet the inference that if idols look they 
can see is not quite the extent of it. 
 
Eye-contact, mutual looking, is a basic mechanism for intersubjectivity because to 
look in another’s eyes is not just to see the other, but to see the other seeing you. 
Eye-contact prompts self-awareness of how one appears to the other, at which point 
one sees oneself ‘from the outside’ as it were, oneself, an object (or an idol). Eye-
contact seems to give direct access to other minds because the subject sees herself as 
an object, from the point of view of the other as a subject. Eye-contact is the basic 
modality  of  ‘second-order  intentionality’,  awareness  of  the  other  person  as  
 
 
 
 
97 
intentional subject … In that she can see herself seeing the idol, the idol must see 
her, because when she sees herself seeing the idol, the idol is seen by her as seeing 
her. (Gell, 1998: 120) 
 
Henceforth the idol’s and the devotee’s perspectives become thoroughly enmeshed in this optical 
oscillation and ‘union’ is thus achieved. But what does this mean for Escape the Esplanade and its 
constituent works? It means that through the existence of eyes within all of the paintings, the 
works  are  granted  even  greater  performative  potential  and  power  of  agency.  For  the  sake  of 
argument, assuming we replace Gell’s idols with my paintings, it is possible to begin to imagine 
how performativity and agency can occur not only on the level of ‘looking’ at the spectator (i.e 
the paintings performing an action) but also through intersubjectivity and it’s consequent ‘union’ 
of two sets of eyes, of object and subject, of subject and object, of two subjects or even two 
objects.  In their entwining, their individual identities  in turn falter, resulting in  a symbiotic 
reciprocity. Of course in no way are the paintings idols, they are artworks and at no point do I 
wish them to be viewed them as objects of devotion. Gell’s own emphasis also remains focused on 
sociological, anthropological implications rather than spiritual ones. He makes this abundantly 
clear in his introduction when he states: ‘I view art as a system of action, intended to change the 
world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it.’ (Gell, 1998: 6) And so for the record 
do I. Gell clearly rejects ideas pertaining to the work of art constituting an alternative ‘visual’ 
language with ‘symbolic meanings’. Instead, he says, he places ‘the emphasis on agency, intention, 
causation, result and transformation.’ (Gell, 1998: 6) i.e an action-centred approach rather than a 
semiotic one: visual art is not ‘like a language’ (Gell, 1998: 14) 
 
Moving on: how else can eye-contact function performatively? In a psychological context ‘looking 
back’ suggests daring. If you ‘look back’ or ‘answer  back’ to someone you are attempting to 
position yourself on their level, even if this is not socially the case. For example answering back to 
your boss implies a level of active (i.e. not passive) self-assurance and belief in your own voice, 
regardless of how incompatible it may be with his or hers. In this way it communicates a spirit 
and desire to be on the same level or part of the same network (Joselit, 2009). The gallery space 
becomes more like a social space in which the beholder and the painting can take on a (social) 
relationship on a similar level – it becomes a space in which the aura and cult of the art object is 
dissolved through shared non-verbal communication. If someone doesn’t ‘look back’ you can 
judge them to be shy or superior.  Eye contact is indicative of where one feels one stands in a 
social hierarchy. ‘Individuals in the superior position may look less because they don't need to  
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read their subordinate's feedback. It may also be true that they don't care what their inferiors 
think  or  how  they  are  responding  to  their  message’  (Nelson,  A.,  2010).  Eye  contact  is  the 
strongest  form  of  nonverbal  communication.  A  study  headed  by  Stephen  Janik  and  Rodney 
Wellens at the University of Miami in Florida found that 43.4 percent of the attention we focus 
on someone is devoted to their eyes, with the mouth running a poor second at 12.6 percent.  
 
Finally ‘looking back’ bears a historical dimension. ‘Looking back’ at the past helps frame ideas of 
viewing  for  the  future.  As  I’ve  previously  described,  Diderot  maintained  that  convincing 
paintings of the eighteenth century should not under any circumstances make eye contact with or 
‘look  back’ at their  viewer.  Instead in order to circumvent theatricality and consciousness of 
viewing, the subjects of the paintings were required  at all times to remain absorbed in their 
actions and oblivious to the beholder before them.  
 
We have seen that for the French painters of the early and mid-1750s the persuasive 
representation of absorption entailed evoking the perfect obliviousness of a figure or 
group of figures to everything but the objects of their absorption. Those objects did 
not include the beholder standing before the painting. Hence the figure or figures 
had to seem oblivious to the beholder’s presence if the illusion of absorption was to 
be sustained. In Chardin’s art that necessity remained mostly implicit: it was satisfied 
by seeming merely to ignore the beholder – the torn jacket, unpinned apron, and 
half-open drawer that I have characterized as signs of absorption show that Chardin 
himself was not forgetful that his paintings would be beheld – and by portraying 
absorptive states and activities with remarkable fidelity. (Fried, 1980: 67) 
 
It was  only when  Manet’s works  of the first  half of the  1860s emerged that the  concept of 
‘looking back’ at the beholder began to be reassessed. In Olympia (1863) Manet can be seen to 
reject anti-theatricality altogether in favour of what Fried terms ‘facingness’ – a self-conscious 
illusionistic pictorial engagement of the subject with the viewer. Here Manet can be seen to be 
inverting the nineteenth century convention of figures in paintings never directly addressing the 
viewer.  In  this  work  he  establishes  eye  contact  between  the  subject  of  the  painting  and  the 
beholder in order that the viewer is teased, and finds themselves ultimately locked into the gaze of 
a prostitute. The facing mechanism here is brought about through direct eye contact. Only at this 
juncture in the nineteenth century did ‘looking back’ begin to become a tool for expression as 
opposed to an obstacle to be avoided.  
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So we have established that the works in Escape the  Esplanade ‘look back’ and also what this 
means  contextually.  ‘Looking  back’  then  can  be  understood  to  be  not  only  physical,  but 
historical, social and psychological. Above all, though, ‘looking back’ at the spectator represents 
an exchange. I was attempting to capture within this show, and this chapter title, something of 
the nature of a balanced relationship in which the aura of the art object is dissolved and no longer 
‘objectified’ by the gaze. Chapter 2, titled ‘Looking At’, similarly refers to this idea of exchange 
but more agency appears inherent in the term ‘looking back’. It suggests an active intention to 
perform an action rather than just taking an opportunity to do so. ‘Looking Back’ offers more of 
a  direct  challenge  and  active  attempt  to  redress  the  balance  between  the  spectator  and  the 
objectified artwork.  
 
3.2. Non-Binary Hang 
 
The paintings in Escape the Esplanade also negated theatricality through their non-binary hanging 
style, which in turn led to greater performative interaction. The works functioned less on an 
individual, confrontational level and more as a whole installation akin to the back room of The 
King of Hearts Has No Moustache. As I’ve outlined previously Fried’s vein of theatricality occurs 
when the painting is self-consciously set up in physical opposition to the viewer.  
 
This physical ‘facingness’ (Fried) was largely evaded in Escape the Esplanade as a consequence of 
none  (bar  one)  of  the  paintings  being  hung  in  this  traditionally  one-to-one  and  potentially 
confrontational style. Instead they were installed in a manner that meant that the viewer was at all 
times encircled and contained by them, part of their network (Joselit again). Moreover the one 
traditionally installed work – hung at head height and flush to the wall – consciously subverted its 
binary positioning through its fragmented and evasive subject matter. Entitled The Unnamable 
(Fig.  40)  after  Beckett’s  book,  which  consists  of  an  entirely  disjointed  monologue  from  the 
perspective  of  an  unnamed  (presumably  unnamable)  and  immobile  protagonist.  There  is  no 
concrete plot or setting – and it is uncertain throughout whether the other characters exist or 
whether they are facets of the narrator himself. The painting’s surface is similarly ambiguous in its 
layered grounds and dissolving features. There is a face but as a viewer we are unsure  to whom it 
belongs – Beckett or one of his many characters? Thus the painting’s abstracted subject matter, its 
breakdown of binary positions, sits in stark contrast to the installation of the painting itself – 
which  remains  undiluted  and  oppositional  in  its  uncomplicated  facingness.  This  negates  its  
 
 
 
 
100 
theatrical potential altogether (in Fried’s terms – if we continue to understand theatricality as a 
celebration of objecthood) as a result of its ability to play ‘subject’ (a fragmented face) off of 
‘object’  (a conventionally-hung canvas), thereby neutralizing  both in the  process. If  both  are 
neutralized, neither can dominate and nor can theatricality.  
 
 
 
Fig. 40. Kate Hawkins, The Unnamable (2013) 
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Correspondingly ‘in the 1974 issue of screen dedicated to Brecht, Stephen Heath seeks to explain 
the complexity of Brecht’s concept of ‘distanciation’ that is not a mere separation: the aim is no 
longer to fix the spectator apart as receiver of a representation but to pull the audience into an 
activity of reading; far from separating the spectator, this is a step towards his inclusion in a 
process: the spectator must be included, his attitude modified’. (Heath 1974: 111-12) (Lisbon, 
2013 notes on tableau.) Following this, Heath remarks that ‘distanciation … is the work of this 
location  and  refusal,  a  work  against  separation-and-identification’,  (1974:  111)  i.e  against 
binaries.  This  agency-engendering  (performative) reading is what The  Unnameable s ou gh t  t o 
achieve,  in  conjunction  with  the  show  as  a  whole,  through  moving  the  viewer  away  from 
submitting passively to the power, appeal, or aura of an index (an artwork).  
 
 
 
Fig. 41. Installation View, Kate Hawkins, Escape the Esplanade (2013) LIMBO Margate  
 
In  accordance  with  Brecht’s  concept  of  distanciation  and  non-illusionistic  theatre  all  the 
‘paintings’ within Escape the Esplande in some form negated theatricality by way of their non- 
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binary, non-oppositional hanging styles. Apart from The Unnameable the remaining works leant 
on walls or valet stands, tilted from on high, balanced on shelves or structures, drooped from walls, 
they sloped, dangled, draped, hung, bent, slanted, inclined, rested, nestled, tipped, bowed, twisted, 
squeezed. Inherent in their installation was the description of an action: a verb. These are ‘doing’ 
words and the paintings consequently ‘did’ things as performativity ‘does’. And through these 
inherent ‘active’ qualities I hoped they encouraged the spectator to likewise experience ‘action’. 
Benjamin believed the mimetic faculty had its origin in a primitive compulsion to imitate, and 
thus gain access, to the world. (Gell, 1998: 100). Gell expands on this in his citation of Taussig 
who writes with reference to J. Frazer’s The Golden Bough: 
 
I am particularly taken by [Frazer’s] proposition that the principle underlying the 
imitative component of sympathetic magic is that ‘the magician infers that he can 
produce any effect he desires by merely imitating it’. (52) … I want to dwell on this 
notion of the copy, in magical practice, affecting the original to such a degree that the 
representation shares in or acquires the properties of the  represented. To me this is a 
disturbing notion, foreign and fascinating not because it so flagrantly contradicts the 
world around me but rather, that once posited, I suspect if not its presence, then 
imitations thereof, in the strangely familiar commonplace and unconscious habits of 
representation in the world about me. (Taussig 1993: 47-8) 
 
Gell writes that Taussig doesn’t take this far enough and his ‘mimetic faculty’ is rather vaguely 
delineated plus at no juncture does Frazer ever explain why the mutual resemblance of the image 
and  the  original  should  be  a  conduit  for  mutual  influence  or  agency.  (Gell,  1998:100) 
Nevertheless I would like to keep this in mind with regards to artworks imitating spectators and 
even more significantly, spectators imitating artworks. As I explained above, Escape the Esplanade 
may  very  well  have  broken  down  the  traditional  binary  distinctions  of  spectatorship,  i.e.  a 
spectator standing before a painting ‘beholding it’ (as a result of the hang there were very few 
paintings to ‘stand before’ in the traditional sense – it was more a case of standing ‘next to’, 
‘about’ or ‘among’) but perhaps in the process the exhibition unwittingly introduced another 
binary  arrangement
37  –  that  of  painting  standing  before  (and  imitating)  the  spectator? 
                                                         
37 Binary oppositions are a facet of structuralist thought (Saussure). I am talking in these terms here, as these were the terms in which 
Fried introduced his argument about theatricality in Art and Objecthood in 1968. Plus, in general I believe this more structuralist 
mode of thinking is more productive than the deconstructive agendas of post-structuralist thought, as I wrote about in relation to 
phenomenology and open-ended, process-based practices in Chapter 2.  
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Fig. 42. Installation View, Kate Hawkins, Escape the Esplanade (2013) LIMBO Margate  
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Fig. 43. Installation View, Kate Hawkins, Escape the Esplanade (2013) LIMBO, Margate 
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After all, the works were in some sense all ‘looking’ as they all had ‘eyes’ be they painted-on or cut-out. 
According to Benjamin (Taussig 1993; Benjamin, 1933) if they could ‘see’ they could also ‘copy’. The 
‘false mirror’ constituted the very secret of mimesis; that is to perceive (to internalize) is to imitate, and 
thus we become (and produce) what we perceive. (Gell, 1998: 31) 
 
Earlier on I claimed that works in Escape the Esplanade avoided theatricality through their non-binary 
hanging style. I have however gone on to argue that what occurred was perhaps more of a subversion of 
these binary oppositions rather than an out and out deconstruction. In a way the spectacle (the paintings) 
became the spectator and the spectator the spectacle. Taking as a starting point (but not the end point) 
Guy Debord’s description of the spectacle as the inverted image of society in which relations between 
commodities have supplanted relations between people, in which ‘passive identification with the spectacle 
supplants  genuine  activity’,  the  paintings  attempted  to  overturn  this  and  usher  in  a  new  era  of 
performativity, of ‘action’. Debord shrewdly describes the Society of the Spectacle as a realm of appearances 
that separates passive subjects from themselves but at no juncture does he offer us an alternative to this 
inauthentic surface state. He argues we have become passive observers and that is all. Escape the Esplanade 
on the other hand attempts a future where the spectator is once again given agency in the form of social 
life (Sennett, 1991). It is this idea of social life that drives me to think perhaps these binary oppositions 
needn’t be entirely broken down or deconstructed in the historical, post-structuralist sense but rather 
expanded  – a d d e d  t o  – to  i nclude  other  artworks  and  their  own  oppositions.    Escape  the  Esplanade 
included a non-binary hanging style in the sense that it was never a case of just two separate entities i.e the 
spectator versus the painting. The painting was at all times flanked by other paintings and structures, by 
its network, by its friends: plurals rather than two discrete elements. In addition the spectators were at all 
times surrounded by the paintings as if by a crowd of people.  
 
3.3.  Performative Transitions 
 
Next I want to argue that Escape the Esplanade achieved performativity and consequent agency by making 
visible performative transitions within the exhibition structure. In general this was achieved through the 
utilisation of see-through structures as well as through the use of the hinge as a transitional tool.  
 
Firstly  the  use  of  transparent  structures  engendered  transitions  through  space.  The  transparency 
embedded within the structures themselves served to encourage transitions of the eye alongside transitions 
within the space more generally. They were never solid or static –  as a plinth can be. They were dynamic  
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in both their material makeup and also method of display and consequently encouraged flow of spaces, 
eye  lines  and  people.  This  dynamism  was  further  added  to  by  a  feeling  of  anthropomorphism.  The 
paintings and their structures didn’t feel so much like dead objects but rather living protagonists. For 
instance Blue and Beheaded (2013) while alluding to an unfortunate death in its title nevertheless felt alive 
as a result of its awkward and slightly phallic anthropomorphic form. Constructed from a blue powder-
coated valet-stand this assemblage also alluded to an idea of social performance and display as a result of a 
valet-stand being closely linked with fashion and the idea of keeping up appearances. Taking this idea of 
fashion  and  social  performance  one  degree  further  Both  Eyes  (2013)  was  actually  fabricated  using  a 
clothes-horse. In this instance the clothes-horse was made from a four-panel see-through folding screen 
that loosely referenced back-stage dressing rooms and theatre scenery. The transparency of the clothes-
horse was also echoed by the painting itself that hung off its top bar that included two cut-out eyes on a 
diagonal. If, as a spectator you bent your knees and angled your head slightly to the left then it was 
possible to see right through onto the back wall of the LIMBO space as the positioning of the painting’s 
cut-out eyes more-or-less reflected those of the viewer’s. 
 
 
         
Fig. 44. Kate Hawkins, Blue and Beheaded (2013)   
Fig. 45. Kate Hawkins, Both Eyes (2013) 
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Furthermore these transparent structures suggest networks intrinsic to their own objecthood, to a much 
greater extent than a solid form ever could.  If we jump back to Joselit quickly we can recall how it is 
important for contemporary painting to be part of a network. With regards to the transparent structures 
they provided both networks autonomous to themselves and also functioned as interconnected arms to 
the larger network of the show. Their similar formal concerns only helped cement this web of works 
further. For instance if we compare Blue and Beheaded and Both Eyes it is possible to see how both works 
have cross-arms, both have feet, (although Blue and Beheaded has slightly fewer) both have uprights, and 
both  are  similar  in  proportion  or  colour.  Furthermore  both  works  are  composed  of  pastel-coloured 
paintings hung from darker supports. In all these ways they complement each other.  
 
As I touched on in Chapter 2 performativity is reliant on transitions in order to occur at all. It requires a 
transition between states, a transformation, in order that something gets done. In the case of these two 
works  their  transparent  frameworks  only  helped  aid  performative  interaction.  The  spectator  was 
encouraged to (visually, physically and viscerally) ‘move through’ the space in order that they experience 
translation,  transition  and  transformation,  in  order  that  a  performative  could  occur.  Moreover  the 
structures themselves embodied the performative nexus of ‘action’. Both Eyes appeared as if trotting off 
towards the back of the space while Blue and Beheaded embodied dynamism in another form – through 
the severing action of his head from his body. In both these ways performativity was personified. 
 
Performative  transitions  were  made  visible  by  employing  hinged  forms  or  such  like.  I  have  already 
discussed the piece Both Eyes, which along with taking up transitional forms also used hinges. Before I 
embark on a full discussion of hinges I think it is quickly worth noting that the qualities of a hinge, a 
joining mechanism, are not dissimilar to those of hyperlinks. As touched on in chapter 2, in relation to 
reading behaviours, hyperlinks constitute the nuts and bolts of these online networks. To some extent the 
use of hinges is analogous to the use of hyperlinks. Both are mechanisms that influence reading – be it of 
online text or paintings. Hinges embed themselves within a context enabling objects to sit side by side 
that  would  not  normally  be  permitted  to  do  so.  In  this  uneasy  juxtaposition  they  help  engineer 
fragmentation and distortion. Similarly hyperlinks fragment, distort and scatter, yet paradoxically they 
also connect. And perhaps this is the key. Conceivably painting needs to achieve both a disruption and 
connection in order for it to succeed in contemporary frameworks. This is perhaps how contemporary 
painting  embraces  performativity  (through  transitions)  without  becoming  theatrical  in  Fried’s  terms. 
Through the use of hinges Escape the Esplanade played to our contemporary style of reading.   
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Although  hinges  were  employed  in  Both  Eyes,  they  were  most  noticeably  utilized  in  Heavy.  Heavy 
constituted a medium-sized oil painting that was hung just above skirting board height from two hinges. 
Depicting a Roman acroterion bust usually found on the side of sarcophagi, Heavy appeared even heavier 
as a consequence of its unusually low hang. Of course ‘heavy’, is also a play-on-words alluding to an 
unsavoury  type  of  hired  help.  The  hinges  here  allowed  Heavy t o  h a n g  o f f  t h e  w a l l  i n  a  g e s t u r e  o f  
dynamism which sat in direct opposition to the painting’s depiction of a non-human lifeless form: a lump 
of stone.  
 
  
Fig. 46. Kate Hawkins, Heavy  (2013) 
Fig. 47. Robert Rauschenberg, Pilgrim (detail) 
(1960)  
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Akin to the way in which an idol might be understood to be a vessel acting as link between the divine and 
secular worlds, a hinge might similarly be understood to be a link between two worlds: those of beholder 
and artwork. In the case of Heavy the hinge provided an active and performative bond between these two 
worlds. Similarly Pilgrim, a work from Rauschenberg’s Combine series, produced between 1953-63, on 
show as part of the Onnasch  Collection, included a hinge
38 that served to unite the canvas with its 
immediate vicinity. Pilgrim, ‘a vehement gestural painting in blue and white is layered with paper and 
fabric collage in sweeping strokes that culminate in a kitchen chair, looking as if it has slipped down the 
canvas,  inviting  the  viewer  to  enter  the  painting’  (Wullschlager,  2013).  The  title  ‘Pilgrim’  is  also 
significant here in relation to the hinge. Suggesting a traveller journeying from one place to the next, the 
hinge can be understood as the apparatus of travel or the transit lounge between the two different worlds 
of viewer and artwork. Yet paradoxically just through the existence of ‘Pilgrim’ these two distinct worlds 
are broken down and notions of objecthood and spectatorship simultaneously destabilized. As Rancière 
puts  it,  emancipation  (which  equates  to  performativity,  as  outlined  in  Chapter  2)  ‘begins  when  we 
challenge the opposition between viewing and acting’ (Rancière, 2009: 13) i.e when we break down these 
binary worlds. 
 
3.4.  Context 
 
In the same vein the installation of the paintings in Escape the Esplanade naturally provided context. This 
contextual environment, not dissimilar to a tableau-vivant, in turn helped further suggest meaning, hold 
the attention of the spectator and promote performativity.  
 
For Gell an art object has no ‘intrinsic’ value relating to its status as such. He maintains that an art object 
is  a  function  of  the  social-relational  mix  in  which  it  is  embedded.  i.e  its  context.  Just  as  Escape  the 
Esplanade is a context rather than a collection of art objects I want to talk first about how context can 
suggest meaning. I’m aware that this would not be Gell’s first consideration - as an anthropologist he is 
interested in why social agents in particular contexts produce the responses they do to a particular work of 
art and, as I noted earlier, less concerned with the cultural, aesthetic ‘apppreciative’ approach, instead 
placing much more value on how context brings about social agency. (I will come to this later) However 
                                                         
38 The metal hinge was attached to the centre of the chair’s top rail and gave the illusion of joining the chair to the canvas behind. In its most 
recent display at the Hauser of Wirth space in Saville Row it did not appear as though the hinge was directly attached to the canvas (although it 
was to the chair). When viewed from the side there was a barely perceptible crack of light. Nevertheless the illusion was more than visible even if 
the second screw wasn’t.  
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much I might agree with Gell, as an artist I would see it as a missed opportunity not to briefly discuss 
what ‘context’ means from an art-historical perspective (although my discussion does remain within the 
realms of the social). 
 
At this juncture I want to return briefly to the concept of tableau. As discussed in chapter 1 Tableau-
vivant has a complex relationship to its brother term tableau.  At one and the same time it seemingly 
encompasses  more,  in  terms  of  physical  mass  and  contextual  perspective,  but  then  less,  in  terms  of 
‘temporal,  conceptual  and  compositional  formation’,  (Lisbon,  2013:  77)  Yet  one  can’t  fully  be 
understood  without  the  other.  As  Lisbon  notes  these  ‘living  pictures’  (tableaux  vivants)  ‘were  often 
allegories staged for a royal procession … royalty would move from tableau vivant to tableau vivant … 
Through this notion of theatre as a succession of individual scenes or pictorial moments, we gain an 
insight into the complex temporality that characterizes the history of the tableau in its relation to the 
tableau vivant.’ (Lisbon, 2013: 78) 
 
In the same way the individual paintings within Escape the Esplanade can’t be fully apprehended without 
the full cast of LIMBO characters present. The context that the other works in the show provided was just 
as significant as the individual paintings themselves. They simultaneously occupied the position of tableau 
and  tableau  vivant.  Furthermore  their  group  composition  was  just  as  important  as  the  compositions 
within their independent picture planes, the individual tableau.  
 
Furthermore within the larger ‘tableau’ of the exhibition there were other individual scenes taking place 
that consisted of more than one work but not the entire exhibition, like the scheming girl gang, which 
included the works Eloise, Being Seeing and Squiggle (all 2013), ‘hanging’ out on the uninterrupted right 
side wall of the LIMBO space. These self-governing scenes served as additional narratives to the overall 
exhibition. The creation of the three-strong girl-gang was not a pre-determined decision and only came 
about  during  the  process  of  the  ‘hang’.  The  three  individual  works  within  this  group  were  always 
independent and seemingly  unconnected works in the context  of the studio.  However once  I  began 
installing  it  made  sense  to  hang  them  together  despite  their  outwardly  clashing  yet  complementary 
personalities. Eloise epitomized effortless, classy cool while at the same time appearing warm. Being Seeing 
was a slightly more confrontational proposition as she looks right through you with her large doe-eyes. 
Yet in this moment the mirror-effect was called into play (Gell, 1998: 120) and an optical oscillation 
resulted (as in the case of Owl), a back and forth of seeing, and concurrent awareness of being seen. Yet 
despite her propositioning stance, her doe-like eyes seem to suggest a shyness beneath her leggy allure.   
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Fig. 48. Kate Hawkins, Left: Eloise (2013) Middle: Being Seeing (2013) Right: Squiggle (2013)  
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Fig. 50. Kate Hawkins, Left: Roman Sun II (2013) Right: III (2013)  
 
Fig. 49. Kate Hawkins, Mary (2013) 
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Lastly – Squiggle, who might be the least refined but most self-assured of all with her caked-on mascara 
and glossed hair. She is probably the most fun too. This clashing arrangement of personalities further 
helped  to  emphasize  the  contradictions  inherent  in  their  (and  all  of  our)  characters.  They  were  all 
simultaneously  intimidating  but  non-threatening,  sexy  but  shy.  Only  through  this  framework,  this 
unlikely contextualisation was this made possible.  Sim ilarly the installation of Roman Sun I, II & III 
(2013) produced another tableau vivant this time with a more laissez-faire feel as a consequence of the 
paintings lounging, stretching, reclining, sprawling, lolling from their projected plinths.  However the 
positioning of both the Roman Suns and the Girl Gang more or less opposite one another, some of the 
spectators  felt
39  was  suggestive  of  a  more  flirtatious  and  sexualized  relationship.  These  discrete  but 
complementary ‘contexts’ or ‘scenes’ within the Margate show only added to enrich the social tapestry of 
the exhibition and (hopefully) adjacent high street and town.  
 
At this point it is worth once again referencing the Edward Kienholz wall text as I discussed in Chapter 1 
(part  of  the  Onnasch  collection exhibition titled Re-view at Hauser and Wirth).  Through K ienholz’s 
reformulation of the term tableau he engenders his contextualized works with meaning beyond that of 
their singular status – through his understanding of tableau as a constitution of the whole installation he 
grants them sociability imbued with that of a social status. Their group context provides another layer of 
meaning apart from that of singular autonomous artwork. The same can be said for the installation Escape 
the Esplanade including the smaller scenes or tableaux (such as the girl gang) within the larger exhibition 
tableau. 
 
Meaning was further suggested not only by way of the individual tableau but also by the reading of the 
LIMBO project space as a street with a context beyond that of the gallery. For instance the individual 
tableaux relate directly to the shop windows of Margate’s high street which parallels the length of the 
gallery space situated only a few meters away down a small alley. The tableaux within the show, such as 
the girl gang or the installation of Roman Suns, closely echo the high street window displays in their 
curated  compositions.  Furthermore  my  flirting  groups  and  gangs  also  speak  of  wider  contextual 
connotations of the leisure attractions of seaside towns more generally. Also the inclusion of Fig. 49, Mary 
(nominally after Mary Portas of Queen of shops fame) brings to mind the ‘struggling’ high st in another 
contextual  formulation  which  cannot  be  entirely  severed  from  Margate’s  history  as  a  once  gracious 
                                                         
39 A c o u pl e  o f pe o pl e  po st -show mention  this particular set-up  (the  Girl  Gang  opposite  Roman  Suns) an d it s su gge st e d m e an in gs t o  m e 
specifically  
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regency seaside destination fallen on hard times but one that has recently begun again its ascent to favour 
through, this time, the of the patronage of the arts in the form of the David Chipperfield designed Turner 
Contemporary gallery.  Thus the wider local context supplied many levels of meaning within the context 
of the exhibition more generally. 
 
Context  also  helped to engage and hold  attention.  Moyra  Derby in  In  Depth as  Breadth in Rotation: 
Tableau as a Holding Apparatus, links tableau to the idea of ‘holding’ attention. In her text Derby assigns 
‘holding’ three  behaviours: holding  back,  holding fast  and holding  attention. It is the third  (holding 
attention) that I would like to briefly focus on. In relation to this Derby cites Jonathan Crary’s assertions 
that attention’s reliance on selection and exclusion inevitably provoke absences and gaps: the unperceived 
as much as the perceived. Derby maintains ‘its need to “selectively isolate certain contents of a sensory 
field at the expense of others in the interests of maintaining an orderly and productive world” provides a 
description  that  [she]  thinks  can  be  applied  to  the  conventions  of  tableau,  and  more  widely  to  an 
understanding of the term apparatus as framed by Agamben
40’. (Derby, 2013: 28) from Crary) If then we 
begin to consider Escape the Esplanade a tableau as opposed to a tableau vivant Derby’s claims could neatly 
translate to this exhibition, this social apparatus. Also Crary’s assertion follows on from what I outlined in 
chapter 2, using the examples cited by Dan and Chip Heath, suggesting that ‘gaps’ are intrinsic to our 
ability to attend.   
 
Again, I want to bring in Dan and Chip Heath’s text on the subject of retaining attention and how 
important they believed context to be. They cite the story of an upstart television network in the 1960s 
(ABC) who signed a contract to televise college football games. In order to get people interested, in what 
was historically a difficult sell to a niche audience, a twenty-nine year-old employee named Roone Arledge 
sat down one Saturday afternoon and wrote a memo. He said: 
 
Heretofore television has done a remarkable job of bringing the game to the viewer – now we 
are going to take the viewer to the game!... 
      After our opening commercial billboards, instead of dissolving to the usual pan shots of 
the field we will have pre-shot film of the campus and the stadium so we can orient the 
viewer. He must know he is in Columbus, Ohio, where the town is football mad; or that he 
                                                         
40 Derby writes in her footnote how apparatus is described by Agamben in What is an Apparatus and Other Essays (2009) as ‘a set of practices, 
bodies of knowledge, measures, institutions that aim to manage, govern, control and orient – in a way that purports to be useful – the behaviours, 
gestures and thoughts of human beings’.   
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is part of a small but wildly enthusiastic crowd in Corvallis, Oregon. He must know what the 
surrounding country and campus look like, how many other people are watching this game 
with him, how the people dress at football games in this part of the country, and what the 
game means to the two schools involved. (Heath & Heath, 2007: 91) 
 
The memo was three pages long and described camera angles, impact shots and opening graphics. The 
trick, Arledge said was to give viewers enough context about the game so that they’d start to care. And this 
idea of providing context in  order to  harness attention is equally true  of the  Margate show.  Here I 
believed the provision of context in the Limbo space, which took the form of a street, only served to aid 
engagement with the individual works as well as the exhibition as a whole. 
 
Lastly I believe (as Gell does) that context has the ability to promote agency. As I just mentioned, the 
paintings  in  Escape  the  Esplanade  functioned  both  autonomously  and  collectively. Y v e -Alain  Bois  in 
Painting as Model writes ‘sculpture belongs to the same space as ordinary objects – the space of everyday’ 
(Bois, 1990: 127). All of the works in this show are paintings in some form, most of which also bridge the 
divide to sculpture. However I would contend that every work belongs to the ‘space of everyday’ and only 
through belonging to that space can they even begin to exercise their potential agency. I don’t adhere to 
Greenberg’s assertions of art’s autonomy or even Fried’s 1968 re-drafting of them in Art and Objecthood, 
or any other assertions for the transcendental, auratic qualities of artwork. Alfred Gell regarded art objects 
as devices ‘for securing the acquiescence of individuals in the network of intentionalitites in which they 
are enmeshed’ (1992: 43). In this way he understood art as a special form of technology, rather than an 
object succumbing to its aura as an artwork. In my mind also, if art is autonomous and auratic, it is by 
definition apart from the world: socially and politically removed. It follows that it is also socially and 
politically less potent and only by retaining a social relation or connection can art retain the potential for 
agency and change. Gell contends that  ‘Human minds are inevitably “social” minds, to the extent that we 
only know our own minds in a social context of some kind, “action” cannot really be conceptualized in 
other than social terms. Moreover, the kinds of agency which are attributed to art objects (or indexes of 
agency) are inherently and irreducibly social in that art objects never (in any relevant way) emerge as 
agents except in very specific social contexts’. (Gell, 1998: 17) Thus it is possible to perceive how hugely 
significant ‘context’ is in terms of art’s potential for agency. 
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3.5.  Alfred Gell’s Anthropological Theory of Art 
 
 
Fig. 51. Installation View, Escape the Esplanade (2013) LIMBO, Margate 
 
This ability of context to bring about agency links neatly to my last point – that the works in Escape the 
Esplanade ultimately achieved performativity and thus agency through their sociality: their social relations 
and interactions. It would seem amiss at this juncture, considering their formalism – their occupation of a 
space  somewhere  between  abstraction  and  representation  – n o t  t o  m e n t i o n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  
anthropomorphism  and  to  Alfred  Gell’s  anthropological  theory  of  art.  To  summarise:  Gell’s  is  an 
ahistorical, systematic, anthropological account of agency. He is not concerned with symbolism but with 
action and agency – what an artwork can ‘do’ as opposed to what it ‘says’. Thus considered art works are 
the equivalents of persons, and more precisely, the equivalents of social agents. To apprehend how and 
why art objects exercise such influence on their viewers, Gell argues for art as a special kind of technology. 
(Van Eyck, 2010: 4) Gell defined this as ‘a theory of social relations that obtain in the neighbourhood of 
works of art, or indexes. These social relations form part of the relational texture of social life within the 
biographical  (anthropological) frame of reference.  Social r elatio ns o nly  exist in so far  as th ey ar e mad e 
manifest in actions.’ (Gell, 1998: 26) As was outlined in the introduction the first sentence here forms the 
nexus of my research - that art works can be and trigger performatives -  while the last statement explains  
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the reasoning behind my research - in this last sentence he implies that social relations can’t exist without 
‘action’. And thus we can see why it is so important that works of art can and do ‘act’ and bring about 
performatives. Without action, without performativity, there is no social-life per se. Correspondingly in 
the instances when the works in My Brother is a Hairy Man, The King of Hearts has no Moustache and 
Escape the Esplanade ‘worked’ together they initiated performatives and in the process a social life of their 
own. I believe this occurred most consistently and authentically in the latter show. 
 
In Gell’s consideration of Art works as the equivalents of persons or social agents anthropomorphism and 
animism come into play. Furthermore in my mind it is difficult to conceive of works in social terms if we 
don’t at first conceive of them as social beings. In order to do this I have attempted throughout the 
Margate exhibition to emphasise their anthropological qualities. Throughout this Chapter (and thesis 
more  generally)  I  have  repeatedly  hinted  at  the  anthropomorphic  traits  of  all  my  paintings  and 
assemblages and here I would like to discuss them in a little more detail. 
 
In  a  similar  way  to  how  idols  are  religiously  efficacious  – i . e .  t h e r e   are  beneficial  returns  for  the 
worshipper who converses with them, dresses them, bathes them, offers food – I believe a painting can be 
socially efficacious. Idols are religiously efficacious because they are invested with the power of social 
agents. ‘The idol may not be a “living thing” but it has “intentional psychology” attributed to it, then it 
has something like a spirit, a soul, an ego, lodged within it’ (Gell, 1998: 129). Can this be the case for a 
painting as well? Alfred Gell believes so. He contends that anything can be a social agent as long as actual 
human persons/agents are in the neighbourhood of that inert object. He writes: 
 
‘social agents’ can be drawn from categories which are as different as chalk and cheese (in fact 
rather more different) because ‘social agency’ is not defined in terms of ‘basic’ biological 
attributes (such as inanimate thing vs. incarnate person) but it is relational  – it does not 
matter, in ascribing ‘social agents’ status, what a thing (or person) “is” in itself; what matters 
is where it stands in the network of social relations. (Gell, 1998: 123) 
 
In this formulation we can begin to understand how Gell takes as his starting point the logical and factual 
impossibility of inanimate matter being animate, and solves it by arguing that objects can indeed be seen 
to possess considerable characteristics of animacy if they are considered not as living beings but as agents 
(Van Eyck, 2010). So an artwork is an agent in the same way an idol is an agent. Thus a painting can ‘do’ 
whatever the (human) agent intends of it. And in this way worshippers can reconcile their consciousness  
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that the objects of their devotion are dead matter with their parallel belief that they can also, act, listen 
and see. Van Eyck suggests that ‘money is the supreme example of this, but one can also think of the 
effectiveness of performative speech and of official documents like passports, or the functions of heraldic 
or military insignia. All these objects or acts make those who see or hear them act, but they are not 
therefore considered as living beings’ (2010: 8). 
 
But how can an icon or painting become an agent? Gell stipulates that for time immemorial Western 
philosophers have endlessly debated  about how best to distinguish between ‘actions’ (stemming from 
agency) and ‘happenings’ resulting from material causes and have ultimately reached no agreement. In a 
determined leap Gell recommends that the inverse also holds true, that is, if pressed, we are not really sure 
about how an idol (or my case a painting) is not quite a person – even though we are perfectly certain it 
isn’t. He says any argument can cut both ways and ‘there is nothing to prevent us from asserting, if we 
wish to, that the behaviour of a statue (standing still) occurs because the statue has a mind, intends to 
stand still, and does as a consequence of this prior intention stand still.’ (Gell, 1998: 126) By this logic we 
can see how an inanimate object in the form of an idol (or artwork) can be transformed into an agent 
purely by claiming or stipulating its role as social other.
41 
 
Mary  (2013)  is  an  example  of  animation  simply  by  stipulating  her  role  as  social  other.  This  claim 
functions both in terms of her conception as both Mary Portas and the Virgin Mary. The virgin of course 
is a reference to the divine and immaculate - the multitude of virgins represented throughout art history - 
and operates easily as social other: in her position as ‘chosen one’ she is by definition exceptional. Her 
second conception as Mary Portas functions slightly differently as social other, particularly in the context 
of Margate
42. As this however she embodies something of a modern-day celebrity idol in her operation as 
both the outsider and ‘oracle’. According to Skye Sherwin she was depicted as ‘a stiff bobbed hairdo and 
dark eyes, hung on a leggy tripod’ (Sherwin, 2013) Still, in either incarnation (celebrity or virgin) Mary is 
potent.  
 
Caroline van Eyck in her text Living Statues: Alfred Gell’s Art and Agency, Living Presence Response and the 
Sublime  terms  the  experience  of  a  work  of  art  becoming  alive  a  ‘living  presence  response’.  My 
                                                         
41 According to Gell the other way in which an idol or artwork can be animated is by assuming a hidden agent (2010: 133). This consists of 
‘providing it with a homunculus, or space for a homunculus, or turning it into a homunculous within some larger entity’ (2010: 133).  
42 Mary Portas (of Mary Queen Of Shops fame) visited Margate with a television company approximately six months prior to the exhibition 
Escape the Esplanade, in an attempt to revive their high street. Her visit and input received mixed reactions and feelings amongst residents and 
since then her ‘ill-fated government-sanctioned attempt to make over the high street has become the stuff of local legend.’ (Sherwin, 2013)   
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anthropomorphic paintings and assemblages in Escape the Esplanade similarly served to harness a ‘living 
presence  response’  from  their  spectators.  Van  Eyck  says  of  Gell’s  thesis  that  ‘it  offers  a  new  way  of 
understanding  living  presence  response  because  it  singles  out  precisely  that  aspect  of  the  interaction 
between works of art and their viewers that makes them similar to living beings: their agency, the power 
to influence their viewers, to make them act as if they are engaging, not with dead matter but with living 
persons’ (2010: 4). 
 
She goes on: ‘it is precisely the experience of a work of art that turns out to be alive, of the creeping 
awareness or sudden appearance of the inanimate as an animated, living being that defines living presence 
response,  making it resistant to any  form of scientific  explanation,  and at the same time profoundly 
unsettling’. (2010: 5) In reductive terms these types of responses are completely nonsensical as the viewer 
knows that works of art are made up of lifeless matter, just as idols and paintings are, and any reaction 
pertaining to a living form can only be mistaken, delusional, projection, or an expression of idolatry, 
fetishism, magical thinking or hysteria. However Van Eyck suggests that not all living presence responses 
are behavioural. She asserts that much of the time they are experiential: ‘Viewers react to works of art as if 
they are living and acting persons not because they have come alive for some miraculous or supernatural 
reason,  or  because  these  spectators  suffer  from  cognitive  or  semiotic  confusion  –  which  is  a  way  of 
redefining living presence response, but not of explaining it – but because they experience the work of art 
as living.’ (Van Eyck, 2010: 6) Although my paintings are not made in a faithfully representational style I 
nevertheless intend for them to have physiognomies like people. I intend them to stand in for humans. I 
intend their behaviour to stand in for human behaviour. As a consequence of these anthropomorphic 
qualities viewers to Escape the Esplanade also experienced them as ‘living’. On a number of occasions I 
overheard viewers referring to ‘those girls’ or ‘those guys in the alcove’. This was further compounded by 
the fact that it was ‘set’ on a street – and in this way the architecture of the space – as well as the objects in 
it further highlighted this experience. Also because the composition of the exhibition alluded to a social 
situation – where it was not a giant leap for the spectators to imagine themselves within that situation – a 
‘living presence response’ was further emphasised. 
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Fig. 52. Kate Hawkins, European (2013)  
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Fig. 53. Kate Hawkins, Black Tie Black Eye (2013) 
 
 
Leading on from this Gell explains that the inferential schemes (abductions) we bring to indexical signs 
are very like, if not actually identical to, the ones we bring to bear on social others. This is interesting in 
terms of social relations and is one way of defining Van Eyck’s ‘living presence response’ – in that, ‘like 
real living persons the works of art act upon the viewer; they exercise agency’ (Van Eyck, 2010: 7) This is 
perhaps  true  of  European ( 2 0 1 3 ) .  European i s  l i fe l i k e  i n  h i s  p r o p or t i o n s  a nd  h e ig h t.  A t 1  m e t r e  5 9  
centimetres he is shorter than your average male (he is male – we know this because of his facial hair and 
tie) but not by a huge distance. Although his component parts are semi-abstract, the manner in which 
they have been assembled very strongly suggests the physiognomy of a person. His body is an off-cut from 
our European
43 Walnut kitchen work-surface and his head a square canvas. This anthropomorphism is 
further emphasised by his tie, which operates as a linking mechanism, beginning at his chin and preceding 
vertically down his chest. It in turn bridges the canvas and the wood – acting in part like another hinge.  
European could conceivably be a social other. He even comes across as European, well maybe French or 
Italian, in his precision, attention to detail and poise. Black Tie Black Eye (2013) on the other hand is 
grounded in a much more British vulnerability. It is not clear whether this fellow has been punched in the 
eyes while out carousing in his tux and tails, whether he is tired, or just wearing glasses. Whichever 
applies, he is nevertheless flawed and fundamentally human: another social other. 
 
                                                         
43 The title of the work originated from this.  
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Thus it is possible to understand our reactions to these paintings or assemblages as part of a large complex 
of viewers’ responses in which art works are treated not as the inanimate objects they really are, but as 
living beings, whose presence is felt to be genuinely akin to that of a living being. Their social personas sit 
comfortably  within  Gell’s  nexus,  his  ‘network  of  social  relations’.  (Alfred  Gell,  1998:  6–7) T h i s  i s  
particularly significant in relation to my exhibition as a whole as the exhibition, to a greater extent than 
the previous two, was composed solely of a ‘network of social relations’. And these social relations were in 
every way as significant as the component indexes (the individual paintings).   
 
Their  significance  is  crucially  affected  by  the  relations  which  exist  between  them,  as 
individuals, and other members of the same category of artworks, and the relationships that 
exist  between  this  category  and  other  categories  of  artworks  within  a  stylistic  whole  – a 
culturally or historically specific art-production system. Artworks, in other words, come in 
families, lineages, tribes, whole populations, just like people. They have relations with one 
another as well as with the people who create and circulate them as individual objects. They 
marry, so to speak, and beget offspring which bear the stamp of their antecedents. Artworks 
are manifestations of “culture” as collective phenomenon, they are, like people, enculturated 
beings. (Gell, 1998: 153) 
 
Thus we can begin to understand how an anthropology of art, as opposed to a history or philosophy of 
art, within the context of my work and the current relational zeitgeist could lay the foundation for future 
discussions of spectatorship, modes of address and agency. Indeed Van Eyck proposes that the task of the 
anthropology of art is to ‘explain why social agents in particular contexts produce the responses they do to 
a particular work of art’. It is Gell’s stroke of genius to develop such an anthropology by replacing social 
agents with art objects. His anthropology of art is an anthropology of the agency of objects. (2010:7) 
 
Of course Gell’s is not a perfect argument – it is too reductive in parts, he doesn’t differentiate between 
religious and aesthetic experience, and many would argue (including van Eyck later on in her text) it is 
flawed with regards to its lack of historical dimension and narrow view of Western aesthetics. That said, it 
is the only theory of art that comes close to explaining the agency I am attempting to activate through my 
paintings  and  assemblages.  And along with  being  an  anthropological theory it is also a performative 
theory of art. And in that I deem it hugely significant.  
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3.6.  Conclusion 
 
In  all  of  the  above  ways  I  believe  that  exhibition  Escape  the  Esplanade  achieved  a  greater  degree  of 
performativity and consequent agency than either of the previous shows. In my mind it achieved this 
through a combination of reasons: the works’ capacity to ‘look back’, their hanging style, their visual 
transitions, the provision of context and their consequent sociality. All of the above operated in the form 
of an oscillation of agency – depending where you were in the space, on which artwork you were viewing 
at  which  moment.  Gell’s  insistence  on  viewing  a  work  of  art  as  technology  rather  than  an  object 
succumbing to its own aura is testament to this. In this manner an artwork can be understood as an active 
tool imbued with a capacity for action and consequent agency as opposed to a passive entity. And in the 
same vein we can begin to understand why, despite the paintings operating individually, they perhaps 
achieved greater performativity as a cohesive social whole – their sociality ultimately engendered agency. 
After all, according to Gell, ‘action’ cannot really be conceptualised in other than social terms. Below (Fig. 
54) is a hand-written note left, unexpectedly, by a gallery visitor to the exhibition in Margate. It reads: 
‘Dear Kate, I really love your cut-out eyes on opposing heads. The owl-face is wonderfully positioned as 
its eyes followed me round the room. Thank you for ‘making’ my trip to Margate. Best Wishes, Peter 
Gregory’. It is of course a slippery business trying to define whether an exhibition has been successful or 
not and in what terms – as Gell pointed out before in the context of the Western Philosophical debate 
pertaining to ‘intentional’ will vis a vis chance happening and the resulting (and undecided) inference of 
personhood – ‘success’ mostly remains elusively unquantifiable. However, I would argue here that the 
existence and content of this note goes some way to demonstrating the work’s agency and performative 
capacity. Its presence implies that through the work I was able to engender Peter Gregory (as a spectator) 
with agency: the works ‘made’ his trip to Margate and henceforth incited an action from him i.e. the 
writing of the note.   
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Fig. 54. Hand-written note by a gallery visitor, Escape the Esplanade, Margate (2013) 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
 Artistic practice is not only the result of the research, but also its methodological vehicle, when the research 
unfolds in and through the act of creating and performing. (Borgodoff, 2011: 46)  
 
This quote by Borgodoff, used previously in the methodology (p. 15), concisely encapsulates the thinking 
and processes behind the project as a whole – that there be a genuine reciprocity at all times between 
studio practice and the theoretical dimension. This was put into play repeatedly throughout the research 
but most fluently during the installation of the final exhibition Escape the Esplanade in Margate. Here, 
admittedly due in part to the difficulty of the space, the subjects of the works were essentially formed as 
the objects (the paintings and their supplements) and their installations took shape. Although the painted 
elements had already been made in the studio prior to installing the show, the final outcome of the works 
was not decided until the set up in the space itself. During the installation I was concerned with the 
interplay  between  the  paintings  and  their  intended  structures  or  supplements,  the  space  that  I  was 
constrained by and the relationship between the various works that I had in mind as a consequence of my 
prior research. The intention was to create an almost physical effect on my viewer i.e to incite them to 
walk in a particular direction, view some paintings as groups and others as individuals, observe some 
works from specific angles, become objects in the place of subjects etc. so that both subject and object 
were simultaneously created and performed. 
 
To answer my original question, this series of exhibitions has shown, with particular emphasis on the 
most recent two – The King of Hearts Has No Moustache and Escape the Esplanade, that painting can be 
performative without becoming theatrical in Michael Fried’s terms. The greater question lies in what this 
means for spectatorship and how did each of the exhibitions reshape the territory of spectatorship? 
 
My  Brother is a H a ir y  M a n,  with reference to Fried’s  terms ‘absorption’, ‘theatricality’  and ‘tableau’, 
reshaped the territory of spectatorship through a renegotiation and expansion of the term tableau. This 
meant  a  framework  was  put  in  place  from  which  the  spectator  could  be  ‘absorbed’  into  the  larger 
exhibition  environment  or  installation  as  a  whole.  Through  this  sense  of  unconscious  and  physical 
‘absorption’ theatricality could at one and the same time be negated in order that sincerity prevailed. Most 
significantly  this  broadening  of  tableau’s  parameters p a v e d  t h e  w a y  f o r  a  f u s i o n  o f  p a i n t i n g  a n d   
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performance resulting in a more performative painting practice, leading in turn, I would claim, to more 
performative spectatorship. Thus My Brother is a Hairy Man ‘looked towards’
44 performativity and its 
consequent agency. 
 
The second exhibition The King of Hearts Has No Moustache, helped reshape the territory of spectatorship 
through a sensitive negotiation of context and content. This was achieved through the introduction of a 
network of artworks that provided context, alongside the conceptual and performative content of the 
individual works themselves. In The King of Hearts Has No Moustache the greatest level of performativity 
was achieved through the works’ address to the spectator as individual rather than social collective. Thus 
the  beholder  was  invested  with  greater  agency  and  power  which  in  the  end  engendered  greater 
performativity. Performativity was also achieved through the use of industrial, manufactured,
45 supports as 
supplements to the paintings which bridged the gap between self-design and sincerity
46. The industrial 
supports also helped present the idea of a contemporary network of sorts: they were all imbued with 
perceptions of state-of-the-art, mass-produced technologies. Thus they belonged to a network, in Joselit’s 
terms,  but  ultimately  avoided  becoming one, in  Kester’s. The  King  of  Hearts Has  No  Moustache a l s o 
showed that painting has more potential to promote performativity when it acknowledges its conceptual 
and contextual networks as the paintings in the back space did. In the front room of the exhibition, 
performativity most often occurred on the level of the individual pieces where the paintings engaged the 
spectator on more of a one-to-one basis. For example the viewer of Be Yourself or Something Else, was not 
only  reflected  back  at  themselves  sporting  a  moustache  but  they  were  also  reflected  in  their  role  as 
spectator. They ‘looked’ at themselves ‘looking’. And in this moment of consciousness a new reality was 
produced – they moved from being unaware and passive spectators to visibly active agents. In the back 
space performativity more generally occurred on the level of the exhibition as a whole where the artworks 
functioned plurally, generating a many-to-one experience with the intention that the spectator became 
fully immersed in the installation. Painting has more potential to promote performative spectatorship 
when it is less concerned with addressing a network of spectators but rather an individual. In this manner 
it can evade open-ended process-privileged practices that ultimately engender apathy not empowerment. 
Thus through directly ‘looking at’
47 the spectator as an equal other, the paintings in The King of Hearts 
                                                         
44 This phrase is included in the heading of Chapter 1. 
45 Following My Brother is a Hairy Man, I felt the inclusion of a certain level of manufactured, machine-made material could actually aid sincerity 
and thus performativity (see the discussion on the Glaze gang, Chapter 1). 
46 This was not fully achieved by The Aesthetic Responsibility series of paintings in the 2011 exhibition My Brother is A Hairy Man. Ironically they 
did not take enough responsibility for their own aesthetic although the collaged Barbs did. 
47 This phrase is included in the heading of Chapter 2.  
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Has No Moustache concurrently commanded and brought about equal agency. 
 
In the final exhibition, Escape the Esplanade, a number of elements combined to instantiate ‘the act of 
performing’
48: the space itself, the thinking behind the paintings, the installation of the paintings and the 
physical interrelation between them. Certainly in the exhibition there were individual performatives in 
play such as with the work titled European. This hybrid balances a canvas on an off-cut of European 
Walnut kitchen work-top. It does not ‘describe’ a European – it remains too abstract in its forms to be a 
straightforward constative. It does however force the viewer to ‘act’ in conceptually linking the head of the 
painting to the body of wood through the provision of a visual clue: the green tie. The work moves from 
being a square painting on a rectangular slab of wood to something else i.e. an impression of a European 
and in this movement a transition of states occurs. These individual performatives occurred throughout 
many of the works in the show such as Black Tie Black Eye, Mary, Blue and Beheaded etc. but essentially 
the performative power of Escape the Esplanade lay in the recurring performances imbued in the artwork’s 
‘sociability’:  not  only  were  individual  performatives  taking  place  on  the  level  of  artwork/viewer  but 
performatives were also taking place amongst the artworks themselves as a consequence of their display 
and installation – as I mentioned earlier in relation to the girl gang comprised of Eloise, Being Seeing and 
Squiggle. Finally, many performatives occurred as a consequence of the exhibition space being imagined as 
a street and the exchange of roles between spectators and artwork that this motivated – repeatedly the 
spectators became protagonists and artworks spectators. In this way the spectators were ‘activated’ into a 
role of performer or ‘object’. 
 
In Escape the Esplanade, traditional ideas of spectatorship were addressed and restructured through the 
viewer becoming an integral element of the installation. Thus both the artwork and the spectator were 
activated in a performative and consequently prescribed agency. Directly this relates back to the definition 
of performativity and Butler’s assertion that a genuine performative act is never predetermined. In this 
way the exhibition achieved a greater degree of performativity and consequent agency than either of the 
previous shows. This was also in part due to the performatives inherent within the works, for example 
their  ability  to  ‘look  back’  at  the  spectator,  their  anthropomorphism,  their  tactics o f  d i s p l a y ,  t h e i r  
manifestation of visual transitions as well as their contextualization and sociability. It is this idea of the 
social that I return to again and again. If, as Gell claims, ‘action’ cannot really be conceptualised in other 
                                                         
48 Here I am revisiting an explanation of the performative outlined in the introduction (p.8): ‘Its meaning is not tied up with the content of a 
performance but the act of performing itself, where a transition of states occurs.’  
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than social terms, then it follows that despite the paintings’ capacity to operate independently through the 
generation of individual performatives, they conceivably achieved greater performativity  as a cohesive 
social whole. It was their collective sociality that ultimately engendered their agency.  In these terms they 
worked together as well as working with the spectator thus generating a symbiotic ‘pact’ of sorts. The 
paintings put faith in the spectator just as the spectator put faith in the paintings – in this way they were 
both granted agency, and also, if we return to Sartre for a moment and his proposition that our acts 
define us and our essential qualities’, identity. Thus agency is what makes us human and agency is also 
what makes painting artwork. Escape the Esplanade endeavoured to ‘look back’
49 at society together with 
the history of painting in a simultaneous attempt to move them both forward through the generation of a 
series of performatives and the consequent agency imbued within those ‘acts’.  
 
Going forward, potential future investigations suggested by this doctoral research might involve concepts 
briefly touched on but not yet fully explored. As outlined previously I consciously chose not to engage 
with ‘duration’ in this body of research despite it being a concept central to Fried’s arguments, particularly 
in Art and Objecthood (1967), and other positions on theatricality. However going into this next stage 
‘duration’  might  well  provide  fertile  ground  for  further  investigations  particularly  alongside  Brecht’s 
distancing  effect  as  discussed  briefly  in  relation  to  the  painting  The  Unnamable  (2013).  Brecht’s 
distancing  effect  is  premised  on  disrupting  the  audience  in  order  that  they  are  conscious  of  their 
perceptions rather than just unconsciously identifying with the characters in the play. In a sense this 
neatly follows the research to date and the active / passive responses that relate to performative versus 
theatrical spectatorship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
49 The parallel phrase ‘looking back’ is included in the heading of Chapter 3.  
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